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INTRODUCTION
Russia has become a very different country since it annexed Crimea 
three years ago. By breaching international law, its relations with 
the West are now fraught with tension, even in areas where there 
was once hope of cooperation. In a bid to reduce its dependence 
on Europe, Russia has touted its pivot to Asia and its Eurasian 
Economic Union, but those wheels have been slow to turn. Inside 
the country, three years of economic stagnation have followed 
that historic takeover of 2014. Sanctions are biting, and so are low 
global oil prices. Within the government bureaucracy itself, power 
struggles are underway: new ideologies and new faces are jostling 
for prominence.
The aim of this book is to provide an analysis of these trends 
providing a road map for anyone seeking to understand the workings 
of “post-Crimean” Russia. It includes studies of Russia–West 
relations, the role of sanctions, Western policy towards Ukraine, 
anti-Americanism, Russia’s military doctrine, the fate of its army’s 
modernization plans, migration, the increasing “weaponization” of 
history, and the government’s attempts to build a new “Crimean 
consensus” with Russian society, a reworked social contract 
emphasizing traditional values and a vastly different understanding 
of human rights to that in the West.
The authors of the book are experts from Germany, Poland, 
Russia and United Kingdom. Ulrich Speck, James Sherr, Ernest 
Wyciszkiewicz, Petr Bologov, Bartłomiej Gajos, Pavel Luzin, Tatiana 
Stanovaya, Ben Noble, Fabian Burkhardt, Vladislav Inozemtsev, 
Olga Gulina, Olesya Zakharova, Stepan Goncharov, Olga Irisova, 
Denis Volkov and Anton Barbashin are among the regular and ad 
hoc contributors to Intersection: Russia/Europe/World, an online 
publication on Russian foreign and domestic affairs. 
The Intersection is a new-generation online magazine that 
combines features of a think-tank, regional studies journal and an 
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online commentary outlet. Its goal is to provide in-depth analysis of 
political, economic, legal and social developments in Russia, and 
their regional, European and global ramifications. Launched in May 
2015, Intersection has featured more than 350 articles published in 
Russian and English, it has given voice to over a 100 experts, both 
established scholars as well as many aspiring voices from Russia, 
Ukraine, Europe and beyond. Founded and concieved by a team 
of Russian researchers, established and funded by the Centre for 
Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding, Intersection is run by 
an international team from Russia, Poland, Germany, the United 
States and the United Kingdom. This publication is the first printed 
book edited and co-authored by the Intersection team. 
 
The Intersection Editorial Team
1ULRICH SPECK
RUSSIA’S CHALLENGE  
TO THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Russia “is back“ on the international scene. But not as a “responsible 
stakeholder“ of the existing international system, as the West 
had hoped for years. Instead, Russia has become an increasingly 
aggressive power, using military force in Ukraine and Syria to 
advance its goals. By confronting the West in both these countries, 
Russia has boxed itself back into the global super league of powers.
A few years ago, there was a consensus among observers that 
the U.S. and China have become the two most powerful countries; 
experts talked about a world run by the “G2.“ Today many see the 
world more in terms of a G3. For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
a leading American strategic thinker, talks about the United States, 
China and Russia as “the three principal shareholders of global 
power.“1
Surprisingly, Russia’s rise into the top league of powers 
happened at a time when Russia was in economic decline. Today 
Russia is only the 12th biggest economy in the world, featuring 
between Korea and Australia. Its GDP for 2016 is projected at 
$1,267 billion. For the U.S., it’s 18,561 billion; for China, 11,391; 
Germany, 3,494.2 The Russian economy has not diversified; it 
1 Zbigniew Brzezinski’s interview to Huffington Post on 23 December 2016, 
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/zbigniew-brzezinski-america-influence-china_
us_585d8545e4b0d9a594584a37.
2 Nominal GDP, cf. http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-
gdp.php, referring to World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016.
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remains overwhelmingly dependent on the extraction of natural 
resources, with the help of Western technology.
How can this disjunction between economic means and 
foreign policy ambitions be explained? Why is Russia so keen to 
play in a league with two countries whose economy is many times 
bigger; why is it not trying to find its place among mid-sized powers 
such as France, Britain, Japan and Germany? In other words, what 
is driving Russian foreign policy?
THE “REALIST“ INTERPRETATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
A standard explanation is “wounded pride.“ According to this view, 
Russia is first and foremost a “proud“ country that has been hit hard 
by the loss of empire and influence since the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. It is craving for status and recognition. But the West has not 
accommodated those needs and aspirations. Instead it has enlarged 
NATO and constantly “humiliated“ Russia. U.S. president Barack 
Obama’s remark about Russia as a “regional power“ is often cited 
as proof for the alleged disrespectful treatment. This interpretation 
of Russian foreign policy cites the speeches of Russian president 
Vladimir Putin, who is regularly attacking America as the power 
that dominates the world and denies other powers their proper 
status.
An important proponent of this view is one of the leading 
thinkers of the “realist“ school in foreign policy, the academic John 
J. Mearsheimer. According to him, Russia is just behaving the way 
great powers do: “Putin’s pushback [in Ukraine] should have come 
as no surprise. After all, the West has been moving into Russia’s 
backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin 
made emphatically and repeatedly.“3 For many foreign policy 
“realists,“ it is obvious what Russia wants: being recognized as 
a “great power,“ with a “sphere of influence“—or “backyard“—and 
a seat on table when it comes to major global decisions.
3 J.J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs, 
18 August 2014, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault.
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It often follows from this analysis, implicitly or explicitly, that 
the way forward it to give Russia what it wants. As a “satisfied“ 
power, Russia would not anymore challenge the status quo; instead 
it would contribute to the greater common good and partner with 
other countries where their interests converge. A Russia that 
is globally respected, and can freely dominate its “backyard,“ 
would be a constructive partner for America and share with it the 
burden of global governance—such as non-proliferation—and the 
stabilization of unruly regions such as the Middle East.
While the “realist“ interpretation of Russian behavior is 
consistent in itself, and consistent with the theory of realism, it fails 
to properly identify the drivers of Russian foreign policy. Russian 
foreign policy comes wrapped into the language of “realism.” But 
the way Russia is acting is not consistent with classical great power 
politics.
If Russia’s aim would be to become a truly great power, 
the Russian regime would focus on building the domestic and 
international foundations for such a role—the way China does. It 
would first and foremost seek to reform its economy, in order to 
have the material resources for the projection of power, in a world 
where economic power is at least as crucial as military power.
Secondly, Russia would try to build a system of friendships 
and alliances. The history of the state system in Europe until the 
World War II is first and foremost a history of treaties and alliances. 
Today Russia is isolated in Europe and no longer a member of 
the G7. China is not treating Russia as a true ally; it looks down 
on Russia as a second-rate power. Neither the Shanghai Treaty 
Organization nor the BRICS have turned into true alliances. In 
its “near abroad,” in the post-Soviet space, Russia has alienated 
many potential allies. And its closest partners—mainly Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Armenia—regularly demonstrate deep unease with 
Russia’s aggressive foreign policy.
The only relevant power resource Russia has, in order to back 
up its huge international ambition, is military power, especially 
nuclear power. When it comes to the number of nuclear warheads, 
Russia is on eye level with the United States. It is therefore not 
surprising that Moscow is keen to use this power resource to 
advance its goal. Nuclear intimidation has been at the center of 
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Russia’s strategy in its confrontation with the West over the last few 
years. Fear of an accidental escalation has grown in Europe; and 
under Obama America has been keen not to be drawn into a proxy 
war with Russia in Ukraine and Syria.
ACCOMMODATING RUSSIA IS NOT GOING TO WORK
The “realist“ view of Russia as a “great power” is not only 
analytically unconvincing. It is also leading to problematic policy 
recommendations. For “realists,“ accepting a Russian sphere of 
influence is the way ahead. The West should make clear to Russia 
that NATO and EU are not going to be enlarged further east. It 
should accommodate Russia by accepting that the post-Soviet 
space (minus the Baltic countries) is the sphere of Russian influence, 
and not challenge Russia there.
Such an approach however is not just inconsistent with the 
UN system based on state sovereignty. It is also not going to lead to 
better Western relations with Russia for a number of reasons. 
First, it has not worked in the past. Accommodation of Russia 
has been, de facto, the policy the West has pursued from the break-
up of the Soviet Union 1991 until 2014 when the West reacted to 
Russian aggression against Ukraine with sanctions.4 Out of all the 
successor states of the Soviet Union, only Russia got the West’s real 
attention. Russia’s claim to inherit the UN Security Council Seat 
from the Soviet Union and its nuclear weapons has been supported 
by the West. America and Europe have put their hopes on a strong 
Russia that would transform into a liberal democracy and a market 
economy over time. The West has not objected to Russia’s use 
of military force in the post-Soviet space as a tool to keep other 
countries unstable and dependent on Moscow (especially Moldova 
and Georgia). American and European leaders have seen Russia as 
4 On the Ukraine conflict see: U. Speck, The West’s Response to the Ukraine 
Conflict: A Transatlantic Success Story, Transatlantic Academy, April 2016, 
www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/west%E2%80%99s-response-
ukraine-conlict-transatlantic-success-story.
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the key partner and interlocutor, accepting Moscow’s view of the 
“near abroad“ as a sphere of influence, or better, sphere of control. 
This approach has failed, not because of Western meddling but 
because of Russia’s inability to produce a stable environment. The 
way Russia has exerted influence in the post-Soviet space—through 
intimidation, use of military power, support for corrupt leaders—
has provoked resistance. Russian influence has been, in Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, a major obstacle to economic and 
political modernization. Reformers in these countries turned to the 
West for help: to counterbalance Russian influence and to support 
their reform agendas.
In other words, the conflicts between Russia and post-Soviet 
countries are homegrown. They are not going to disappear if the 
West decides to abandon the approach of limited engagement it has 
pursued with reform-minded countries in the post-Soviet space. If 
the West cuts those relationships in order to accommodate Russia, 
the result is likely to be more conflict and desperation in those 
countries, leading either to more war or emigration; certainly not 
to stability.
The second reason why accommodation is not going to work 
is that it would probably not lead to satisfaction but to even more 
hunger. Instead of becoming a reliable, constructive partner, Russia 
would likely double down on its attempts to gain more influence 
abroad using coercion and subversion, pushing back against 
Western influence. If the West accepts the claim of an overall very 
weak Russia to global pre-eminence, it strengthens those forces 
in Russia who want to reverse history and restore further imperial 
glory.
Russia is a former empire that is looking for a role. If the only 
role it can conceive of is an imperial one, then it is a revisionist 
threat to its neighbors. Empires don’t have borders, unlike nation 
states. But for European stability, it is key that Russia starts to accept 
the reality of borders in the post-Soviet space: the fact that Russia 
is only one of 15 successor states of the Soviet Union, and that the 
other 14 are equally sovereign and should be treated as such.
Stability in the post-Soviet space is only going to be available 
if Russia buries its former imperial self, accepts the current borders 
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and starts treating neighbors as equals. Russia is not the first country 
that went through such a painful transformation from imperial 
grandeur to the identity of a nation-state, indeed many European 
countries did: Turkey, Austria, France, Spain and Britain did, among 
others.
The third reason why accommodation is not going to work is 
that Russia can only project the image of a leading global power as 
long as it acts as a spoiler. Without a solid economic background, 
without much soft power and without real friends and allies, Russia 
is not in a position to play a constructive role, to build and shape 
order. It lacks the economic tools of statecraft, and it remains very 
vulnerable itself to economic pressure. Only as an aggressive, 
confrontational player that is disrupting the designs of others, 
Russia can stay on the top of the international game.
But the fourth reason is by far the most important one: 
Russia’s great power ambition is just the ideological surface of 
the operation. What is really driving Russian foreign policy is the 
fight of the regime for survival. It is this fight that is pushing Russia 
towards an endless conflict with the West. The dangerous enemy 
against which the Kremlin is fighting is democratic contagion.
WHAT IS THE RUSSIAN STRATEGY?
Russian foreign policy is the external dimension of a broader regime 
survival strategy. The goal is to keep the current elites in power, 
with Putin on the top. And the main threat is the democratization 
of Russia.
It is a fear that is not unfounded. Putin has seen many 
autocratic regimes fall: in Central Europe, in Eastern Europe, in the 
Middle East. He was in Dresden as a KGB agent when the East-
German regime broke down. And with the “Colored Revolutions“ 
in Georgia and Ukraine, the threat of democratic revolution came 
closer to Russia. With the anti-Putin protest in Moscow in December 
2011, the wave reached Russia itself.
There are several dimensions to the Kremlin’s strategy of 
regime preservation. At a basic level, it tries to protect Russia from 
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democratic “contagion,“ through the control of the political system 
and of the flows of information. As a country that depends on 
economic and technological exchange with the West, and whose 
elites like to move in and out of the country, Russia however cannot 
simply close the borders. Unlike in Soviet times, control cannot be 
done in this sort of totalitarian manner. That is why Putin has put 
in place a more sophisticated system, keeping up the impression of 
a certain amount of openness.
On a second level, the strategy of regime preservation is about 
building a “cordon sanitaire.“ If a major post-Soviet state becomes 
a successful liberal democracy, then the risk of contagion would 
be high. In the Kremlin’s view, Russia’s neighbors must remain 
part of the autocratic sphere. Only decisive Russian influence can 
guarantee that.
Thirdly, the strategy is about weakening the West. Putin 
appears to see the spread of democracy not as a bottom-up 
movement but as a sophisticated Western, primarily American, 
operation to undermine his rule. He has regularly made clear that 
he sees Western NGOs and politicians as the main driving forces 
behind democratic uprisings in the post-Soviet space. A weak, 
divided West that is unwilling and unable to stand in the way of 
Russian foreign policy designs is one of the Kremlin’s goals. The 
way to get there is a) to strengthen pro-Kremlin politicians in the 
West; b) to weaken transatlantic cooperation; and c) to undermine 
the EU’s attempts to build a joint foreign policy.
The fourth dimension of this strategy is to reverse the 
global trend towards democracy, or “to make the world safe“ for 
autocracy. By keeping the Syrian dictator Assad in office, after U.S. 
president Obama said he “must go“ Putin wanted to demonstrate 
that Western democracy promotion is no longer working, and that 
Russia is a reliable patron for autocrats that want to stay in power. 
The new world order Russia would like to see is one in which 
autocracy is a legitimate, unchallenged form of governance.
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HOW TO DEAL WITH PUTIN’S RUSSIA
The assumption of the “realist“ approach is that by granting Russia 
the status of a great power and accepting its claim to a sphere 
of influence, Russia can be turned into a partner of the West, 
a “responsible“ stakeholder in the liberal international order, 
regardless of the nature of its regime. The argument made here 
is that the nature of the regime is crucial to its foreign policy: it is 
the insecurity of the ruling elites that is forcing Putin to pursue an 
aggressive foreign policy aimed at keeping the threat of democratic 
change at bay.
If regime survival is indeed the driving force, and if the fight 
against democracy is the key rationale behind Russian foreign 
policy, then it is impossible to appease, accommodate or satisfy the 
Kremlin by accepting a Russian sphere of influence and treating the 
country as a global power. The fight against democratic change is 
a much bigger operation which puts Russia at odds with the West 
not for what the West does, but for what it is.
For the Russian regime, the West remains toxic, as Europe 
and America continue, through their very existence, to demonstrate 
the superiority of liberal democracy and a market economy over 
autocracy and a state-controlled economy. Undermining and 
weakening Western strength and its ability to push back on Russian 
aggression—this is what will remain at the center of Russian foreign 
policy. And given the fact that the only true power resource Russia 
has is military power, including nuclear power, the relationship is 
going to remain tense and difficult. A “cold peace,“ peaceful co-
existence, with Russia seems to be the best option available.5
In other words, Europe and the U.S. must play the long game. 
Their best bet is to be firm and united, and to send clear messages 
to Moscow about the West’s red lines: credible security guarantees 
for NATO partners, and the threat of further sanctions in case 
Russia decides to further move into the territory of Ukraine and 
Georgia. Europe and the U.S. should continue to make the case for 
5 U. Speck, A Cold Peace with Russia, Carnegie Europe, December 2014, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/12/09/eu-must-prepare-for-cold-peace-with-russia-
pub-57443.
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the liberal international order and reject the principle of spheres of 
influence. And they should keep the door open for EU and NATO 
membership in principle. Officially denying such a perspective 
would be tantamount to denying them full sovereignty, something 
they have according to the UN charter. At the same time they 
should signal to Moscow that the West is ready to cooperate in 
a transactional manner, case-to-case, and signal to the Russian 
people that the West is not anti-Russian.
In other words, the West’s response to Russian aggression 
against Ukraine is a good template. The main challenge remains to 
stay the course: to work in a united manner, to stay firm and calm, 
and to set clear conditions for the Russian side. Russia needs the 
West more than the other way around. If there is no European and 
transatlantic unity and determination, however, the Kremlin can 
advance an agenda that is not producing stability but undermining 
the liberal order.
Dr. Ulrich Speck is a senior research fellow at the Brussels office of 
the Elcano Royal Institute. In 2015–2016, he was a senior fellow at 
the Transatlantic Academy (GMF) in Washington DC. From 2013 to 
2015 Speck was a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels and 
a foreign policy columnist for Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 

2JAMES SHERR
A DUBIOUS SUCCESS: THE WEST’S POLICY  
TOWARDS UKRAINE AFTER CRIMEA
In March 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea provoked 
a comprehensive and far-reaching reorientation of Western policy. 
From the end of the Cold War until that point, policy towards 
Russia had been governed by a paradigm of “partnership” that 
came increasingly under strain. In some domains, notably defence, 
intelligence and counter-intelligence, a paradigm shift had begun 
unobtrusively years before “polite little people” appeared in 
Simferopol. But upon Crimea’s annexation, the shift became official.
Then and since, it often has appeared that Western policy 
towards Ukraine is more influenced by Russia than by Ukraine itself. 
This is because, in the words of France’s Permanent Representative 
to the UN following Crimea’s annexation, Russia by its actions 
had “vetoed the Charter of the United Nations.”1 Even in the days 
when Russia’s war in Ukraine was mainly a war of stealth, the West 
grasped what it failed to perceive after Russia’s invasion of Georgia 
in 2008: that by attacking its neighbour, Russia was attacking the 
security order of Europe as a whole.2 Since 1991 Russia had served 
as an enabler of—and impediment to—the West’s Ukraine policy. 
1 15 March 2014—Security Council—Ukraine—Statement by Mr. Gérard Araud, 
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, www.franceonu.org/ 
15-March-2014-Security-Council. 
2 In the words of the Wales Summit Declaration of NATO, “Russia’s aggressive 
actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe 
whole, free, and at peace,” 5 September 2014, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
official_texts_112964.htm.
James Sherr20
Paradoxically, after Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity,” the Russian 
factor became even more important than it was before.
Although the West’s focus on Russia has corralled more unity 
with regard to Ukraine than might otherwise have been the case, it 
is an infirm foundation for Ukraine’s own security, not to say its long 
expressed aspiration to be “a full member of the European family 
of civilised nations.”3 For one thing, it compensates but cannot 
substitute for Western confidence in Ukraine’s determination to 
confront its own serious problems. For another, it leaves Western 
support perilously hostage to Russia’s policy and the West’s own 
image of it. Three years after Russia launched its so-called hybrid 
war in Crimea and Donbas, these events are no longer a horrifying 
novelty. They are a wearisome and deceptively stable set of facts 
that can be cast into the shadows by others, scarcely foreseen 
several years ago: ISIS, refugee crises, the disunity of Europe and 
the advent of Donald Trump.
These concerns do not diminish the fact that in 2014, the 
West displayed a quality that for much of the post-Cold War era 
it lacked: clarity. As Angela Merkel declared in especially resolute 
form:
Old thinking in spheres of influence [and] the trampling 
of international law will not succeed … [Such a policy 
will be opposed] no matter how long it will take, however 
difficult this might be and however many setbacks it might 
bring.4
Nevertheless, clarity and resolution have yet to triumph. 
Whilst Western policy has been more cohesive than many 
expected, it has neither been coercive nor compelling. Political 
rivalry, financial interest, disillusionment and fatigue can dissipate 
the forces mobilised by geopolitical threats. But nothing is more 
harmful to a battle plan than misjudgement of the opponent. 
Fortitude and timidity, wisdom and misjudgement can be seen 
across every dimension of Western policy: diplomacy, sanctions, 
economic support and military assistance.
3 V. Horbulin, “Ukraine’s Place in Today’s Europe,” Politics and the Times, 
October–December 1995, p. 15.
4 Comments following the November 2014 G20 summit. 
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POLICY
The events of 2014 forced the West to confront what it knew and 
long pretended not to know. Over many years, Russia had come 
to define its interests in opposition to the post-Cold War security 
order and the Helsinki principles underpinning it. Since the Russia- 
Georgia war of 2008, neither Russian revisionism nor its ability to 
seize the initiative should have been in doubt. Then and since the 
key questions have been: what influence can the West exert on 
a Russian state oblivious of Western disapproval, determined to 
advance its own interests and willing to pay a high price for doing 
so? What leverage does the West possess in a zone of perceived 
advantage to Russia?
Before 2014, these questions were largely sidestepped. The 
Obama “reset” proceeded as if worthy agreements of importance to 
the United States would diminish Russia’s grievances and the threat 
they posed. The EU’s Eastern Partnership offered opportunities to 
countries vulnerable to Russia, whilst ignoring Russia. Warnings 
that the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius is “likely to resemble 
the [NATO] Bucharest summit of 2008” in its consequences had 
little impact.5
Since 2014, these questions have been addressed, but with 
insufficient realism and rigour. The West’s initial aims were bold 
and unequivocal. The first was to bring Russia back into compliance 
with international law and restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. The second was to protect NATO’s eastern 
allies from the “hybrid” threats that had befallen Ukraine. But the 
means to these ends have fallen short of the challenge: sanctions 
(introduced in March 2014 and progressively strengthened) and 
enhanced “assurance” and “adaptation measures” codified in 
NATO’s Newport summit of September 2014. 
For a time, the hope that these means would prove effective 
was understandable. Whilst not dire in themselves, sanctions 
were bad news for an economy with chronic and unaddressed 
5 J. Sherr, Ukraine and Europe: Final Decision?, Russia and Eurasia 2013/05, 
Chatham House, July 2013, p. 12.
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structural problems and precariously dependent on falling oil 
prices ($59 a barrel end 2014, $40 a barrel end 2015).6 Moreover, 
Ukraine had displayed an astonishing resilience. By 1 July, its 
newly formed and largely volunteer “anti-terrorist” units regained 
control of 23 out of 36 districts seized by the insurgents. But in late 
summer 2014, perceptions dramatically shifted, as did the baseline 
of Western policy.
DIPLOMACY
Until Russia threw its conventional forces into the scales in 
August 2014, Western diplomacy was in the background, though 
far from idle. Its aims were to assist in the formation of a unified 
Western response and impress upon Russia the West’s resolve 
and seriousness. Whilst the charges of “isolating Russia” and 
“abandoning dialogue” were belied by the high level discussions 
that did take place, their purpose was to discern, clarify and warn, 
not to negotiate or compromise. This abruptly changed after the 
Russian military offensives of August 2014 and January 2015, 
the immediate consequences of which were, respectively, the 
Protocol on the Results of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact 
Group (Minsk-I, 5 September) and the Package of Measures for 
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements (Minsk-II, 15 February), 
both negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE. From that point 
onwards, diplomacy moved into the foreground, and there it has 
remained.
The Minsk accords were the product of military coercion and 
information war. The January offensive, accompanied by threats 
of still greater escalation was a shock to the metabolism of those 
in Berlin adamant that there could be no “military solution” to 
the conflict. Minsk-II was negotiated without proper consultation 
with allies, without military input (on the Western side) and with 
precipitate haste. It was a bad agreement, ridden with provisions 
6 For a comprehensive and measured assessment of the state of Russia’s 
economy under sanctions, see P. Hanson, “An Enfeebled Economy,” in: The 
Russian Challenge, Chatham House Report, June 2015, pp. 14–22.
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that were ambiguous, abstruse and, on the basis of the sole official 
Russian text, exploited to advance Russia’s vision of how the 
conflict should be solved.
Minsk-II in particular committed the parties to a settlement 
that would compromise Ukraine’s prerogatives as a sovereign 
state. A Russian installed leadership, backed by what the first 
defence minister of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” described as 
“brigades of gangsters” had been placed on a par with Ukraine’s 
state authorities.7 Ukraine was now obliged to devise provisions 
for local elections and “special status” in coordination/accord 
[soglasovanie] with the representatives of the “separate districts” 
[otdelnyye rayony] of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts [hereafter 
ORDLO], who control 4% of Ukraine’s territory.8 The special 
status provisions are to be based on Ukraine’s Law on Interim Self-
Government (Point 4), but also must accord with the provisions 
of Point 11, Footnote 1, including far-reaching autonomy, along 
with the right to independent relations with contiguous Russian 
regions.9 Instead of the “de-centralisation” put forward by Kyiv, the 
republics demand, under the guise of “federalisation,” a veto over 
Ukraine’s foreign policy.10
From the time the Western Normandy partners (France and 
Germany) signed the accord and the USA endorsed it, the aim of 
Western policy ceased to be restoration of the status quo ante. It 
became the implementation of Minsk. Even from this new baseline, 
the West’s negotiating record has fallen short of the challenge 
confronting it.
Whereas Russia has been determined to impose its own 
interpretation of the Minsk provisions, the West has not pressed 
its advantage where it exists. Minsk calls for a process of accord 
7 I. Strelkov, “Eto vse, na chto vy sposobny?,” Vzglyad, 18 May 2014, www.vz.ru/
world/2014/5/18/687251.html and www.youtube.com/watch?v=-T68YLCV0HA.
8 Most English translations of the accord (none of which have official status) 
dubiously translate soglasovanie as “agreement,” but unlike soglashenie (the more 
traditional term) soglasovanie implies a joint process, not just a result. 
9 The Minsk accords accurately refer to the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s 
Republics as “Separate [or ‘certain’] Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts” 
[Otdelnyye rayony Donetskoy i Luhanskoy oblastey].
10 K. Sazonov, Boyeviki ozvuchili trebovania. Na Minske mozhno postavit’ 
tochku, 28 January 2016, http://glavcom.ua/articles/37520.html. 
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with the republics but does not require Kyiv to accept their 
diktat. It is silent about what should occur if there is no accord. 
“Federalisation” is not mentioned in the text. Minsk allows properly 
elected leaders in the ORDLO to maintain “militia” [militsia], the 
Russian term for normal police, but it does not license the current 
unelected authorities to maintain opolchenie, the militarised 
“militias” presently waging war on Ukraine. The Ukrainians do not 
violate the accord by standing firm on these points or any demand 
beyond the Minsk provisions. Instead of standing firm with them, 
the West meekly calls for progress from “both sides.”
The West has not extracted advantage from those aspects of 
Minsk that brook no ambiguity in interpretation: complete cease-
fire, unrestricted access of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission 
and (following OSCE supervised elections) “reinstatement of full 
control of the state border by the government of Ukraine” (Point 9). 
When Putin’s representative, Vladislav Surkov, informed U.S. 
Under-Secretary of State Victoria Nuland in January 2016 that 
Russia would countenance only a cosmetic implementation of 
the Minsk border provisions, the U.S. had every reason to issue 
a formal démarche. Instead, Nuland was obliged to pursue further 
discussions and advertise the determination of the White House 
to see elections held in the ORDLO before President Obama left 
office.11
More than once, the West has drawn lines and moved them. 
After Ukraine passed the first reading of its constitutional reform 
in July 2015, Nuland stated that Ukraine had “done its job” and 
assured Kyiv “there would be no excuses on the other side for 
renewed violence.”12 When Russia sharply escalated attacks in 
November 2015 one month after re-committing itself to a full cease-
fire, the Western powers protested, but discussions then resumed in 
the Normandy format as if nothing had happened.13 
11 V. Socor, “Surkov-Nuland Talks on Ukraine: A Non-Transparent Channel,” 
Parts 1 and 2, Eurasia Daily Monitor 13, no. 103, 26 May 2016.
12 Kyiv Press Conference, 16 July 2015, http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/statements/
nuland-07162015.html.
13 “Parizhskie Soglasheniya. O chem dogovorilis’ Poroshenko i Putin,” 
LigaNovosti, 3 October 2015, http://news.liga.net/articles/politics/6785404-
parizhskie_soglasheniya_o_chem_dogovorilis_poroshenko_i_putin.htm.
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Over the past two years, Washington, Paris and Berlin have 
embraced as their own the Minsk process that Russia forced upon 
them. “Implementation of Minsk” has become a piety that no 
one dare question irrespective of its evident flaws. Most Western 
governments are aware that Moscow does not view autonomy 
for the ORDLO as an end in itself, but as a means of pressure 
on Ukraine. Yet they incongruously act as if Russia will respect 
Ukraine’s (residual) sovereignty once such autonomy is conceded. 
It is indeed possible that if the Minsk process collapsed, the risk of 
a wider conflict would be greater than it is today. Demonstrations 
of risk-aversion and restlessness do not diminish this risk, which 
arises not because of the merits of Minsk but the limitations that the 
West has placed upon itself.
SANCTIONS
It is scarcely the fault of the U.S. Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, 
Daniel Freed, his team of State and Treasury Department experts 
and their counterparts in the European Commission that sanctions 
form the only coercive component of Western policy. In the current 
conflict as in the wider scheme of things, four factors determine the 
effectiveness of sanctions: the adequacy of their design, the unity of 
action underpinning them, their duration and their integration with 
other instruments of policy.
The West’s sanctions are both considered and coherent. 
Neither templated nor generic, they have been crafted by those 
who understand the particularities of Russia’s political system 
and its economy. It is understood that sanctions place further 
burdens on the dysfunctionalities of this economy rather than take 
precedence over the ills that Russia has imposed upon itself. In the 
enhanced format adopted in September 2014 (Tier 3), the sanctions 
encompass “restrictive measures” (asset freezes and travel bans) 
as well as “economic” measures (restrictions on access to capital 
markets and dual-use technology transfer).14 The separate package 
of sanctions on Crimea, which can be ramped up at a time of the 
14 Europa, https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions_en.
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West’s choosing, also encompasses asset freezes, travel bans, as 
well as prohibitions on investment, travel and contact. According to 
some experts, as many as 800 Russian weapons systems depend to 
some degree on Western components, a number of which are now 
subject to restriction. Energy projects reliant on advanced Western 
technology are now off the table. Circumvention of these sanctions 
by means of import substitution (well in evidence) does not in itself 
nullify the potency of the sanctions if they impose diseconomies on 
Russia. Russia’s counter-sanctions (e.g. on Western food exports) 
add to Russia’s losses, even if political benefit is derived from 
persuading Russian consumers that these are Western sanctions 
rather than Russian own goals. Although sanctions appear to have 
stimulated necessary economic reforms in limited areas, their 
overall impact is damaging even if, for a finite period of time, 
bearable.
The biggest threat to Western unity (which has survived 
repeated forecasts of its demise) would be the defection of one 
or more significant parties from the sanctions regime. A unified 
response is reinforced de facto by collateral effects, notably the 
assessment by international investors that Russia constitutes an 
investment risk, even outside currently restricted domains. But 
unity also can be threatened in insidious ways. Whereas many 
international companies refrained from attending investment 
conferences in Russia in 2015, an upturn occurred in 2016, including 
an ill-judged appearance by then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon. Several companies have been inventively circumventing the 
Crimea sanctions package and have done so with some degree of 
success. For all this, it is political changes in the EU and USA that 
constitute the biggest risk to the unity of the sanctions regime. Dire 
forecasts, not to say certainties on this point are premature.
Inseparable from the issue of unity is the issue of duration. 
The impact of sanctions is necessarily cumulative, and this certainly 
is true of those that neither strangle nor decapitate. Yet Western 
“common sense” continues to prevail over experience about the 
tenacity of Putin’s Russia, its willingness to shrug off Western 
opprobrium, tolerate penalties and raise the stakes in the face of 
warnings and risk. Scheduled reviews of the sanctions package 
at six-monthly intervals inform Russia that the West’s patience is 
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short compared to Russia’s own. Without a long game against this 
opponent, there is no game that can be won.
Yet the greatest handicap to sanctions is the expectation that 
they should carry the burden alone. That they are an asymmetrical 
response to Russia’s use of force is no demerit in itself. After all, 
the asymmetrical response is Russia’s method of choice, and it has 
been used to telling effect. Nevertheless, one cannot combat an 
armed assailant by robbing his bank account, not least when he has 
put his arms to use and is poised to use them again.
ECONOMIC SUPPORT
Economic support of Ukraine is not a response to Russian 
aggression. It has been a mainstay of Western policy from the time 
Ukraine joined the IMF in September 1992.15 Its enhancement 
since 2014 has not been stimulated by Russia for the most part but 
by the change of power in Ukraine and the expectations aroused by 
the Revolution of Dignity in the West.
Much as Ukrainians are loath to hear it, this is as it should 
be. Whatever the threat to Ukraine, money has to be spent where 
it will deliver results. An unreformed and unreformable state will 
not do so. Money wasted earns no friends in Western capitals and 
does no good to those Ukrainians who do the fighting and have 
to live with its consequences. The exception to this maxim proves 
the rule. Ukraine has received and properly utilised IMF assistance 
to shore up macro-economic stability, and it is precisely in this 
sphere that Ukraine has performed competently and to the benefit 
of the country. The IMF has been right to withhold disbursements 
of the current Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in other spheres where 
Ukraine has promised but not delivered.
At the same time, the IMF and other Western donors, in short 
the EU and USA, need to broaden their perspective. First, they need 
to remind themselves that the principles the West is defending are not 
15 A “systemic transformation facility” was established in October 1994 and the 
IMF’s first three-year Extended Fund Facility in September 1998, www.imf.org/
external/country/UKR/index.htm?pn=0.
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contingent on maintaining Euro-Atlantic standards of governance. 
Neither the UN Charter, the Paris Charter of 1990, the Budapest 
Memorandum of 1994 nor the other agreements that concluded 
the Cold War hold the rights of sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
freedom of choice to this standard. They are rights deemed inherent 
by virtue of UN and OSCE membership. By comparison with other 
OSCE member states in the former USSR, Ukraine is more Euro-
Atlantic in its ethos and performance than most.
Second, they need to absorb a dosage of self-criticism and 
humility. Very few outside experts, let alone entities, have produced 
a practical programme for reforming, i.e. transforming Ukraine. 
Most reform programmes present a picture of what Ukraine should 
look like after systematic reform takes place. The reality is that, 
whatever President Poroshenko’s shortcomings, he is a weak 
monarch in a feudal system whose real authorities are business 
oligarchs. Even if he were a disciple of Christine Lagarde and not 
the product of this deformed system, he would lack the authority 
and instruments required to meet all of the IMF’s expectations. Even 
Vladimir Putin, the strong monarch in a stronger feudal system, 
would not have the power to do so. The issue is not what should 
be done in Ukraine, but how it is to be done given the powers, 
the people and the mindsets that actually exist. Such a programme 
needs to be produced, and it will be a sobering and humbling task 
if it is done.
Moreover, the West should not forget that Ukraine is 
fighting a vicious war against a nuclear power. Despite this, it has 
undertaken several praiseworthy reforms, albeit few that lessen the 
idiocies and iniquities that beset ordinary people dependent on the 
state or determined to be free of it. The strength of Ukraine lies in 
its alternative state, its so-called civil society, whose motif is “we 
rely only upon ourselves.” It is in this domain that Russia is weak. 
In Ukraine, it is the state that is weak, but as three years of war have 
shown, the country is strong, and it deserves the West’s support.
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Since the fall of Viktor Yanukovych, force and the threat of force 
have been Russia’s principal means of imposing its will on Ukraine 
and its Western supporters. The Russians are fighting not because 
they love fighting but in order to achieve specific political ends: to 
undermine Ukraine, to undermine confidence in Ukraine and to 
secure a formal agreement that would neutralise Ukraine, fragment 
it and subordinate it to Russia. If force is Russia’s most effective 
tool, then the tool has to be devalued and ultimately neutralised.
As we have already argued, sanctions are neither a sufficient 
nor a timely answer to this problem. The strengthening of 
deterrence on Ukraine’s Eastern border is an answer to a different 
problem. Russia’s military instrument will remain both dangerous 
and credible until a system of containment and deterrence is 
constructed inside Ukraine. The aims of such a system should be: 
to constrain rather than defeat Russia and its separatist allies, to 
reinforce Ukraine’s capacity for self-defence, to diminish incentives 
for military action, to underscore the unviability of the separatist 
enclaves and to increase incentives for diplomacy on terms 
consistent with Ukrainian interests. In operational terms, Ukraine’s 
forces must be able to slow down the battlefield and impose risks 
and costs on the attacker inconsistent with his political objectives.
This goal is eminently realisable, and already is on the 
way to being realised. The Russian battle groups that intervened 
decisively in August 2014 and January 2015 possess formidable 
capability. But they also are designed for specific purposes. 
They are not occupation forces. They strike and withdraw. They 
lack the numbers and infrastructure to invade and hold most of 
the country. Even the establishment of a land bridge to Crimea 
is problematic. Since the devastating offensive of January 2015, 
Ukraine’s armed forces and National Guard units have acquired 
considerable proficiency and hard capability. In the recent six-day 
engagement surrounding Avdeyevka, Ukraine outmanoeuvred and 
defeated a Russian-commanded separatist force despite the latter’s 
considerable advantage in artillery. It is likely that a replay of the 
January 2015 scenario would prove more difficult for Russia and its 
allies today. Nevertheless, they would still prevail.
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If it is to be effective, Western assistance must aim to reinforce 
Ukrainian strengths and remedy weaknesses. There are no “silver 
bullets” in this exercise. It must be an evolving and cumulative 
process, emphasising the skill sets of institutions, as well as units 
and commanders. Whereas at the tactical and sub-tactical levels 
(regiment, battalion and below), the competence and experience 
of Ukraine’s military commanders is on a par with and arguably 
superior to the Western teams advising them, Ukraine’s deficiencies 
lie at the operational level: high intensity, manoeuvre warfare 
between large combined arms formations. This is Russia’s strength. 
The advisory task is complicated by the fact that it is no longer 
a NATO strength. With the exception of Russia itself, Ukraine’s 
experience of hybrid (but full spectrum) war is unique in Europe. 
That experience is producing a new generation of operational 
commanders. NATO firmness is needed in pressing Ukraine’s 
ultra conservative military leadership to give these commanders 
responsibility commensurate with their battle experience. In 
other respects, the advisory relationship must be a collaborative 
enterprise, not a pupil-teacher relationship.
Transfer of military hardware must be approached with care 
but without taboos. Ukraine’s defence-industrial complex (OPK) 
has the means to supply its forces with the vast majority of hardware 
they require. What Ukraine lacks most of all is adequate intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability against Russia’s 
electronic warfare and reconnaissance-strike complexes. These are 
neither “lethal” weapons nor politically toxic. Yet in their absence, 
even a well trained and highly motivated force risks evisceration on 
the battlefield.
An augmentation of Western military assistance to Ukraine 
is not without risk. It is politically symbolic assistance of limited 
military that is likely to “provoke” Russia rather than measures that 
actually strengthens Ukraine’s capability. It is the deficiency of such 
capability that leaves Ukraine vulnerable to an opponent who has 
shown no respect for the restraint of others.
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IN CONCLUSION
Since the annexation of Crimea, a number of Western commentators 
have claimed that Russia holds all the cards. Had this been so, 
the Ukrainian state would have collapsed by summer 2014. Russia 
has been constrained by the nature of its objectives (which have 
transformed friends into enemies), by its misjudgement of Ukraine 
(where national consolidation is stronger than contempt for the 
country’s leadership) and by limits on its own national power and 
capability (which is in decline). Russia’s aim is not to preserve 
a “frozen conflict” in Ukraine. This most fluid and volatile conflict 
has been from the start a means to securing Ukraine’s subservience. 
Once that objective is no longer achievable, the ORDLO loses its 
utility to Russia.
Russia’s principal assets in this conflict are tenacity, the 
acumen and ruthlessness of its authorities, the professionalism 
of its military and diplomatic establishments, and its willingness 
to assume risks and pay a high price in defence of its perceived 
interests.
The greatest liability in this conflict is the West’s fear of 
playing the cards at its disposal. Risk is inherent in a dangerous 
situation. The danger is created by Russia’s aims and its febrile 
and conspiratorial view of the world. Fear of “provoking” Russia 
enhances risk. Although we do not know how Russia will respond 
to a more resolute defence of Western interests in Ukraine, we do 
know how it responds to weakness. It is time we also learnt that 
Russia has no respect for opponents who are stronger but unwilling 
to use their strength.
James Sherr is an associate fellow at Chatham House (the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs) and the author of Hard Diplomacy and Soft 
Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad (published by Chatham House and, 
in Russian, the Razumkov Centre, Kyiv).
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CRIME BRINGS PUNISHMENT: 
 THE IMPORTANCE OF SANCTIONING RUSSIA
This is not another piece seeking to answer questions like “are 
sanctions effective?” or “how much damage have they done to 
the economy of Russia or the EU?” These common-sense inquiries 
are a bit misleading. The first one is too general, and actually 
unsolvable, since there are simply no convincing benchmarks 
to precisely quantify the effectiveness of sanctions. The second 
question narrows the whole problem down to a purely economic 
dimension, sidestepping the fact that sanctions are a political tool 
dressed in an economic costume. 
This essay focuses on the functions of sanctions that go 
beyond economic “pain-gain” logic. After all, sanctions are not just 
about directly seeking policy reversals through economic coercion; 
their success lies in constraining future possibilities and signaling 
political willpower. 
TIP OF THE ICEBERG PERSPECTIVES ON SANCTIONS
Generally, the effectiveness of sanctions is measured crudely: has 
the target of sanctions moderated or reversed their policies? This 
logic applied to the current situation reads: Western efforts to put 
an end to Russia’s proxy war in eastern Ukraine and to reverse the 
annexation of Crimea have brought no tangible results so far, thus 
they should be lifted. 
Ernest Wyciszkiewicz34
What is problematic with such an approach? Actually, if 
applied, it would automatically make any sanctions against any 
actor dead on arrival. The optimal tactic for the wrongdoer would 
be then just to wait and see and do nothing for a while. Yet, any 
101 on sanctions starts with an obvious claim that they are a long-
run endeavor and require patience and perseverance. To expect 
an instant effect is to misunderstand (or purposefully distort) the 
meaning of sanctions as well as their function. Sanctions are not 
an economic equivalent of Blitzkrieg. They contribute to a gradual 
rise of economic and political costs for the target, and the necessary 
extent, intensity and duration of sanctions has to vary case by case.1 
Put it this way. Success—understood as policy change—
in the short-term is rare, in particular when sanctions are used 
against a state that has accumulated significant resources and has 
consolidated a developed system of power capable of absorbing 
significant external shocks. Were sanctions really imposed just to 
change the behavior of an autocrat ruling over a huge country with 
significant financial reserves, relatively low state debt, enormous 
natural resources and political ambitions? If so, then those standing 
behind such an understanding of sanctions must have been very 
naïve. 
Some other observers are preoccupied with the exact costs 
of restrictions. There is nothing wrong with such an approach 
as long as it is based on serious examination of data, and not on 
hasty generalizations drawn from problematic assumptions. There 
are studies that incorrectly identify a decrease in EU-Russia trade 
as a direct effect of sanctions.2 They significantly overestimate 
the impact of trade restrictions, which creates an impression that 
they are self-serving and more focused on advocacy than sound 
research. It becomes visible in comparison to less reductionist and 
1 For in-depth analysis of sanctions, their evolution, functions and effectiveness, 
see: M. Eriksson, Targeting Peace. Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions, 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2010.
2 E. Christensen, O. Fritz, G. Streicher, Effects of the EU-Russia Economic 
Sanctions on Value Added and Employment in the European Union and 
Switzerland, WIFO Study, Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Vienna, July 
2015; M. Crozet, J. Hinz, “Collateral Damage: The Impact of the Russia Sanctions 
on Sanctioning Countries’ Exports,” Working Paper CEPII, June 2016, www.cepii.fr/ 
PDF_PUB/wp/2016/wp2016-16.pdf.
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more comprehensive studies that revealed rather insignificant costs 
of sanctions for EU economy.3 
Obviously, economic sanctions are meant to attach a price 
tag to a target’s behavior, but their actual impact is always very 
complex and context-dependent. Sanctions never operate in 
a vacuum. Lots of other factors carry weight such as the general 
economic situation of the target, the nature of its political system, 
the scope and intensity of mutual cooperation, as well as the 
availability and introduction of other coercive measures.4 Identical 
measures used at another time, against different target and under 
different circumstances would bring diverse consequences. Any 
effort to disentangle sanctions from other intervening factors—be 
it oil price movements, currency devaluation, halted structural 
reforms or changing moods of investors—would prove futile. 
Both cases—be it preoccupation with visible and rapid 
policy change or dollar-denominated impact—illustrate the tip 
of the iceberg perspective, when people try to reduce complex 
phenomenon to a one-dimensional issue. In some cases it is just an 
error, in others it is quite a useful self-serving tactic. 
What really matters is the political function of restrictions for 
the EU and its members. A simple truth is that sanctions are very 
often more about the sender than the target. In particular, when 
the sender is a collective body that needs to reach unanimity and 
consensus. 
Interestingly, the same political explanation can be offered 
when it comes to Russian countermeasures introduced in response 
to Western actions. What initially might have been thought simply 
as retaliatory means quickly transformed into a more sophisticated 
3 D. Gros, F. Mustilli, The EU’s Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia: 
Much Ado about Little, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), November 
2015; The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on EU-Russian Trade Flows, 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), July 2016; R. Giucci, W. Walter, The 
Economic Impact of EU-Russia Sanctions on the EU Plausibility Check of Existing 
Studies Using a Simple Estimation, Berlin Economics, February 2017, http://berlin-
economics.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/BE_Economic-impact-of-EU-RUS-
sanctions-on-EU_17-Feb-2017.
4 More on efficiency of sanctions, see G.C. Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered, 3rd Edition, Washington: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2007. 
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tool. True, a ban on agricultural imports was supposed to hit 
influential interest groups across the EU to make them allies in 
a battle for lifting sanctions. However, the direct economic effect of 
these restrictions turned out to be negligible. Instead of social unrest 
it rather triggered the only rational response from those dependent 
on the Russian market: namely, a drive for diversification. 
Russian counter-sanctions should be seen from the very 
beginning as a tool to reinforce a rally around the leader effect. 
Most of all by proper burden sharing, i.e. nation-wide redistribution 
of costs among various social groups. In other words, the authorities 
nationalized risks associated with sanctions to feed anti-Western 
feelings and divert public attention from regime’s failures, as well 
as to protect a circle of cronies from excessive losses. 
RATIONALE FOR EU SANCTIONS
How can we apply this broader perspective to the actions of 
the European Union? Sanctions are defined in EU documents as 
follows: “not punitive, but designed to bring about a change in 
policy or activity by the target country, entities or individuals.” 
Sadly, no time horizon of this desirable change is given, which 
makes rigorous appraisal of success or failure impossible by 
definition at such an early stage. Yet, at the same time “sanctions 
are one of the EU’s tools to promote the objectives of (its) Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): peace, democracy and the 
respect for the rule of law, human rights and international law.”5 
To clarify, EU sanctions indeed are supposed to lead to the policy 
change of the targeted nation or company, but at the same time 
they are designed to defend fundamental norms and values. The 
EU wants to deter third parties from doing damage to these values, 
as well as to reassure its members that it would strongly resist such 
behavior. Purposefully ambiguous Brussels language is not helpful, 
of course, but at least it shows that sanctions are not just about 
5 EU Restrictive measures. Factsheet, Brussels, 29 April 2014, www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2014/04/pdf/factsheet-eu-restrictive-measures.
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goods and services but actually about defending values that make 
up EU interests. 
Restrictions against Russia were gradually imposed from 
March 2014 as a consequence of the EU’s non-recognition policy 
of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol and in response 
to deliberate Russia-sponsored destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. 
First rounds of sanctions (asset freezes, visa bans, limited economic 
restrictions) were specifically targeted at people and entities directly 
involved in acts of undermining Ukrainian territorial integrity. 
They were followed by broader sectoral economic sanctions as 
a response to Russian meddling in the Donbass. These measures 
later on were linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk 
agreement, which so far has not happened and led to subsequent 
prolongations of the regime (the latest one in December 2016). 
The rationale for introducing a sanctions regime was 
reinforced in the Declaration by the High Representative on 
behalf of the EU on Crimea6 of March 2015 “one year on from 
the holding of the illegal and illegitimate ‘referendum’ and the 
subsequent illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the 
Russian Federation, the European Union remains firmly committed 
to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The European 
Union does not recognize and continues to condemn this act of 
violation of international law. The illegal annexation of Crimea and 
Sevastopol by the Russian Federation is also a direct challenge to 
international security, with grave implications for the international 
legal order that protects the unity and sovereignty of all states. The 
European Union will remain committed to fully implement its non-
recognition policy, including through restrictive measures.” 
So, restrictions were introduced to pave the way for the conflict 
resolution built upon preservation of Ukraine’s independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Desirable modification of 
Russian behavior should be thus in line with above principles. 
Sanctions were imposed to signal unequivocal disapproval 
for blatant violation of basic norms of international law and order. 
It means actually that they might be open-ended, assuming the 
6 See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-declaration 
-high-representative-crimea.
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current unwillingness of Russian government for any concessions. 
And at least when it comes to measures related directly to Crimea 
there is no way out of current situation apart from an annulment 
of annexation (illegal by definition) and laying legally sound and 
politically acceptable solutions on the table. 
Linking the removal of sectoral sanctions to the Minsk 
agreement was supposed to provide stakeholders with credible way 
out of the stalemate. Yet, it quickly turned out that the agreement 
is not to be implemented any time soon due to its inherent flaws 
and thus this delusional face-saving option for each stakeholder is 
dead and buried. 
SANCTIONS AND DETERRENCE
True, sanctions might not have generated sufficient costs to make 
the Kremlin fully reverse its policy. However, it does not mean 
they had no impact at all on Russian military plans in Ukraine. 
One should not dismiss the “what if” question. What if sanctions 
had not been imposed? What would Russia’s offensive in Ukraine 
have looked like? Would Russian troops have gone further? What if 
sanctions were lifted or eased without any concessions? Obviously 
counterfactual arguments cannot be verified (as well as falsified) 
but certainly they should not be ignored just because of a lack of 
access to a nontransparent Russian decision-making system. It is 
impossible to prove beyond any doubt how exactly the expected 
costs of sanctions impacted the situation on the ground—or how 
much impact came from a recurring threat of strengthening them 
(such as rumors on removing Russia from SWIFT system in 2014 that 
emerged during Russia’s offensive in Ukraine). A lack of direct 
information sources requires using indirect ones, such as Russian 
narratives built around sanctions as well as official reactions. If 
restrictions meant nothing, then they should not have come up in 
discussions so often. Indeed, Russia’s propaganda machine made 
an effort to dismiss Western policy as useless. Superficial messages 
are supported by allegedly professional and comprehensive studies 
to undermine the whole concept of sanctions and in particular their 
effectiveness when it comes to Russia. The latest study by the Russian 
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International Affairs Council7 is illustrative. It gives the reader a lot 
of objective information on sanctions, their legal basis, types etc., 
but the final message is as follows: “sanctions often fail to bring 
the intended result and sometimes generate opposite outcomes, i.e. 
triggering more objectionable actions of the sanctioned entity” or 
“the biggest effect comes from sectoral and comprehensive sanctions 
that harm the population of the sanctioned country.” The problem 
is that issues discussed by researchers and contested by many are 
presented as self-evident truths and broader functions of restrictions 
are totally ignored. This and other recurring efforts to question 
effectiveness of sanctions in this specific context reveal indirectly 
that Western measures restricted Russian room for maneuver and 
might have prevented Russia from even more aggressive actions. 
Sanctions in Russia’s case turned out to be quite painful, but 
not just because of their design or scope, but due to them hitting 
at the same time as Russia was in need of restructuring its oil 
and gas dependent economy, a flaw since 2011, which left the 
country exposed to a fall in global oil prices. Political and military 
adventurism under such circumstances did not pay off economically, 
leading to a currency crisis, dwindling reserves, rising inflation, 
a three-year long recession, and a decrease in production, trade and 
investments. However, Russia might have had more opportunities 
to mitigate the harmful effects of its own policy, had there been no 
sanctions that denied access to necessary capital. It is not risky to 
say that those constraints might have put on hold some political or 
military plans. Yet, it is true that the longer the sanctions regime 
exists, the less economic impact it has due to the adaptation of all 
actors involved in a “new normal.” The longer restrictions operate 
the more significant political signaling becomes. 
The continued determination and intensity of Russian efforts 
to make the West lift sanctions can serve as a valid though indirect 
confirmation that their costs are significant. But it also might show 
the Kremlin’s awareness of a broader meaning to restrictions. The 
strategy is not only to get economic relief, and access to Western 
capital, but—more importantly—to regain room for maneuver in 
7 One of the latest effort of that kind was done by Russian International Affairs 
Council, see: V. Morozov, Sanctions: Everything you want to know about how 
sanctions work, RIAC, 2017, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/sanctions. 
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Ukraine and to undercut an intra-EU and EU/U.S. consensus about 
policy towards Russia. 
It seems rather unlikely that sanctions alone could force 
Russia to redefine its policy, but each and every government has 
certain capability to endure hardship. The West, if indeed interested 
in defending the rules of the game in the face of offenders, should 
just wait, identify loopholes and eliminate them. Sanctions should 
stay untouched, unless real not fake concessions are made. A clear 
signal of ”strategic patience” when it comes to sanctions should 
have been another deterrent. Recurring correlation between debates 
on lifting sanctions and increased tensions due to the activities of 
quasi-separatists shows indirectly what might happen if restrictions 
are eliminated too soon and without Russian withdrawal from 
Ukraine. Sanctions still protect Ukraine and Europe from further 
escalation as they make it potentially much more expensive both 
economically and politically. Russia hides this behind a narrative 
that sanctions are an obstacle to normalization; as a matter of fact, 
they are an obstacle to deterioration. 
SANCTIONS AND REASSURANCE
Restrictions are important not only as a deterrent, but also as 
a symbol and practical expression of Western unity, resolve and 
consolidation that managed to overcome deep internal divisions; 
they represent a remarkable consensus on several rounds of 
economic restrictions against the EU’s neighbor to the east. Many 
observers were taken by surprise when the EU managed to escape 
from a convenient trap of empty expressions like “grave concerns,” 
when it overcame internal divisions and found common ground 
with the U.S. 
It might not have ended up like this, had Russia not overplayed 
its hand by continuous escalation in order to test the West to the 
limit. It has been almost forgotten that in the period between the 
annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Donbass, many 
in the West were ready to accept it as a fait accompli. Had Putin 
stopped then and there, probably neither the EU nor U.S. would 
have been interested in reaching for harsher measures than those 
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already imposed, which at the time were lighter measures like visa 
bans or asset freezes—perfect as a face saver for political inaction. 
Russia, though, wanted to seize the day and get the full prize: 
total subjugation of Ukraine through instigating conflict in Donbass 
and other regions. Political costs of inaction were rising for Western 
governments and reached critical mass on July 17 when Russia-
sponsored mercenaries, possibly with participation of Russian 
officers, shot down the civilian aircraft MH17 with almost three 
hundred people on board. This crime paved the way for economic 
sanctions: it turned the Russia-Ukraine war from a relatively distant 
and abstract issue (at least for Western societies) into a wake-up call 
for EU governments to do something so as not to pay the political 
price. 
Up to this point, many observers considered the divergent 
levels of exposure to Russia would mean that reaching a common 
position on sanctions would be unlikely. Restrictions jointly 
supported by the U.S. and EU should not be taken too lightly even 
if they seem not optimal and did not meet high expectations. They 
should not be belittled in particular given the naïve but deep faith 
in many EU capitals in a brand new world of economic and energy 
interdependence with Russia as a mutual guarantee of security and 
welfare. Overcoming a diverse sensitivity and vulnerability of EU 
economies associated with the scope of their interconnectedness 
with Russia was a meaningful achievement. It was not easy to put 
aside political illusions and economic self-interest in exchange for 
mutual consent to pay a certain price for a long-awaited but rare 
solidarity. 
Sanctions, therefore, constitute the most important material 
confirmation of common political and legal assessment of 
annexation of Crimea and ongoing violations of Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity. Logical conclusion should therefore be that sanctions 
could be lifted only after return to status quo ante, no matter how 
improbable this return might seem. 
Taking a broad view, the West faces following dilemma: 
either to give up, lift sanctions and let Russia go with Crimea, 
Donbass, Ukraine’s surrender and Putin’s regime consolidation 
under anti-Western rhetoric or to realize finally that the conflict is 
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not only about Ukraine but about the whole concept of the West 
as a community able and willing to defend its constitutive values. 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
Targeted sanctions were chosen correctly, given the nature of 
the Russian regime entrenched in personal loyalties and informal 
redistribution of privileges. The system responded in a very 
peculiar way. It imposed a ban on agricultural imports from the EU 
and other countries, which officially was supposed to be an act of 
reprisal to inflict similar damages on adversaries. Yet, as a matter 
of fact the regime sanctioned its own society in order to achieve 
rally around the leader effect. That mission has been accomplished. 
Elites nationalized the risks associated with their policies, charged 
their own citizens and successfully put the blame on the West. 
Interestingly, critics of sanctions use this Kremlin-crafted anti-
Western mobilization as a proof of failure of Western policy and 
an argument for doing away with restrictions. But it only proves 
that the Russian government quickly found a way to neutralize the 
West’s intention not to hit Russia’s society too hard. Targeted and 
sectoral sanctions were invented some time ago to replace all-out 
economic measures that usually made the people suffer more than 
their kleptocratic elites and thus led to political mobilization around 
them. Russian elites realized risks associated with such an approach 
and decided to increase the public costs of sanctions. Results of 
countermeasures—that partially led to an increase in inflation and 
had influence on daily life (access to products, decrease in quality 
etc.)—were instrumental for the mobilization of citizens around 
the slogan that it was the West to be blamed for any worsening 
of their well-being. Their response may have an impact on future 
handbooks on sanctions, but it should not be used as an argument 
for changing Western policy. It would be a clear advice for any 
other would-be EU adversary on how to get sanctions lifted cheap 
and fast. 
So, it was the West which hesitated to impose costs on 
ordinary Russians, regardless of their general approval of Putin’s 
actions. Restrictions were designed to reduce pain for the society 
Crime Brings Punishment: The Importance of Sanctioning Russia 43
while increasing costs for the elites. The EU’s mantra that sanctions 
are not a punitive measure turned out to be at least partially true. 
The Russian government recognized such a tactic as dangerous, so 
it decided to punish its compatriots with inflation, limited access to 
certain products and a general decrease in the standard of living. 
So, those who repeat constantly that sanctions should be lifted to 
lend a helping hand to Russian citizens and diffuse anti-Western 
rhetoric simply rely on misleading cause and effect link.
Last but not least, sanctions are the consequence of an 
aggressive, reprehensible Russian policy towards Ukraine and the 
European order—not the cause of deterioration in Russia-West 
relations. The general support of Russian society for Kremlin’s 
aggressive policy has turned it into an accomplice, and so must 
take partial responsibility and pay associated costs. Addressing the 
punishment instead of the crime as a way of returning to “business 
as usual” would only deliver a blow to sanctions as policy tool. It 
would not lead to conflict resolution. 
PATIENCE REQUIRED
As time went by, Russia’s government and Russian companies 
invented various ways of escaping from restrictions, for example 
by asset transfers from sanctioned banks and firms to other entities. 
Plenty of other measures were used to circumvent sanctions or 
exploit loopholes, often with a helping hand given by some Western 
consulting companies. Some allude to these practices to mock 
sanctions, but it is a too hasty conclusion. Even if punished Russian 
companies managed to survive and develop, it required a lot of 
effort from them and significantly increased their transactional costs. 
Time is of the essence. Russia’s vulnerability to the EU’s 
economic pressure is of a medium-term to long-term nature, although 
structural weaknesses are being revealed on daily basis. Within 
Russia’s elite, the most valuable currency is loyalty—guaranteed 
either by proper redistribution of resources within the elite or by 
intimidation when necessary, or both. It is hard to identify weak 
points in Russia’s body politics, namely those who win and those 
who lose. But it is evident that competition for more and more 
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limited resources to be allocated among cronies has already started. 
The number of surprising comings and goings in 2016 can serve 
as indirect proof of a highly competitive environment around and 
within the Kremlin, and a manifestation of ongoing power struggles. 
The current Russian leadership went so far in its information war 
that coming back to business-as-usual is highly unlikely anytime 
soon. Putin and his inner circle have effectively become hostages 
of their own propaganda. Their domestic credibility relies now on 
an antagonistic attitude towards the West, in particular the U.S. 
Russia’s leadership has managed to plant in their compatriots’ 
minds the idea of a pre-planned conspiracy having been executed 
by the West to dismember the Russian Federation.8 
It is unlikely that a potentially more Russia-friendly new 
U.S. administration under Donald Trump (which still needs 
to be confirmed by deeds not just fond words) can change this. 
When it comes to Crimea-related sanctions the situation seems 
clear. According to the U.S. State Department announcement of 
16 March 2017: “Crimea is a part of Ukraine. The United States 
again condemns the Russian occupation of Crimea and calls for its 
immediate end. Our Crimea-related sanctions will remain in place 
until Russia returns control of the peninsula to Ukraine.”9 President 
Trump’s position is less clear but domestic constraints10 and a lack 
of any convenient pretext—at the time of writing (March 2017)—
made lifting sanctions difficult despite such signals having been 
disseminated. So there should be no illusions about the prospects 
for real change in America’s policy towards Russia under the current 
administration. Putin—after the annexation of Crimea—needs an 
8 See December speech of President Putin in which he said that “even if Maidan 
had not happened the West would have come up with sanctions” or interviews 
of Nikolay Patrushev, Head of Security Council, to Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 
which he deciphered the whole U.S.-led conspiracy aimed at destroying Russia 
and taking over its resources. I. Yegorov, “Vtoraya Kholodnaya,” Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, 15 October 2014, www.rg.ru/2014/10/15/patrushev.html; I. Yegorov, 
“Patrushev: Tsel’ SShA—oslabit’ Rossiyu,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 10 February 2015, 
www.rg.ru/2015/02/10/patrushev-interviu-site.html (both in Russian).
9 See www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/268482.htm
10 See The Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017—bipartisan effort to codify 
into law large portions of U.S. sanctions regime on Russia and provide for 
congressional review of any proposed sanctions relief by the President, 
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1059.
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anti-Western and anti-U.S. posture as a source of legitimization to 
stabilize his fractured political system. 
What the West needs right now is patience and far better 
management of expectations rather than self-serving or naïve 
claims about their alleged total uselessness. The fate of economic 
sanctions against Russia will tell us more about the West than the 
targeted state in question. And these sanctions should be analyzed 
beyond naïve “pain-gain” logic. They are about Western readiness, 
responsibility and capability to act jointly in defense of fundamental 
values and interests. First and foremost they are to signal unity 
and resolve, to deter and reassure, and only then to punish and 
stigmatize. To increase chances of success, the unimpressive 
“wait-and-see” approach should become the lowest common EU 
denominator. Further aggression should elicit further sanctions.
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4PETR BOLOGOV
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS AFTER CRIMEA
On 19 December 2016, a vote at the UN General Assembly 
served as a useful indicator for how countries around the world, 
particularly Russia’s neighbors, are responding to the annexation of 
Crimea. A majority voted for and adopted a resolution1 on human 
rights violations in Crimea, urging Russia to allow the presence of 
international observers on the peninsula. Drafted and proposed 
by Ukraine, 70 countries backed it, 26 voted against it2 and 
77 abstained. Despite the outcome of the vote being in Ukraine’s 
favor, it means that three years after the peninsula’s annexation, the 
majority of UN member-countries refused to take action against 
Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea, or at least preferred to remain 
silent.
In March 2014, only ten countries3 refused to classify 
the Crimean referendum as illegal (with only 58 UN members 
abstaining), and about a hundred countries opposed the Kremlin. 
Two-and-a-half years later, the countries that sided with Russia 
in the Crimean conflict were followed by India, China, South 
Africa and Iran. Four CIS countries also now support the Kremlin, 
particularly in its Crimean policy: two key post-Soviet Central Asian 
1 United Nations, Seventy-first session, Human Rights Promotion and Defence: 
Reports from Special Rapporteurs and Representatives on the Human Rights 
Situation, 31 October 2016.
2 Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, China, the Comoro 
Islands, Cuba, North Korea, Eritrea, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Philippines, 
Russia, Serbia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Uzbekistan, 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
3 UN News Centre, Backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, UN Assembly 
declares Crimea referendum invalid, 27 March 2014.
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republics—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—have joined Armenia 
and Belarus in voicing their backing. Does this indicate that the 
Kremlin’s influence has been growing in the post-Soviet space over 
the last three years?
Not necessarily. It is hard to compare the political weight 
of the two resolutions. In 2014, it concerned open aggression and 
the seizure of another country’s land. 2016’s resolution was about 
protecting minorities for the most part. Secondly, India, China, 
South Africa, Iran, and the post-Soviet countries now supporting 
Russia number among the world’s leading human rights violators 
themselves, so they were not likely to condemn practices that they 
in turn could be accused of; besides, their consolidated voting may 
be based on corporate interests.
Nevertheless, the question arises as to how relations between 
the CIS countries and Moscow have changed since the annexation 
of Crimea, and to what extent these changes have been affected 
by the Russian authorities themselves and their actions in Ukraine.
The referendum in Crimea triggered a chain of events which 
directly influenced Russia’s relations with its neighbors. The war in 
Donbas has generated fears in Belarus and Kazakhstan—Russia’s 
closest allies—of a repeat of the “Ukraine scenario” on their territory. 
Equally, the economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation 
by Western countries sent tremors through the neighborhood on the 
eve of another Kremlin-initiated integration process—the Eurasian 
Economic Union. The acute escalation of tensions between Moscow 
and Washington has also made some post-Soviet republics rethink 
their future development prospects; a number of countries are still 
dithering between the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Russia’s EEU, or 
closer ties to China through its “New Silk Road.”
Crimea and its aftermath are just a regional component of 
the processes taking place in the post-Soviet region over the past 
three years. The war in Syria, the Russian-Turkish conflict which 
finally resulted in rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara, 
the EU’s internal problems, the U.S. presidential elections, falling 
energy prices, and the growing Islamist threat—all these factors 
affected those processes no less than the “Ukrainian crisis.” Finally, 
the ex-Soviet republics themselves witnessed a range of events 
absolutely unconnected with Kremlin or White House policies, 
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but which could potentially tip the balance of power of certain 
regions towards one of the leading political players. In turn, China 
has joined Russia and the U.S. as a leading political power with its 
fast-growing influence on the post-Soviet political space, especially 
in Central Asia.
Therefore, even if Moscow has clearly strengthened its 
position within the CIS in the last three years, it did so through 
political manoeuvring and speculation performed mostly outside 
the post-Soviet territory. This makes the Kremlin’s nascent diktat 
highly unstable, since it only rarely has something feasible to 
propose to its neighbors, if one counts cooperation within the EEU 
as such, for example.
CLOSEST ALLIES
Even before Crimea fell de facto under Russian control, there was 
intense talk that the next region where “green men” might pop up 
could be in Northern areas of Kazakhstan, where small Russian-
speaking communities still reside. However, although a threat of 
separatism did exist4 in the republic after the collapse of the USSR, 
it has almost vanished in the last quarter of a century, and exists 
more in the heads of political scientists and journalists than in 
reality. So it makes little sense to draw parallels between Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan, at least while Nursultan Nazarbayev is in power.
Astana’s official position regarding Crimea was expressed by 
the Kazakh MFA, which issued a statement that “Kazakhstan, once 
again, accentuates its commitment to the fundamental principles 
of international law, according to the United Nations Charter,” but 
“understands the Russian Federation’s decision under the current 
circumstances.” Astana viewed the Crimean referendum itself as 
“a free expression of will”—to quote the wording of the Kazakh 
MFA’s official statement5 on this issue.
4 Three Threats to Nazarbayev: How Stable Is Kazakhstan, Carnegie Moscow 
Centre, 25 August 2016.
5 “MFA: Kazakhstan views the referendum held in Crimea ‘as a free expression 
of will of the Autonomous Republic’s population’,” Zakon.kz, 18 March 2014.
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This point of view has seen few significant changes since 
then. At some point Nursultan Nazarbayev attempted6 to act as an 
intermediary in settling the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but later, 
probably after realizing the futility of this process, preferred to 
concentrate on resolving the main problems in Kazakhstan, such 
as falling hydrocarbon prices which provoked a devaluation of the 
local currency, and the threat of religious extremism. At the same 
time, after the Crimean crisis and the start of the war in Donbas—
where abolishing the law7 protecting the rights of linguistic 
minorities was used as pretext to take up arms—certain minor 
concessions to the Russian-speaking population were introduced 
in Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev himself later spoke8 in defense of the 
Russian language and called for Kazakhstan to remain an officially 
bilingual country.
In the summer of 2016, when Kazakhstan was rocked by 
a series of terrorist attacks, it became obvious that, even without 
“green men,” Astana now had a fight within its borders. Although 
the standard of living in Kazakhstan is higher than in Ukraine, this 
does not imply that people would not become actively involved 
should attempts be made to fuel a conflict, for example, on religious 
grounds. Moreover, we also need to consider that a change of power 
is likely to happen in the near future (Nazarbayev will turn 77 in 
2017), which could trigger a conflict between groups of influence 
close to the president and would instantly affect society. This also 
happened in Kazakhstan back in the Soviet times.
Still, despite the potential threat of Russian intervention in 
the republic’s internal affairs after Nazarbayev’s departure from 
the political stage, Kazakhstan currently remains Russia’s most 
consistent ally in the post-Soviet space. Up until recently, Belarus 
could also have been considered similar, but Moscow’s foreign 
policy shift in priorities from West to East, towards India and China, 
and a basic freeze in its relations with the European Union, plus 
6 “Nazarbayev is ready to be an independent mediator in resolving the crisis in 
Eastern Ukraine,” Radio Ozodi, 22 December 2014.
7 The Ukrainian law “On the principles of the state language policy,” 2 July 
2012.
8 “Nazarbayev: officials have no right to ‘forget’ the Russian language,” Rosbalt, 
16 February 2016.
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endless trade wars, have led to a situation where Russia’s erstwhile 
“most-brotherly” country has wound up on the periphery of the 
Kremlin’s interests. The Belarusian economy has been experiencing 
a prolonged crisis9 since 2011 (despite a relative stabilization, 
a decline in all the main economic indicators was recorded10 
in 2016—GDP, volume of foreign trade, industrial output, and 
housing construction). Yet Kazakhstan—with its gigantic oil, gas 
and uranium deposits—is a much more attractive partner for Russia 
right now, the infamous “Slavonic brotherhood” notwithstanding.
The start of the Ukrainian crisis seemed to offer golden 
opportunities for Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko when, 
at the end of 2014, he shot to fame as Europe’s main peacemaker 
by mediating negotiations between the Donetsk separatist leaders 
and Kyiv. It should be noted that the Belarusian leader is highly 
experienced in manipulation regarding the status of other pro-
Russian enclaves in post-Soviet territory—Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia—which he has yet to recognize, despite encouraging 
benefits received from the Kremlin. This is why Lukashenko decided 
to support Russia in the Crimean issue by agreeing11 that the 
peninsula is a de facto part of Russia (apart from him, only the Kyrgyz 
MFA has called the Crimean referendum and its consequences an 
“objective reality”12). In a remarkable twist, Lukashenko also stated 
that Ukraine “should remain united, whole and undivided.” Minsk 
still adheres to this position, although Lukashenko’s comments on 
Crimea and the Eastern Ukrainian situation have varied significantly 
over the last three years—ranging from all but justifying the Russian 
aggression, to promising to fight13 Putin should he “encroach on 
Belarusian soil.”
9 Ye. Pozhidayev, “Belarusian Crisis: Devaluation of Lukashenko,” EADaily, 
29 December 2016, https://eadaily.com/en/news/2016/12/29/belarusian-crisis-
devaluation-of-lukashenko.
10 National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Main socio-
economic indicators of the Republic of Belarus in January 2017.
11 “Lukashenko stated that Crimea is now a de facto part of Russia,“ BBC News 
Russian Service, 23 March 2014.
12 “Kyrgyz MFA recognised the results of the Crimean referendum,” Forbes–
Kazakhstan, 20 March 2014.
13 “Aleksandr Lukashenko to Ksenia Sobchak: I will fight whoever encroaches on 
Belarusian soil. Even if it is Putin,” Dozhd TV channel, 21 May 2014.
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This latter intention is also indirectly reflected in the new 
Belarusian military doctrine adopted in summer 2016. It mentions 
both “hybrid war” and “neutralizing an internal armed conflict” 
which could be provoked from the outside.
While the Russian-Ukrainian conflict itself has only affected 
Moscow’s relations with its closest partners indirectly, the economic 
sanctions imposed on Russia by the West and the retaliatory 
food-import ban turned out to be quite painful for Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, effectively phasing out all agreements that had been 
reached hitherto inside the Customs Union. After all, neither 
Astana nor Minsk are subject to Western sanctions (largely due to 
their cautious rhetoric concerning Crimea) and, therefore, had no 
reason to toughen their own economic policies towards Western 
countries. This automatically led to the re-establishment of internal 
limitations on the movement of goods within the Customs Union, 
thus rendering the union pointless.
After refusing to show solidarity with Moscow in its economic 
confrontation with the West, Belarus continued to supply banned, 
imported EU products to Russia by replacing their labels. As 
a result, in recent years Russian customs have regularly rejected 
large shipments of food products from Belarus, invariably invoking 
outraged criticism from Lukashenko. To a lesser extent, a flow 
of banned products is also entering Russia from Kazakhstan, but 
goods transit is not as significant for Astana as it is for Minsk, so 
such issues have never reached an inter-state level.
At the end of 2014, the situation was aggravated further by 
the sharp devaluation of the Russian rouble, making Belarusian 
and Kazakh goods less profithan Russian produce. As a result, 
the members of the EEU, founded at the start of 2015, have been 
engaged in a slowly progressing trade war with one another ever 
since.
The Eurasian Economic Union’s project itself, whose main 
parameters were proposed by Russia, has been seriously modified 
following pressure from Kazakhstan. Provisions relating to the 
sovereignty of member countries (which went beyond economic 
integration) have now been excluded: articles concerning common 
citizenship, foreign policy, inter-parliamentary cooperation, 
passport and visa systems. So far, the EAEU’s economic component 
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is not very impressive either. “It doesn’t matter how our union 
evolves—first it was a Customs Union, then a United Economic 
Space, now it’s the EEU—the amount of trade restrictions has not 
changed and has remained level at 600. What’s more, after signing 
the agreement, our internal trade is only falling,” said Lukashenko 
in May 2016. In fact, foreign trade is also in decline14—the volume 
of EAEU trade with other countries dropped 17.2% during the first 
nine months of 2016, compared to the same period in the previous 
year, reaching $361.7 billion.
Table 1. Reciprocal trade between EAEU countries during the first year  
of the EAEU’s existence
Internal bilateral trade Dynamics Share in the totaltrade turnover
-25%
Armenia–Kyrgyzstan 108.1 0.00
Armenia–Russia 91.2 2.82
Armenia–Belarus 86.9 0.07
Kyrgyzstan–Russia 78.3 3.20
Armenia–Kazakhstan 75.8 0.01
Belarus–Russia 73.8 57.14
Belarus–Kyrgyzstan 72.4 0.15
Kazakhstan–Russia 74.0 33.45
Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan 71.2 1.90
Belarus–Kazakhstan 60.8 1.26
Source: “Eurasian Economic Union. What is happening in the wings of Putin’s 
project,” Ukrainian Realities information agency, 2 March 2016.
Amid constant wrangling between Minsk and Moscow 
over trade restrictions, rumors again began to circulate about 
Lukashenko’s alleged plans to turn towards the West. This may 
be based on the partial lifting of sanctions against the Belarusian 
authorities. However, such rapprochement is out of the question 
without real reforms inside that country; its political system is 
tailored to one person. Lukashenko has yet to show any desire to 
bring Belarusian legislation closer to European standards. So no 
14 “Foreign trade turnover of the EAEU countries is falling for the second year in 
a row,” EurasiaNet.org, 4 January 2017.
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matter what steps Minsk makes towards rapprochement with the 
EU and USA, they could be eradicated at any moment by another 
loan or gas discount from Russia, which is exactly what Lukashenko 
is striving for. This is a decades-old tradition already, so it would be 
extremely naïve to expect any changes on that front.
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, which joined the EEU in January 
2015, have felt the least impact of the Ukrainian events. Their 
integration into the Russian sphere of influence is purely pragmatic. 
Similarly to other members of the union, Bishkek is interested 
in lifting the existing trade restrictions (above all on the border 
with Kazakhstan) and attracting Russian and Kazakh investment 
(Gazprom has already taken control of the republic’s gas-
transportation system). For Armenia, which seems to have forgotten 
about its European prospects altogether, the priority issue is security, 
so it will join any union which would guarantee its protection from 
external aggression.
However, the deterioration of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
situation in April 2016 demonstrated that none of the EEU countries 
are prepared to stand up openly for Yerevan. This sad fact led the 
Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan to make a statement15 at the 
union’s last summit: “Either our partners will consider the Eurasian 
Economic Union as a territory for economic development, stability 
and security, in which investments can be made and long-term 
plans envisaged, or everyone will become accustomed to it being 
a permanent hotbed of tension and discord.” Russia responded 
to this statement by sending Iskander missile systems to Armenia 
which, as Yerevan experts are convinced, will somewhat restrain 
Azerbaijan’s military zeal.
POTENTIAL FRIENDS
Straight after the Crimean referendum in 2014, the authorities in 
Uzbekistan, where Islam Karimov was still in power, refused to 
comment directly on the situation on the peninsula and urged the 
15 “Armenian president: escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is 
a serious challenge for the EAEU’s security,” EADaily, 31 May 2016.
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conflicting sides—Russia and Ukraine—to come to the negotiating 
table. At the same time, Uzbekistan abstained from voting on the 
UN resolution condemning the annexation of Crimea. Three years 
later, in the vote on Human Rights violations on the peninsula, 
Uzbekistan supported Russia. Above all, this is connected to 
the fact that the head of state was not Karimov, who was always 
extremely careful in making foreign-policy decisions, but Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev, a man with much less diplomatic experience than his 
late predecessor, but who is potentially inclined to a Russian style 
of governance—i.e. restricting civil liberties, strict control over the 
economy, and dialog with neighbors based on his own military and 
technical superiority.
Karimov, who headed probably the most difficult of all the 
post-Soviet republics, in terms of ethnic and religious conflicts, 
managed to balance skillfully between Russia and the West for 
a quarter of a century without letting either side impose its will on 
Tashkent. The former president’s decisions were the pinnacle of his 
diplomatic talent: he easily joined military unions (CSTO) initiated 
by Moscow, only to leave them equally easily later; then he let 
NATO establish military bases on Uzbek territory, only to evict 
them16 at the first sign of interference in the country’s internal affairs 
(criticism of Karimov’s actions to suppress an uprising in Andijan).
His successor has already demonstrated that Uzbekistan’s 
foreign policy will not become more open and direct under 
his rule. Mirziyoyev curtailed local conflicts with immediate 
neighbors—Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—and, on 29 November 
2016, Russian minister of defense Sergey Shoygu, together with 
his Uzbek counterpart Qobul Berdiyev, signed17 an agreement 
on developing technical and military cooperation and plans for 
bilateral collaboration between the two ministries in 2017. As part 
of that agreement, Uzbekistan might receive weapons from Russia, 
which is what the late Karimov was previously hoping for from 
the USA. Mirziyoyev is refraining from any categorical assessments 
16 R. Wright, A. Scott Tyson, “U.S. evicted from air base in Uzbekistan,” The 
Washington Post, 30 July 2005, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/07/29/AR2005072902038.html.
17 “Russia and Uzbekistan have signed a military and technical cooperation 
agreement,” Sputnik, 29 November 2016.
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of Eurasian integration—unlike his predecessor, who felt that 
Uzbekistan had no place in the EEU. This in itself makes a dialog 
on this issue possible.
We can assume that Uzbekistan, which had distanced itself 
from Russia in the “noughties,” will continue to move closer to the 
Kremlin under Mirziyoyev’s rule. A similar course was sometimes 
plotted so carefully by Karimov that it was hard to understand which 
side Tashkent was on—that of Moscow, Washington, or maybe 
Beijing. Russia’s policy regarding Ukraine does not bother the 
Uzbek authorities, as they have no borders with Russia. The same 
goes for Human Rights violations in Crimea—since Uzbekistan itself 
has some of the lowest civil-liberties ratings in the world. Another 
matter is that Tashkent’s ambitions could hinder its rapprochement 
with Moscow, since it has always positioned itself as a regional 
leader on an equal footing with Astana.
It was expected that Tajikistan would apply to join the EEU 
by the end of this year. Its president, Emomali Rahmon—who was 
declared the “leader of the nation” and the “founder of peace and 
national unity” in his home country—guaranteed himself lifetime 
rule in May 2016. The republic is considered one of the poorest in 
the CIS, but it also houses the largest Russian military base (No. 201) 
and a significant part of its active population are migrant workers in 
Russia. Nevertheless, Rahmon is in no hurry to join the EEU so far.
Most probably, having close economic ties and a sizeable 
trade turnover with Beijing, which is also the biggest investor 
in country’s economy, Tajikistan will use its position to balance 
between Moscow’s and Beijing’s interests. This could potentially 
bring similar benefits, as it used to for Tashkent, when it used to 
alternate between a pro-Russian and a pro-American line.
In addition, Dushanbe is evidently concerned about the 
EAEU’s common customs tariffs. The example of Kyrgyzstan (which 
raised its tariffs after joining the union) showed that importing cheap, 
mass-produced Chinese goods—which is what the local population 
mainly consumes—became too expensive and unprofitable. 
However, irrespective of whether Tajikistan joins the EEU, it is 
currently doomed to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence, since to 
a large extent the Russian army will guarantee the country’s stability 
should the situation in neighboring Afghanistan deteriorate.
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Figure 1. Tajikistan’s main trading partners (in January–September 2016)
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Source: “Tajikistan’s external trade turnover has decreased by over $1.4 billion in 
two years,” ASIA-Plus, 17 October 2016.
The reasons for a possible rapprochement between Russia 
and Turkmenistan are somewhat different, although the Afghan 
factor is also present. Having sold the major part of its natural gas 
to China for several years in advance, Ashgabat found itself gripped 
by a hard-currency deficit, since Turkmenistan only receives 
about a third of China’s gas payments in “real” money. The rest 
goes towards repaying loans from China. The instability of the 
hydrocarbon market, on which the local economy is founded, has 
forced the Turkmen government to abandon its former self-isolation 
and neutrality policies and forge links with the Kremlin. Their aims 
are still unclear, but it could be military cooperation in securing the 
Afghan-Turkmen border or joint gas-related projects, even possibly 
letting Gazprom take control of the country’s gas-transport system.
NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
Azerbaijan, which is located on the opposite side of the Caspian 
Sea from Turkmenistan, took Russia’s annexation of Crimea pretty 
badly, due to its own territorial conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
republic’s president, Ilham Aliyev, has not changed his position 
in the last three years. Nonetheless neither this, nor dispatching 
Iskander missiles to Armenia have stopped Baku from maintaining 
the status quo in its relations with Moscow: the trade turnover 
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between the two countries is growing, and both countries’ leaders 
pay each other regular visits. If the Kremlin had opted to escalate the 
conflict with Ankara after the Turkish military shot down a Russian 
fighter-plane, it would have probably affected the Azeri stance. But 
now that Russia and Turkey are allies again, Baku cannot fail to take 
this into account, although the Azeri authorities prefer Pakistan and 
Israel to Russia for technical and military cooperation.
Georgia, having experienced its own “Ukrainian scenario,” 
has not altered its course of careful rapprochement with Russia 
following the annexation of Crimea. This was adopted after 
the coalition led by businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili won the 
2012 parliamentary elections. Even though the two countries 
have not restored diplomatic ties, Russia is still Georgia’s third-
largest trading partner, and tourists from the Russian Federation 
already account for a third of visitors to the country. Nevertheless, 
the republic’s future is connected to the EU, and relations with 
Russia will always be dimmed by the problems of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, which, like in the case of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh, take priority over any events in Ukraine.
Up until recently, relations between Russia and Moldova have 
been developing in a similar pattern, making even a theoretical 
union between the countries impossible due to the unresolved 
conflict in Transnistria. On the other hand, forecasts that Moscow 
would try to connect Donbas to Transnistria by capturing southern 
parts of Ukraine, thus creating a single anti-Ukrainian front, 
have—fortunately—not come true. They also failed to frighten 
the Moldovan population, half of whom (according to numerous 
surveys) see their country’s future as linked to Russia, a traditional 
market for local agricultural produce.
The authorities in Chisinau, who supported European 
integration, have lived through numerous political scandals and 
battles in recent years. These overshadowed the events in Ukraine 
and led to the Socialist party leader, Igor Dodon, winning the 
presidential elections in November 2016. The new head of state, 
a known espouser of pro-Russian rhetoric, did not hesitate to 
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promise18 he would hold a referendum on the already signed EU 
association agreement and the possibility of joining the EEU. The 
outcome of such a plebiscite would primarily depend on events in 
the European Union itself, as well as Brussels’ ability to successfully 
counteract the centrifugal forces inside the EU.
ENEMIES
Taking all the above into account, we must admit that, although 
the “Crimean issue” did cause growing tension and mutual mistrust 
between some former USSR republics, on the whole it did not lead 
to Russia being isolated—or even reduce its influence on its nearest 
neighbors. Even the economic sanctions imposed by the West did 
not deter Moscow’s traditional allies, although the EEU’s future is 
uncertain (while the existing imbalance remains, expect decreased 
cooperation between Russia and the EU, and increased contacts 
between Brussels and other EEU countries).
The “Ukrainian crisis” practically annihilated the economic, 
social and cultural ties between Kyiv and Moscow. Trade turnover 
between the two countries had reached19 almost $45 billion in 
2014; it had fallen to just 4.7 billion20 in the first half of 2016. This 
demonstrated that the Kremlin has not only maintained its influence 
over CIS countries despite the economic crisis but is also prepared 
to use force to reaffirm such influence. Maybe, to some degree, 
even thanks to the economic crisis, because Russia turned out to be 
better prepared for an environment of inflation than the economies 
of countries which depend directly on it—e.g. Belarus.
Of course, Moscow was helped by the disarray and dithering 
inside the EU, which led to Brexit and the rising popularity across 
the continent of local nationalist parties which, as a rule, seem 
to revere the Kremlin’s policies. The outcome of the presidential 
18 “Media: Igor Dodon intends to hold a referendum on the abolition of the 
Association Agreement with the EU,” TASS, 14 November 2016.
19 Ukrainian MFA. Trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and 
Russia.
20 “Trade turnover between Russia and Ukraine declined by 57.8% in the first 
half of the year,” Vedomosti, 12 August 2016.
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elections in America—which traditionally retains its influence 
not only in Ukraine, but also the Caucasus and Central Asia—
could also potentially contribute to a growing Russian presence 
in neighboring countries. Especially if Brussels’ and Washington’s 
formerly consolidated position on sanctions against Russia falls 
apart due to the actions of Donald Trump’s Administration, and 
a fading American interest in the post-Soviet space. Any steps 
forward regarding the status of Crimea, or even the White House’s 
readiness to discuss the issue, would only strengthen Russia’s 
influence in the post-Soviet space—a boost for Vladimir Putin’s 
aspiration to reverse the effects of the “major geopolitical disaster 
of the 20th century,” as the Russian leader once called21 the collapse 
of the USSR. But a reversal done in the spirit of Moscow’s interests, 
of course.
Translation: Alexandra Godina
Petr Bologov is a Russian journalist covering the post-Soviet space. He has 
worked in a number of Russia’s major news outlets, including  Lenta.ru, 
RBC and Republic.ru (former Slon.ru). His work has also appeared in 
Russkaya Planeta, Novoye Vremya, Meduza and Carnegie. 
21 Vladimir Putin: “The collapse of the USSR is a major geopolitical disaster of the 
century,” Regnum.ru, 25 April 2005.
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HISTORY AS A WEAPON
History has often been used and misused for political purposes. 
Over the last few years, the Kremlin has turned to history as an 
“information weapon” to outflank opposition to its annexation of 
Crimea. Its instrumentalization of the past has succeeded so far in 
mobilizing domestic support for the regime; on the peninsula itself, 
it has helped create a degree of acceptance for Russia’s de facto 
rule. 
However, its effect has been much more limited elsewhere. 
The Kremlin’s politics of memory1 has not led to the international 
recognition of Crimea that Russia might have hoped for; neither has 
it convinced the Crimean Tatar minority, politicians in Kyiv, most 
of the Ukrainian public, or policy makers in the West.2 
HISTORY AND INFORMATION SECURITY
No doubt, the Kremlin has intensified its use of history as a form 
of propaganda since the beginning of the Ukrainian Revolution of 
2013–2014. It increased further after the Winter Olympics finished 
in Sochi, and Russia embarked on its annexation of Crimea. 
1 The term “politics of memory,” used in the article, is understood as conscious 
promotion of historical interpretations and statements by politicians aiming at 
reaching political goals. Propaganda does not need to be, but might be a part of 
politics of memory. 
2 While some anti-establishment nationalist politicians across Europe have 
embraced Russia’s historical interpretations, those in the political mainstream are 
still largely skeptical.
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However, only the intensity is new. The regime of Vladimir Putin 
has long paid special attention to the past and has usually looked 
at it through a military lens. The Information Security Doctrine of 
the Russian Federation was adopted as early as September, 2000. It 
described “historical traditions” as a part of the country’s “spiritual 
life,” which can be harnessed for the purpose of defending the 
Russian Federation.3 
Continuity in that respect was preserved in several other 
documents on security issues, mostly those dealing with information 
warfare and youth education programmes.4 Every attempt to 
promote a vision of history that deviates from the Kremlin line has 
long been treated as a danger to Russian security. That emphasis 
has remained largely the same. The latest Information Security 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation, adopted on 5 December 
2016, defines how, in what is termed “the information sphere,” 
the protection of “historical and moral values” in Russia is part 
of the national interest. The document describes the influence of 
information from the West in general terms, but with a defensive 
tone: “There is a growing information pressure on the population 
of Russia, primarily on the Russian youth, with the aim to erode 
Russian traditional spiritual and moral values.”5 
Russia’s main goal in this regard, the document contends, 
is a neutralization of information, especially any that could 
undermine historical and patriotic traditions. This document claims 
to be purely defensive, above all with the collective memory of its 
own citizens in mind. Yet it does not rule out the use of its politics 
of memory for power projection beyond Russia’s borders. Indeed, 
the Russian government refers to the past frequently as a means of 
convincing the international community that its actions in Central 
3 Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation adopted in 
September 2000, www.pravo.gov.ru. 
4 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 adopted in May 
2009, www.pravo.gov.ru; National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation 
adopted in December 2015, www.pravo.gov.ru; The State Programme “Patriotic 
Education of the Russian Federation’s citizens” 2016–2020, http://government.ru/
media/files/8qqYUwwzHUxzVkH1jsKAErrx2dE4q0ws.pdf.
5 Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation adopted in 
December 2016, www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_
publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2563163.
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and Eastern Europe can be justified. Appeals to international law, in 
the Kremlin’s statutory interpretation, appear secondary to Russian 
officials; arguments based on historical rights are given precedence. 
Historically, of course, the Kremlin’s control over the region 
spanned far beyond Russia’s borders with an ease that international 
law today explicitly rules out.
CYBER TACTICS AND “FASCIST” LABELS
On a number of occasions, the Kremlin has shown a willingness 
and ability to use political and technological measures, including 
cyberattacks, to uphold a Soviet interpretation of the World War II. 
The importance of this interpretation is that it paints Russia as 
a liberator in Central and Eastern Europe, rather than an occupier 
and oppressor. When this is questioned by other governments, 
the Kremlin has kicked back fiercely. For instance, the Estonian 
government in 2007 decided to relocate the Bronze Soldier 
Monument and bodies of Red Army Soldiers. Russia condemned 
this move. Shortly after, a cyberattack against Estonia’s government 
servers was launched. Though never proven, the Kremlin was 
widely suspected of being behind the attack. 
Another conflict flared up when the European Parliament 
debated the responsibility of the USSR for the outbreak of World 
War II, condemning crimes committed by the Soviet regime. In 
2008, Parliament established the European Day of Remembrance 
for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism to be commemorated on 
23 August, when the Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty was signed. Then 
in July 2009 the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution 
“Divided Europe Reunited,” saying that both Stalin’s USSR and 
Hitler’s Nazi Germany are responsible for various crimes, including 
genocide.6 
6 “Resolution on divided Europe Reunited: promoting human rights and civil 
liberties in the OSCE region in the 21st century,” in: OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
and Resolutions Adopted at the Eighteenth Annual Session. Vilnius, 29 June to 
3 July 2009, pp. 48–49.
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The moves by European institutions clashed with Russia’s 
view, which was far more sympathetic towards the Soviet Union’s 
actions. By and large, the Kremlin contends that the Soviet Union 
forced into signing a treaty with Germany because of the duplicitous 
appeasement policies of France and Great Britain. So the Kremlin 
established a special Commission designed to dispute the OSCE 
and the European Parliament, which was called “the Presidential 
Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to 
Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests,” and which 
was dissolved over three years later, in 2012. The State Duma and 
the Federation Council both also issued an official protest against 
the OSCE resolution.7 
PUTIN SETS THE STAGE
All arguments spread by Russia during its conflict with Ukraine 
are based on its conviction that the latter is an “artificial state,” 
as stated by Putin in 2008. Thus, Kyiv should not be allowed to 
pursue its foreign policy independently and all other states should 
accept Ukraine as Russia’s sphere of influence. History served as 
a platform to advance such arguments. Once the protests in Kyiv 
broke out in November 2013, Moscow started to wage a high-
intensity information assault with arguments based on the past.
Kremlin-controlled media depicted the Maidan as a fascist 
movement, inspired or even organized by the West, so as to 
frighten Russian-language speakers living in the eastern parts of 
Ukraine who still held strong ties to Russian news and culture. 
Maidan supporters were presented as heirs to the Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists—responsible for collaboration with Nazi-
Germany during the World War II—and in the same vein as the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which committed many war crimes, 
including genocide against the Poles. It showed one side of the 
7 Zayavlene Soveta Palaty Soveta Federacii Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy 
Federacii i Soveta Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy 
Federacii v svyazi s prinyatem Parlamentskoy assambleey OBSE re zo lyucii 
“Vossoedineniye razdelennoy Evropy: pooshchrenie prav cheloveka i graz hdanskikh 
svobod v regyone OBSE v XXI veke,” www.duma.gov.ru/news/273/58991.
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truth, but deliberately omitted the other—that both organizations 
are also perceived by many Ukrainians as a force fighting for the 
independence of Ukraine, defenders against enforced Sovietization.8 
The essence of historical propaganda spread by Kremlin 
during the Maidan and after the annexation of Crimea is 
encapsulated in Putin’s speech of 18 March 2014.9 Although his 
speech was directed first of all to Russian citizens as a way of 
generating domestic support, messages based on history that are 
addressed to foreign countries are also easily noticeable.
Russia’s president focused on two periods: the medieval 
Ruthenia (Rus’) and the epoch of the Soviet Union. His speech 
reflected two general convictions which are widespread in Russia. 
According to the first one, the medieval Ruthenia (Rus’) was an 
exclusively Russian state.10 The second belief says that Ukrainians 
and Russians are de facto the same people. 
He stated in the speech that Vladimir/Volodymyr the Great, 
having baptized himself in Chersonesus in the 10th century, had 
established a civilizational basis, which links Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belarusians. But this ideological conception of the all-Russian 
nation appeared only in the 17th century, and only became a firmly 
established idea and ideological concept of the Russian Empire in 
the 19th century. According to it, the pan-Russian nation consists 
of three “tribes:” Great Russians (Muscovites, later Russians), Little 
Russians (Ruthenians, later Ukrainians) and White Russians (White 
Ruthenians, later Belarusians). Although Lenin and his comrades 
in the first years of the Bolshevik regime rejected it as a bourgeois 
and a “product” of Tsarist imperialism, in the Stalin-era the “three 
tribes” theory was revived in a modified form as a concept of “three 
fraternal nations.” 
Further, the president of Russia referred to the Soviet times, 
presenting himself as a man who brings back historical justice. His 
negative statement concerning Bolsheviks’ national policy could be 
8 Stavlennya do vyznannya OUN-UPA, zhovten’ 2015, http://ratinggroup.ua/
files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_upa_ua_102015.pdf. 
9 Address by President of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
10 The Russian language, in comparison to English, Polish and Ukrainian, does 
not distinct between terms “relating to Ruthenia” and “relating to Russia.”
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treated as an announcement of the upcoming Russian intervention 
in Eastern Ukraine. In other words, not only does the Kremlin use 
history to justify its actions retrospectively, but also in advance of 
its next ones. A form of preparing the ground.
Putin expressed his profound disappointment that the 
Bolsheviks after the Revolution incorporated “the sizable territories 
of historical Southern Russia.”11 By that he meant several Ukrainian 
oblasts: Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk (now Dnipro), Zaporizhzhya, 
Mykolayiv, Kherson, Odessa. In April 2014 those lands became 
a main goal of the operation “Russian Spring” launched by the 
Kremlin, which aimed at the dismemberment of the Ukrainian 
state, or, as a minimal goal, making the Ukraine dysfunctional. 
One month later Putin used a historical term “Novorossiya,” a term 
coined in the 18th century, as a way of describing South Eastern 
Ukraine.12
Thereafter, the president of Russia exploited the Soviet period 
in order to boost his popularity and present himself as a man who 
repairs historical failures by conducting a “referendum” on the 
peninsula. He condemned the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for 
having made Crimea a part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. This was, 
in Putin’s view, a betrayal of local inhabitants, who had supposedly 
not been consulted. Putin omitted any mention that the majority of 
Crimea’s inhabitants voted in 1991 in a referendum for Ukraine’s 
independence.
The Kremlin has actively sought to dampen any revolutionary 
idealism emanating from Kyiv’s Maidan movement, the subsequent 
ousting of President Yanukovych, or from the reforms that have 
followed. History once again has been useful. Equating the history 
of the “Great Patriotic War” with the current situation engages 
Russian citizens and draws in Russian volunteers, who join the 
self-declared “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.” Such 
analogies constitute emotional bond between Russians and 
their government, which can present itself as a guard of national 
memory. Meanwhile, accusing the Ukrainian government of 
“fascism” has been damaging. Firstly, it aimed at delegitimizing 
11 Address by the President of the Russian Federation…, op.cit.
12 Ibidem.
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the new Ukrainian government in the eyes of European public 
opinion. Secondly, similar to the case of Russian citizens, appeals 
to the history of the World War II provide one of many ideological 
motivations for foreign mercenaries from Serbia, Italy, France, 
Spain, who joined the side of Russia-backed separatist republics in 
the Eastern Ukraine.
In order to strengthen the credibility of this argument on 
3 April 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defense published selected 
declassified reports from the World War II: those concerning 
the collaboration of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) with 
Germany.13 The supposed threat of Ukrainian fascism has been 
heralded by the Kremlin, regardless of the results of the last 
parliamentary elections in Ukraine in October 2014, where the far-
right party Svoboda won just 4.7%, and the similarly nationalist 
Right Sector got only 1.8%.
Putin’s statements have been repeated throughout the 
conflict. The one historical argument that fell into disuse almost 
immediately was a parallel between the “reunification” of Crimea 
and the unification of West and East Germany in 1989. 
A public opinion poll, conducted in Russia shortly after the 
annexation of Crimea and Putin’s speech, showed this strategy 
worked well in terms of mobilizing support of the society for the 
regime. Putin’s tactic of positioning himself as a true defender of 
national history, who brings historical justice, earned him gains 
in approval ratings. His approval increased by 25% compared 
to January 2014, reaching a level of 80%.14 A poll, conducted in 
February 2017, showed that almost every second Russian citizen 
is proud of the “return” of Crimea (43%).15 Furthermore, the vast 
majority of Russian citizens (97%) agree with a statement that 
Crimea is as a part of Russia, with 78% claiming that its “accession” 
13 Deyatel’nost’ organizaciy ukrainskikh nacionalistov v gody otechestvennoy 
voyny, http://mil.ru/files/morf/una.pdf.
14 “Martovskie reytingi odobreniya i doveriya,” Levada.ru, 26 March 2014, 
www.levada.ru/2014/03/26/martovskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-2.
15 “Gordost’ i styd,” Levada.ru, 1 March 2017, www.levada.ru/2017/03/01/
gordost-i-styd.
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brought a benefit for Russia.16 This success in terms of mobilizing 
the public by means of referring to history contains an emotional 
dimension. For 79% of respondents, the annexation of Crimea 
demonstrates a “return to the traditional role of Russia,” namely 
a great power.17 41% (the highest number in last 10 years) of 
Russian citizens believe that Russia is among the most influential 
countries.18 
On the other hand, the Kremlin’s politics of memory 
concerning the peninsula was far less successful at the international 
level and did not prevent an imposition of sanctions by the West. 
The international community has not recognized Crimea as a part 
of Russia.
NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND CHANGE OF PRIORITIES
The intensity of Kremlin anti-Ukrainian historical propaganda 
decreased after signing the second round of ceasefire agreements 
brokered in Minsk, known as Minsk II. The intensity diminished 
as it became less likely that Russia would be able to impose its 
vision of a “federalized” Ukraine. In Putin’s annual addresses to the 
Russian Federal Assembly in 2015 and 2016 there were scarcely 
any mentions of Ukraine. Overall, it seems that the political project 
“Novorossiya” has been put on ice, if not abandoned completely. 
Moreover, hardly any new narrative concerning Ukraine has been 
developed by Russia up to this point. After Minsk-II, other events at 
the international level took Russian attention away from Ukraine. In 
September 2015, Russia officially intervened in the Syrian civil war. 
16 The methodology of this survey is questionable. The question “Do you agree 
with a statement that Crimea is Russia?” is biased and suggests affirmative answer. 
“Krym i Sevastopol’: tri goda s Rossiey,” VTSIOM, 16 March 2017, https://wciom.
ru/index.php? id=236&uid=116112. However, a public opinion poll, conducted 
by the Levada Centre in April 2016, showed similar result: 87% of Russians think 
that Crimea ought to be a part of Russia. “Krym dva goda spust’ya: vnimanie, 
ocenki, sankcyi,” Levada.ru, 7 April 2016, www.levada.ru/2016/04/07/krym-dva-
goda-spustya-vnimanie-otsenki-sanktsii; “Krym i Sevastopol’: tri goda s Rossiey,“ 
op.cit.
17 “Krym dva goda spust’ya...,” op.cit.
18 “Sankcii ne strashny,” Levada.ru, 31 Jannuary 2017, www.levada.ru/2017/01/ 
31/sanktsii-ne-strashny.
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Although Moscow’s main goal is still active—it aims at 
changing Ukraine into a Russian protectorate—is priorities have 
changed. Russia is trying to lift Western sanctions, shift the axioms 
of world order and bring about desirable, from its own point of 
view, leadership change in the most influential states. 
The general downgrading of Ukraine historical themes 
was clearly visible in a TV interview “Direct Line” with Putin in 
April 2015. Having said that Ukrainians and Russians were “one 
people,” he criticized Kyiv for changing when it celebrated Victory 
Day—May 8 instead of Russia’s (and the USSR’s) May 9. Further, 
Putin remarked that this was an another attempt aiming at depriving 
“those who treasure historical memory of our common victory.”19  
The commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the end of 
the World War II demonstrated even more vividly this shift in 
Moscow’s priorities. Putin did not refer to Ukraine, but pointed out 
the spirit of cooperation between the U.S., the USSR, France and 
Great Britain, which had led to the defeat of the Third Reich. This 
claim served as a platform to advance a political proposal, namely 
“a creation of a system of equal security.”20 In other words, Putin 
projected a vision of a new Yalta, which would anew recognize 
and re-establish sphere of influences. 
The article on Russian foreign policy published by Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov on 3 March 2016 unpacked 
those claims extensively.21 The text was addressed to Western 
leaders. A vision of global affairs and prospective role for Russia, 
presented by Lavrov, is based on historical determinism: each 
country is doomed to play a role which stems from its history. 
The most important message for Western politicians: any attempt 
to exclude Russia from the top table are doomed to failure, and 
would only prompt destabilization. To back this up, Lavrov pointed 
19 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin on 16 April 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/49261.
20 Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossii na parade, posvyashchyonnom 70-letiyu 
Pobedy v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne, 9 May 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/
president/transcripts/49438.
21 S. Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background, The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 3 March 2016, www.mid.ru/en/foreign_
policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2124391.
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to the lessons of the past, which showed Russia had been playing 
a positive stabilizing and peacekeeping role since the 10th century. 
In that context only Russia was mentioned by Lavrov as a successor 
of Kyivan Rus’. Therefore, one may assume that no other country 
has a right to consider Kyivan Rus’ as a part of its own history and 
national heritage. Every time when the stability of Europe was in 
danger Moscow was a stabilizing and peacekeeping factor. The 
Vienna Congress 1815 was the most vivid example of it, according 
to the Russian MFA. 
Lavrov devoted special attention to the USSR. He stressed 
its positive role by securing victory over the Nazis in the World 
War II and its impact on the Western project of welfare state, which 
was developed because of socialist ideas emanating from the 
Soviet Union. The subjugation of the Eastern and Central European 
countries by Moscow after the year 1945 was not mentioned. 
Instead, Lavrov stated that any description of the World War II 
as “the clash of two totalitarianisms” is “groundless and immoral.” 
He noted, as an aside, that the upcoming 100th anniversary of 
the Russian Revolution 1917 might be used by “many” to wage 
“information attacks on Russia.” 
Russia, in Lavrov’s vision of history, repaired mistakes made by 
other countries. Having underscored the essential cultural difference 
of Russia, he called for “the partnership of civilizations.” One of the 
obstacles to overcome on the way to such a partnership, according to 
Lavrov, was “the Ukraine crisis caused by the coup in Kyiv.” 
On the basis of Lavrov’s vision, one may assume that Central 
and Eastern European countries are treated by Russia rather as an 
object of international relations, not with their own independent 
ability to act. The Kremlin believes that the “liberation” of those 
countries by the Red Army in 1944–1945 gave Russia “a special 
title” and Russia has a right to protect its “legitimate interests” 
in these states, de facto—hence depriving them of a part of their 
national sovereignty. 
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RUSSIAN MONUMENTAL DIPLOMACY
In this battle over historical frameworks in Central and Eastern 
Europe, monuments still play a key part. A good illustration of 
Russian claims might be the Polish-Russian debate over the so-
called monuments of gratitude to Soviet soldiers. These objects 
were erected by Poland’s communist regime soon after the end 
of the World War II, and have been slowly dismantled after 1989. 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine damaged Russia in the eyes of Polish 
public opinion, and some communities decided to remove various 
monuments from their neighborhoods, perceived as symbol of 
the Polish submission to the Soviet Union. Russia reacted swiftly. 
In September 2015, shortly after one of these decisions, Russia’s 
Ambassador to Poland, Sergey Andreev, claimed that Poland had 
been partly responsible for being invaded in 1939. He also criticized 
a taking down of the monument to General Ivan Chernyakhovsky, 
who most Polish historians hold largely responsible, along with 
General Ivan Serov, for the repression of the Polish underground 
national forces—a part of allied armed forces—in 1944.22 Later, 
a spokesman for the Russian MFA, Maria Zakharova, equated the 
dismantling of Soviet monuments in Poland to acts of terrorism in 
the Middle East. Then, on December 18, the Russian Duma adopted 
a special resolution with similar analogies.23
The case of monuments in Poland is also specific because of 
a treaty which regulates this issue. Its official texts drawn up differs 
significantly in each language. The Russian version is imprecise, 
and can be interpreted as providing protection to “monuments of 
gratitude,” whereas the Polish version refers unambiguously only 
to graveyards.24 
22 Interv’yu Posla Rossii v Pol’she S.V.Andreyeva korrespondentu pol’skogo 
telekanala TVN 24 Brygide Grysyak 23.09.2015, available on the website of the 
Russian Embassy to Poland: http://poland.mid.ru/ru_RU.
23 O nedopustimosti oskverneniya i razrusheniya mest pamyati i zakhoroneniy 
sovetskikh voynov v Respublike Pol’sha, Gosudarstvennaya Duma, 16 December 
2015, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(ViewDoc)?OpenAgent&arhiv/a_dp.nsf/ 
ByID&1380269032D6418A43257F250050C29B.
24 More, see Ł. Adamski, “Russia’s “Monumental” Anti-diplomacy,” Intersection, 
20 December 2015, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-europe/russias-
monumental-anti-diplomacy.
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THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AS A SPECIAL ACTOR
Although Russian Orthodox Church policy of memory in certain 
spheres differs from the Russian government, as for instance in the 
case of remembering Stalin, its vision of Ukrainian history is by 
and large compatible with Kremlin views. It is a true believer of the 
All-Russian nation conception and propagates the idea of a Russian 
World (Russkiy Mir). The first ever meeting between the head of the 
Catholic Church and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church on 
12 February 2016, is a good indication of how the Church could be 
used as a herald of an historical narrative that undermines Ukraine. 
The declaration accepted by Pope Francis and Patriarch 
Kyrill supports the Russian interpretation of the history of Eastern 
Europe, and the disavowal of Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian 
ones. The translation of the title of Kirill, “the Patriarch of All Rus’” 
into English as “of all Russia” demonstrates acceptance, perhaps 
in an unconscious way, of the Russian tradition to identify Rus’ 
with Russia.25 It promotes indirectly a vision of history, according 
to which Belarusians and Ukrainians emerged as de facto 
“separatists”—a community broken away from the naturally united 
people of Rus’—Russia.
Further, the situation in Ukraine was described in “Aesopic 
language.” In the declaration hardly any mention about Russia’s 
role in the war can be found (see paragraph 26). The lack of such 
a claim reinforces the leitmotif of Russian propaganda that a civil 
war is raging in Ukraine. 
The speeches held by Kyrill during an unveiling of the 
monument to the Vladimir/Volodymyr the Great in Moscow 
on 4 November 2016 demonstrate more vividly that the idea of 
an All-Russian nation, presented in the Joint Declaration, is still 
strongly supported by the Orthodox Church. Having said that the 
continuity of the Russian statehood from medieval Ruthenia (Rus’) 
to the Russian Federation exists, the Patriarch Kirill emphasized 
that the grand Prince of Kyiv is a symbol of unity of all peoples 
25 “Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill,” Vatican Radio, 
12 February 2016, http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2016/02/12/joint_declaration_
of_pope_francis_and_patriarch_kirill/ 1208117.
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of historic Ruthenia (Rus’). Interestingly, he did not mention the 
USSR at all. A comfortable accompaniment to Putin’s parallel 
between Vladimir’s/Volodymyr’s state and the Russian Federation, 
where Putin claimed that the ruler of the Kyivan Rus’ back in the 
10th century had centralized his state and united Russian (russkiye) 
lands.26 
HISTORY MATTERS
The Kremlin has not succeeded in its attempts to isolate and exhaust 
Ukraine. Moscow also has not convinced Western countries that 
their policy of sanctions is useless and stabilization might be 
reached only if Moscow’s proposals are accepted. On the other 
hand, the Kremlin’s stated aim, defined as a preservation of the 
stability of the regime, has been achieved.
The year 2017 will mark three very important anniversaries 
in Russia: the centennial of the February and October revolutions 
and the 80th anniversary of the Great Purges. Together with the 
elections that are to be held in EU countries (Germany, France, UK) 
and the ongoing presidency of Donald Trump in the U.S. the year 
2017 bring a new chapter in international relations. 
The Kremlin has several times shown that it misuses history 
and treats it as a means to destabilize and undermine the sovereignty 
of other countries. Since Russian officials believe that Russian 
interests, including claims based on history, ought to be superior 
than the confines of international law, one can hardly hope that 
Moscow will cease to use history as an “information weapon.”
Bartłomiej Gajos is a research fellow at the Centre for Polish-Russian 
Dialogue and Understanding and a PhD student at the Institute of History 
in the Polish Academy of Sciences. 
26 Monument to Vladimir the Great opened in Moscow on Unity Day, 
4 November 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53211.
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2014–2016: A NEW RUSSIAN ARMY GOES TO WAR
Several factors explain the current state of the Russian armed forces 
and their various deployments over the last few years. First of all, 
Russia’s ruling elite strives to maintain power in the country and 
strengthen its world stage presence at all costs. Secondly, Russia’s 
military-industrial complex depends on increased state spending. 
Thirdly, the experience of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War has 
played an important role, in much the same way as lessons were 
learned from the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq carried out by 
the U.S. and its allies. 
Russia’s military engagements since 2014 show increased 
quality and quantity. Clearly, Russia’s military now has greater 
potential to project force. However, these conflicts have also 
revealed that the Kremlin’s options are somewhat limited. 
LESSONS FROM GEORGIA: REFORM AND REARMAMENT
Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008 made it clear to Kremlin 
officials that the Russian army was ill-prepared for modern warfare. 
The victory over the Georgian army came at a heavy cost. This 
military unpreparedness was accompanied by a total lack of 
efficiency. Russia’s growth model, already under strain, struggled 
with the inclusion of poorly coordinated military spending and 
planning. Against the backdrop of ever more confrontational 
relations with the West, a question arose: How was the ruling 
elite going to maintain Russia’s foreign-policy status? After all, it 
was precisely the status of the “great superpower” which afforded 
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representatives of this very class the chance to maintain their 
power, wealth, immunity against potential criminal prosecutions 
and to count on integration with the European establishment. 
Reform of the armed forces, enacted shortly after the conflict 
in Georgia, proved to be an effective corrective. This has led the 
Kremlin to rely on its military force increasingly ever since in terms 
of developing policy aimed at system and power preservation.
Underlying these reforms was a clear objective: to build 
a modern, combat-capable army characterized by high mobility 
and equipped for victory in the event of a short-term local conflict 
beyond Russia’s borders. This has led to brigades becoming the 
main component of ground forces, and their rearmament has 
become one of the key tenets of these reforms. Another keynote 
of these reforms were a focus on speeding up deployment and 
boosting the capacity of communication and intelligence systems. 
The number of combat-ready troops the Kremlin hopes to have 
at its disposal is somewhere between 120–150 thousand personnel 
until 2020, though it does not have a time frame for exactly when 
this will be a reality. There approximately 80 thousand combat 
ready troops today and less than 30 thousand prior to the reform.1 
Among other things, the 120–150 thousand target has come from 
heeding the experience gained by the U.S. and other NATO 
countries during the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, where 150–160 
thousand boots were on the ground at any given time. There is 
also a technical aspect to the reform: changes designed to fit with 
contemporary communication and intelligence systems, effective 
in providing troops with information and operation management. 
At the same time, the reform was not meant to pose a threat 
to the Russian political regime as such. On the contrary, regardless 
of all these changes, it was devised to maintain power relations 
associated with a vast army and to exclude even the faintest 
possibility of politicizing the most combat-ready units. Although 
the term of compulsory military service has been reduced to 1 year, 
the conscription program very much remains in force (nearly 
 130 – 150 thousand men aged 18–27 are conscripted twice a year). 
1 “Kolichestvo batal’onnykh takticheskikh grupp v rossiyskoy armii vozrastet 
pochti vdvoye,” TASS, 14 September 2016, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3620165.
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Russian authorities are resistant to changing the military education 
system. 
One of the most significant milestones in the preparation 
of the Russian army for 21st century warfare came in the form of 
attempts to purchase European arms and establish military industrial 
relationships with European arms manufacturers. Relations with 
France (Mistral helicopter carriers), Germany (a contract with the 
Rheinmetal company to equip a military training center in Mulino) 
and Italy (Iveco armored vehicles and Centauro wheeled tanks) were 
the most notable examples. Cooperation with European countries 
enabled the procurement of a wide range of equipment (from radio 
stations for tanks to industrial machines) and even paved the way 
for the development of Russia’s military space program. 
There was no contradiction between the anti-Western vector 
in Russian politics and cooperation with individual EU member 
states. After all, Moscow has a history of forging “special relations” 
with individual countries. The notions of North-Atlantic or EU unity 
are alien to Russia in this regard. 
Attempts to equip Russian forces with arms manufactured 
partly in Europe have resulted in an acute conflict between the 
Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian military industry 
represented, by and large, by the Rostec state-owned corporation. 
The conflict was further aggravated (and lasted until Minister 
Anatoly Serdyukov was replaced by Sergey Shoygu in 2012) when 
the 20 trillion ruble State Armaments Program for 2011–2020 (SAP 
2020) was adopted in early 2011. 
Moreover, as little as 15% was allocated for the rearmament 
of ground forces as part of the SAP while a further 14% was 
allocated specifically for military communications, intelligence and 
management systems. 24% was to be spent on the purchase of new 
aircraft and helicopters, and another 17% on air and missile defense, 
radars and military satellites. Nearly a quarter of the program’s 
budget was earmarked for the navy. The rearmament of Russia’s 
Strategic Missile Forces included new intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, which accounted for 5% of all of planned spending.2 
2 Gosudarstvennyye programmy vooruzheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii: problemy 
ispolneniya i potentsial optimizatsii, Center for Analysis of Strategies and 
Technologies, 2015, p. 23.
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As little as 2.5 trillion rubles had been spent under the SAP 
2020 by 2014 and the authorities planned expenditure for the 
first year of the war against Ukraine totaled 1.4 trillion rubles.3 
However, the results of changes and increased military spending 
have been reflected in the invasion of Crimea and the subsequent 
conflict in the Donbas.
Military capability was overtly lagging far behind schedule 
by this time. On the plus side, the Russian authorities came to 
realize that the West did not speak with one voice when it came 
to defending principles. This realization came about as a result of 
the diplomatic game which commenced in the aftermath of the 
Russo-Georgian War, the events of the Arab Spring, and the Syrian 
civil war. 
First of all, Moscow noted in August 2008 that unlike the 
U.S., the “old” EU member states were willing to turn a blind eye to 
Russia’s ambitions of establishing a sphere of “special interest” in the 
post-Soviet space. Secondly, the West demonstrated indecisiveness 
when it came to Middle Eastern affairs for the first time in centuries 
during the 2011 Arab Spring. Thirdly, the level of apprehension 
reached its zenith with the “chemical weapons deal” concluded 
in Syria in September 2013—the U.S. eagerly agreed to it, having 
abandoned any intention of using force, which was interpreted by 
the Kremlin solely as a sign of weakness. 
As a result, Russian policy makers aimed at fostering the 
deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Europe. The idea 
was to create special conditions for Russia’s existence against the 
backdrop of the country’s inability to adapt to contemporary global 
norms. Yet this was inevitably fraught with potential for conflict. 
Admittedly, the Kremlin was growing less wary of this prospect 
and hence it resorted to the use of force without a second’s thought 
in response to the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. The Kremlin 
perceived that through this revolution, the system of distribution of 
power and ownership was under threat. 
3 P. Luzin, “The degree of militarism,” Intersection, 12 December 2016, 
http://intersectionproject.eu/articles/security/degree-militarism.
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CRIMEA AND THE DONBAS: NON-LINEAR ENGAGEMENTS
“Hybrid warfare”—that is, non-linear war—is often described as 
strikingly novel but is actually nothing of the sort.4 This classic tactic 
was introduced back in Tsarist Russia and was ultimately mastered by 
the Bolsheviks. At the core of this ploy is the requirement for troops 
to engage under the guise of supposedly local and independent 
political forces, rebelling against the incumbent authorities and/or 
coming to the rescue of such forces. In reality, the political leaders 
of these rebels have been under Russia’s control from the very outset 
and these troops have often been on standby should the need for 
them to be called in arise. The Bolsheviks themselves seized power 
in Russia in 1917 under the pretext of an alleged national uprising 
and had the backing of the organized military force of the Petrograd 
Garrison. 
The annexing of Crimea and the onset of hostilities in the 
Donbas followed a similar scenario which it is not necessary to 
revisit here as it is rather more pertinent to focus on key military-
and-political aspects of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 
The very fact of the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent 
“Novorossiya” project meant that the Kremlin was certain: it would 
be able to dismantle Ukrainian statehood as such. It is noteworthy 
that given the number of combat-ready units, military occupation 
of all regions of Ukraine and protracted warfare were out of the 
question. According to the Russian plan, activists loyal to Moscow 
along with militants and instructors were to paralyze authorities 
in large industrial Ukrainian cities and establish control over 
them. Encouragement could be taken from the fact that following 
the 2009 terrorist attack in Mumbai, it had become clear that 
a well-organized group can be capable of immobilizing an entire 
metropolis. 
In this situation, Russian troops should have, at the very 
least, operated within the framework of humanitarian aid and/or 
peacekeeping missions launched from the territory of Russia and 
4 However there are different interpretations of the Russia’s non-linear warfare, 
for example: M. Galeotti, “Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia’s non-
linear military challenge right,” Mayak Intelligence, 2016.
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Crimea. The goals would have included: extinguishing outbursts 
of organized resistance of the Ukrainian army; the taking of key 
infrastructure and the demoralization of Ukraine’s leaders and the 
entire elite as such. Officially, they would have only been interested 
in the disengagement of the warring parties in the civil conflict 
and Moscow would have held all the diplomatic cards under such 
circumstances. 
However, this was a miscalculation. Deeply underestimated 
was the role of Ukrainian civil solidarity. Overestimated was the 
will of local residents in large Ukrainian cities (except for Donetsk 
and Luhansk) that would be loyal to Russia. On the battlefields, the 
unexpectedly robust resistance put up by the Ukrainian army was 
also a stumbling block for Russia. 
So how could Russia implement its initial plan, maintain 
potential for a diplomatic maneuver and avoid becoming engaged in 
a protracted, conventional war? Moscow was forced to address this 
question in the context of the West demonstrating an unexpectedly 
high level of solidarity when assessing these developments. 
The Russian army, continually rearming and increasing the 
number of combat-ready units, faced a difficult task. The army 
had to act as a deterrent to the Ukraine’s military by constantly 
maintaining a threat originating from Russian territory. It was tasked 
with supplying militant units operating on behalf of the Donetsk 
People’s Republic (DNR)/ Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and 
engaging on the battlefield with composite groups—formed by 
soldiers from various units—independent of any air support and 
under the guise of “militant-volunteers.” 
The Kremlin discarded the idea of a fully-fledged 
“humanitarian” invasion of Ukraine as early as in August 2014 in 
the aftermath of the downing of the MH17 flight with the use 
of a Russian Buk-M1 air defense system and the serious losses 
suffered in the battle of Ilovaisk. However, in the absence of such 
a prospect, the objectives behind all the planned changes including 
the rearmament program had to be readdressed.
Consequently, the Russian army could not act alone in pursuit 
of Moscow’s political goals. It became necessary to impose such 
conditions on Ukraine in order to retain the territory of the DNR/
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LNR and exert further military and political pressure on Ukraine in 
the hope of prompting a new casus belli. 
As a result, these ploys, designed to entrap Ukraine, 
continued, spanning the stillborn Minsk-1 ceasefire agreement and 
the developments of January-February 2015 when the Ukrainian 
army was defeated in a skirmish with militant groups and Russian 
troops in the battle of Donetsk airport and in the city of Debaltseve. 
The Minsk-2 ceasefire agreement was concluded and accordingly, 
Russia became empowered to consolidate the status quo 
indefinitely, to feel safe in the knowledge it had leverage to exert 
diplomatic pressure on Kyiv and, at the same time, leave room for 
maneuver in negotiations with the West. 
The Kremlin focused on the expansion and strengthening 
of deployed armed forces in the following three locations against 
the backdrop of the ensuing confrontation with the West: 1) an 
area around Moscow and to the south of it, towards the Ukrainian 
border; 2) the Kaliningrad Oblast; and 3) occupied Crimea. Joint-
forces troops have been bolstered and enhanced in all three 
locations. 
Thus, the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea are, in fact, turning 
into relative strongholds. These strongholds serve to ensure that 
NATO is at risk of incremental escalation of the conflict including 
nuclear confrontation in the case of any, even hypothetical, attempt 
to suppress the deployed Russian troops with the use of force. It 
should be made clear that the Russian authorities have their own 
interpretation of the causes and results of the overthrows of Saddam 
Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi when implementing policy. 
Alongside the fortification of Kaliningrad and Crimea, the 
headquarters of the 20th army were re-deployed to the Voronezh 
Oblast from Nizhny Novgorod, closer to the border with Ukraine. 
The first Guards Tank Army was formed near Moscow which attests 
to the offensive nature of these units. 
It is also noteworthy that the Russian National Guards, created 
in 2016 on the basis of up to 400 thousand Interior Ministry troops, 
can officially be used outside Russia, for example, in anti-guerrilla 
(formally called anti-terrorist) operations. In other words, National 
Guard troops can take over the task of establishing and maintaining 
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the occupational regime in territories where the Russian army has 
carried out a successful offensive. 
However, it should be emphasized that successful anti-
guerrilla operations are only possible in situations where the 
majority of locals are either loyal or indifferent towards the 
incumbent authorities. In other words, the large-scale use of the 
Russia’s National Guards abroad is largely confined to the post-
Soviet space. 
It turns out that the Kremlin began to develop the Russian 
armed forces in three ways simultaneously based on the experience 
of the war with Ukraine. Initially, the policy of creating a mobile 
and combat-ready contingent of up to 150 thousand, equipped with 
efficient communications and intelligence systems was continued. 
These troops should be prepared for a modern blitzkrieg with 
regular armies outside of Russia (even including the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons). 
Secondly, the Russian regime was to be afforded sufficient 
military guarantees in the case of an attempt by some kind of 
Western or even NATO coalition to defeat it as a response to its 
continued aggressive foreign policy. 
Thirdly, Moscow was to ensure that it was capable not 
only of defeating a regular enemy army on its territory but also 
of establishing a loyal political regime further afield by taking 
advantage of the loyal or indifferent local population. Clearly, there 
are only a few countries in which Moscow would be willing to fight 
for the establishment of a loyal regime yet it is highly likely that 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are among them.
For a variety of reasons, the army has become the main 
tool for Kremlin self-preservation in the global arena since 2014. 
Moreover, a departure from this vector will only be possible in the 
event of a radical political and economic change to the Russian 
regime. 
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RUSSIA IN SYRIA: LIMITED POWER
Unlike in the case of the war with Ukraine, major operations of 
the 2015–2016 Syrian campaign were performed by the air force 
and navy. Russia tried to avoid putting boots on the ground as far 
as possible (if we put Russian mercenaries aside)—mainly special 
operations forces were engaged there. Military police units were 
deployed in Aleppo after the city was taken in late 2016. The units 
were largely made up of natives of Chechnya whose faith was 
closest to the religion practiced by remaining local residents. 
The key long-term objective behind Russia’s actions in Syria 
remained unchanged: to maintain its status as a great superpower 
which would guarantee that the ruling class retains both its power 
and control of assets. There are several aspects to achieving this 
goal in the Middle East.
Russia is trying to forge an alliance with the West (with the 
United States in the first place) against the Islamic State as it plans to 
exploit this later when bargaining over issues vital to the Kremlin. 
Moreover, Russia is trying to occupy political positions so as to 
become a key player in the region without the presence of whom 
no important quandaries can be addressed. 
In addition, fighting on the side of Bashar al-Assad, the 
Kremlin is trying to introduce its own global rules and its own 
interpretation of the notion of state sovereignty. There is no room 
for the social contract theory, the concept of human rights or any 
other values other than power as such. 
However, limitations as regards the Kremlin’s military 
capability have been highlighted over the course of this campaign. 
These hurdles will prove insurmountable in the foreseeable future. 
Thus, for example, it became clear in Syria that Russia had after 
all failed to obtain effective precision weapons and was therefore 
forced to conquer cities the way it was done back in the days of the 
World War II—i.e. by completely obliterating them regardless of 
the potential for civilian casualties. The use of Kalibr-NK long-range 
cruise missiles serves as evidence that the Russian military industry 
is incapable of mass producing advanced weaponry and that the 
reliability of these missiles is relatively low. 
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Apart from strategic submarine cruisers, the Russian navy 
is capable of performing only auxiliary functions. The chances 
of conducting fully-fledged overseas operations remain rather 
slim. It is noteworthy that the famous “Syrian Express”—used for 
transporting cargo from Novorossiysk to Syria—functions thanks to 
large landing ships and second-hand bulk carriers purchased from 
Turkey.
Russia is short of missile cruisers, which it needs to maintain 
the Mediterranean squadron of the Russian navy formed back in 
2013 in connection with the situation in Syria. The crux of the 
matter is that the squadron mainly provides cover for the Syrian 
coast as well as Russian units deployed across the country and, de 
facto, for Bashar al-Assad and his entourage. This cover provides 
protection against potential air strikes given confrontation with the 
West and Moscow’s unsuccessful attempts to force the international 
coalition, headed by the U.S., to establish an alliance with it.
Only 5 Russian missile cruisers and 1 aircraft carrier armed 
with S-300 air defense systems are currently deployed as flagships 
in the Mediterranean squadron. The “Moskva” and “Varyag” missile 
cruisers will undergo maintenance work in 2017 after the “Marshal 
Ustinov” guided missile cruiser has left the repair dock. The 
“Admiral Nakhimov” nuclear-powered battle cruiser is currently 
undergoing long-term revamping which won’t be completed until 
2018. After that, the “Pyotr Velikiy” nuclear-powered battle cruiser 
will likely be modernized. Therefore, only 2 or 3 out of 5 ships 
will be available to take part in squadron rotation over the coming 
years. 
Although the deployment of the only Russian aircraft 
carrier, the “Admiral Kuznetsov,” on the Syrian coast in the fall of 
2016 caused a stir, it very quickly led to a non-combat loss of two 
carrier-based aircraft. The remaining deck-based fighters capable of 
missile-and-bomb strikes against Assad’s enemies actually operate 
from the Russian Latakia air base. When the political opportunity 
appeared at the beginning of 2017, the “Admiral Kuznetsov” was 
withdrawn from Syria. She will also undergo repair.
Of course, the deployment of an aircraft carrier in Syria 
was meant to boost the Kremlin’s diplomatic potential. The logic 
behind it was simple: despite the ineffectiveness of the “Admiral 
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Kuznetsov,” only the U.S. and France are equipped to deploy 
aircraft carriers in contemporary military campaigns aside from 
Russia. However, in the long run, Moscow’s potential to project its 
military might far beyond its borders will remain unchanged and 
could even diminish when the “Admiral Kuznetsov” goes under 
repair. 
Still, a few years ago, Russia negotiated the procurement 
of two French Mistral helicopter carriers and the construction of 
a further two such ships in Russia under license. New capacity for 
overseas campaigns was supposed to strengthen Russia’s position in 
terms of political bargaining with the West and in the international 
arena in general. However, American and European sanctions, 
imposed in the aftermath of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, 
put an end to these plans, much to the surprise of the Kremlin. 
Consequently, it will be precisely troops on the ground which will 
be Moscow’s main military means of achieving its foreign-policy 
goals. 
Russia’s options in terms of the Syrian campaign are few given 
the objective limitations of its military capabilities. If negotiations 
with the West (first and foremost with the United States) are 
unsuccessful, Russia will either have to agree to a partition of Syria 
between Bashar al-Assad, his warlords, opposition forces and ISIS 
or increase the number of Russian boots on the ground. 
Although the idea of more boots on the ground has already 
been given a dry run by the Russian army during drills, supplying 
a large contingent on the ground far from Russian borders could 
prove a difficult task for Moscow. Moreover, it is worth remembering 
that the modernization of the Russian army is intended to enhance 
efficiency in confrontations with regular armies and large-scale 
operations against combatants who have the support of the local 
population. This remains an altogether different challenge to 
deployments in a country like Syria. 
In other words, the Kremlin has most probably plumped for 
diplomacy involving separate talks with key players in the region. 
Regardless of how long the Syrian conflict continues, Moscow will, 
by all means necessary, try to maintain its presence on the ground 
at the current level, with only special operation forces engaging in 
tactical operations. 
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Still, this might result in a vicious cycle. Moscow is unlikely 
to rest on its laurels for very long, even in the case of the conclusion 
and implementation of a most favorable agreement in Syria. Any 
diplomatic victory will soon turn into a Pyrrhic victory against 
the backdrop of the economic impasse and the inability to offer 
an attractive future to Bashar al-Assad (not to mention the Syrian 
people). It turns out that capability and readiness to fight remains 
the only tangible embodiment of Russia’s foreign-policy status—
which means that, in a bid to break the deadlock in one war, the 
Kremlin will almost certainly lunge headlong towards another, 
even against the wishes of some of its leaders. 
Translation: Natalia Mamul
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Economy and International Relations (IMEMO, Russian Academy of 
Sciences). 
7TATIANA STANOVAYA
LEADERSHIP AND BUREAUCRACY  
IN “POST-CRIMEAN” RUSSIA
The events of March 2014, including both the annexing of Crimea 
and wider geopolitical changes, left a deep imprint on President 
Vladimir Putin’s regime and triggered a bifurcation: the country 
began moving in a different direction, followed by a shock period 
which lasted until around early 2016. The country’s leadership and 
bureaucracy needed nearly two years to adapt itself to completely 
unfamiliar and uncomfortable conditions, and to adjust its internal 
mechanisms to a new reality and new challenges. 
“THE TRANSITION PERIOD” OF 2014–2015
The Color Revolutions in the post-Soviet space posed a major 
threat to Putin’s Russia in the early 2000s. Until 2014 Putin’s policy 
response was an attempt to divide influence between Russia and 
the U.S.; tactical and strategic moves were crafted in the hope of 
obtaining a guarantee that the U.S. would not interfere in processes 
occurring within “Russia’s traditional sphere of interest.” In practice, 
this has turned out to be wishful thinking. Lacking leverage to 
protect its own interests, Russia took a radical step and crossed 
a red line by annexing Crimea in March 2014, which instigated 
a profound transformation. Not only in his country’s relations with 
Ukraine and the West, but dramatically reshaping his own regime. 
Until then, stability had been the priority of his regime; it had 
been unable and unwilling to undergo major structural changes in 
government branches or in the wider economy.
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The shift was slow; government needed nearly two years 
to digest the geopolitical crisis and begin to transform itself. The 
country was in the grip of an absolutely unprecedented crisis: the 
geopolitical disaster unrolled hand in hand with plummeting global 
commodity prices that constituted the fundamentals of the Russian 
economy. The crisis was unprecedented in that it was associated 
not only with the country’s downsized financial resources, but 
also new challenges that Putin’s regime had never encountered 
before. Sanctions and a policy of deterrence in general based on an 
unexpectedly strong alliance between Western Europe and the U.S. 
created a sense of deadlock. Even the military campaign in Syria, 
which started in September 2015, had tactical rather than strategic 
objectives: to force the West into a partnership with Russia in the 
face of international terrorism, in the hope of breaking the deadlock 
over Ukraine.
In 2014 and 2015, the regime hesitated over whether to 
choose a conservative stance clearly visible from the beginning 
of the Vladimir Putin’s 3rd presidential term,1 or opt for reforms, 
as urgently demanded by systemic liberals.2 A proposal for an 
early presidential election in an attempt to implement speedy but 
unpopular reforms with minimal political risks—i.e. the re-election 
of Putin followed by reforms—was put forward by Alexey Kudrin 
in 2015. This period was also marked by Putin’s almost total 
withdrawal from decision-making on domestic policy: the president 
focused entirely on geopolitical issues. The bringing forward of the 
election to the State Duma from December to September 2016 was 
symbolic: the aim was to minimize social and political risks, given 
the feeling of uncertainty and growing fears for developments in the 
country. That period was characterized by a feeling of uncertainty 
and the absence of a plan for dealing with the fully-fledged crisis. 
The regime was, as is traditional, moving by inertia towards ultimate 
collapse. 
1 I. Bunin, A. Makarkin, “Nikakogo totalitarisma, tolko konservatsiya i inertsiya,” 
Vedomosti, 22 October 2012, www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2012/10/22/
ot_konservatizma_do_inercii.
2 A. Kudrin, “Kak vernut doverie mezhdu vlastyu, obshchestvom i biznesom,” 
Vedomosti, 21 November 2014, http://info.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/36287891/
kak-vernut-doverie.
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The first signs of internal transformation and adaptation to the 
new reality appeared as late as in early 2016, when Vladimir Putin 
re-embraced a domestic agenda. This was also the onset of the most 
profound “perestroika” in the entire history of Putin’s rule, in the 
retrogressive, historic sense of the word. Such an unprecedented 
revision of the very essence of the regime’s HR policy3 had not 
even been seen during the watershed years of 2004 and 2012. New 
characteristics of the regime were formed two years following the 
annexation of Crimea, becoming indicative of the development of 
the country under “mature” Putin during his 3rd term.
TOWARDS A POST-CRIMEAN PSYCHE
The psychology of any government bureaucracy often absorbs that 
of its leader. As is often said of Putin, he is a tactician not a strategist. 
He is an advocate of realpolitik, who talks of his pragmatic approach 
to foreign policy. (In contrast to the U.S. policy of furthering its 
interests based on an idealist concept of “democratization”). His 
focus is on fostering interdependence mechanisms on energy-
related issues4 and new security architecture, and minimization of 
geopolitical competition via the re-establishment of tacit spheres 
of influence. Yet Putin had grown fully disappointed with the 
potential of this approach by the beginning of his 3rd term in office. 
The strongest conservative wave, an isolationist trend, a “tightening 
of the screws” and a reactionary policy5 were all observed in early 
2012. All were in line with a policy of internal political “shriveling,” 
a search for new “pillars” for the regime and the “spiritual bonds” 
first mentioned by the president in December 2012. Domestic 
policy embraced an axiological component which remained an 
absolutely propagandist, secondary and reactive element of last 
3 T. Stanovaya, “Putin’s New Personnel Policy,” Carnegie.ru, 16 August 2016, 
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64331.
4 T. Stanovaya, “Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii: ispytanie krizisom,” 
Politcom.ru, 27 April 2009, http://politcom.ru/8064.html.
5 Vlast’—elity—obshchestvo: kontury novogo obshchestvennogo dogovora, 
Moscow School of Political Science, February–March 2013, www.msps.su/
files/2013/04/VlastElityObshestvo.pdf.
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resort in foreign policy—a sign of deep disappointment with the 
possibilities of coming to terms with the West. 
Following Putin’s lead, the Russian government has utterly 
changed the psychology behind its policy. Legal depreciation and 
denigration are some of the most significant manifestations of these 
changes: the reduced legal and political value of international and 
national legal norms in the aftermath of the Crimea annexation and 
Russia’s involvement in the Donbas conflict has been noticeable. 
Having crossed the rubicon of the permissible, the regime has 
automatically reduced its level of respect for formalized rules, 
restrictions or principles. It now needs to legitimize its illegal actions. 
Thus, legal depreciation becomes an inevitable consequence of the 
entire set of policies targeted at Ukraine. 
Another—and by no means less important—consequence 
of the annexation of Crimea is Russia’s attempt venturing beyond 
what it saw as its own spheres of interest prior to March 2014. 
Just look at the key policy statements and speeches of the Russian 
leader during his first two terms in office, when he emphasized the 
priority of principles such as non-interference with the affairs of 
other states, territorial integrity and non-violent methods of conflict 
resolution. Moscow was informally delineating its direct spheres 
of interest in those days, within the borders of the former Soviet 
republics. The annexation of Crimea marked Moscow’s violation 
of its own previously declared foreign policies and actively 
protected principles. Russia went far beyond its “traditional sphere 
of influence” afterwards, getting directly involved in the Syrian 
conflict and attempting to affect the domestic political affairs of 
Western countries. 
Vladimir Putin gave up any attempts at finding understanding 
in the West in 2015–2016, switching tactics to one of active 
participation in a game with European countries and the U.S. by fair 
means or foul. A new approach followed: supporting Euro-skeptics 
across the continent, nationalist right-wingers, and any politicians 
sympathetic to Russia and its leader.
This “Extra-zonality,” i.e. going beyond the traditional spheres 
of influence, manifested itself in the emergence of the new threat 
of cyber-attacks from Russia, which have now become a means of 
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influencing and intimidating Western states. Moscow has moved6 
from anti-Western propaganda and promotion of traditional values, 
shared primarily by Russian society, to active involvement with 
external target audiences. The aim being to strengthen the political 
voice of those that oppose the traditional Western political elite, 
and to weaken the West’s value-based approach to foreign policy—
that is, the promotion of democracy around the world as a tool for 
geopolitical expansion. It would be hard to imagine Germany being 
afraid of Russia’s influence on its 2017 parliamentary election five 
years ago, and that “Putin’s interference”7 would become one of 
the hottest topics of the presidential race in the U.S. The Russian 
regime’s new psychology means that Moscow is no longer confined 
to the boundaries of its own “backyard,” and is actively expanding 
its influence far and wide. As long as its resourcefulness is either 
relatively stable or growing, the borders of its “backyard” could be 
moved further into previously unthinkable areas.
“NEW PUTINERS” 
—THE MAIN PILLAR OF POST-CRIMEAN BUREAUCRACY
A shift from a policy of ensuring stability to a policy of administrative 
mobilization took place in 2016. Stability has always been the 
highest priority throughout Putin’s rule. Highly valued and treated 
as a safeguard against the loss of control, it in fact concealed the 
regime’s fear of change, both with respect to HR and to structural 
policy. 
Putin used to try to avoid layoffs and other major staff 
reshuffles. He used to be gentle and careful when it came to the 
people close to him. Putin found it easier to create new structures 
rather than reform existing, inefficient ones, or dismiss their leaders. 
6 T. Stanovaya: “’Opasna, no predskazuyema’. Kak Rossiya napugala mir 
khakerami i prostitutkami,” Republic.ru, 12 January 2017, https://republic.ru/
posts/78445.
7 This Joint Analysis Report (JAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) statement on “GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian Malicious Cyber Activity,” 
29 December 2016, www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20 
296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf.
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Thus, his managerial decisions were peculiar as he found it easier to 
create special institutions to deal with a given problem. This led to 
a bloated multitude of commissioners with unclear competencies; 
the Agency for Strategic Initiatives as an alternative to the Ministry 
of Economic Development, and the special regional ministries that 
bridge the gaps in regional policy. The All-Russian People’s Front 
(ONF) also took on certain quasi-governmental functions. And all 
of this sprawling administrative de-concentration, accompanied 
by corruption as well as the lack of managerial results, used to 
characterize Putin’s governance style prior to Crimea. 
The regime moved to managerial mobilization in 2016: 
the fear of change gave way to the need to create a more viable 
power vertical. This had to do with issues of security rather than 
economy, where the old principles still prevail. The regime 
opted for a personnel shake-up aimed at improved dynamism in 
implementing decisions, de-politicization of top positions and 
technocratic governance. These principles are at the heart of the 
staff reshuffle that affected the management of the FSO (Federal 
Protective Service), the SBP (Presidential Security Service), the 
presidential administration, the Federal Customs Service, governors, 
the FSB (Federal Security Service), and the Investigative Committee. 
Gone are those who made too much ado, caused political conflicts, 
had their own ambitions which were against the “common cause,” 
or, as with Sergey Ivanov, those who were bored with routine and 
did not really delve into detail. Apart from that, there is a growing 
demand for technocrats and managers who are ready to serve 
Putin based on the new principles and are devoted to predefined 
tasks, bypassing clan logic. Managerial posts can also be occupied 
by those who are ready to achieve the maximum at minimum 
cost. A wave of “new Putiners”—technocrats, personal aides and 
bureaucrats—is rising, solidifying. They accompany the president 
every day, but do not enter into dialog with him. 
As a result, Putin has distanced himself from his informal 
entourage of cronies, former comrades-in-arms and associates, and 
is no longer interested in satisfying their needs and demands, which 
have become too expensive. One can therefore see yet another 
peculiarity of the post-Crimean regime: the president is not inclined 
to further maintain and “feed” his own elitist “safety cushion”—i.e. 
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the entourage he entrusted with control over informal spheres of 
influence in the 2000s. The political system will enter a mature 
stage when Putin is able to maintain outright control without the 
support of his entourage. Moreover, at this stage, his “own people” 
have stopped being an asset and have become a burden that 
requires continuous maintenance and attention. 
In this sense, 2016 is indeed a watershed year from the point 
of view of the quality of the ruling elite undergoing a shake-up. The 
Putin elite (cronies and former comrades-in-arms) were invited into 
the government system in the 2000s to solve problems related to 
politics and state apparatus, and their influence has since expanded. 
Subsequently, they have gradually been promoted to significant 
posts in strategic sectors (Rostec, Rosneft or the Russian Railways), 
having formed a dense layer of new oligarchy. However, in 2014–
2016, a distance between the state and this Putin-based oligarchy 
was formed, springing from an ever more clear contradiction 
between the interests of corporations and those of the government. 
“The interests of the company are important, but the interests of the 
entire economy are also at stake,” Vladimir Putin said to the head of 
Rosneft in February 2015. This was in response to Rosneft’s request 
to cut taxes. The head of JSC Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, 
requested subsidies too often and lost his post only a few months 
later. He was not offered substantial compensation, either. The story 
of Rosneft’s privatization8 in December 2016 in accordance with 
Sechin’s exclusive plan is the story of the latter’s triumph. However, 
we should not let it mislead us. In the end, it might turn out to be 
too expensive for the current management of the oil company to 
operate, and become a one-off success. The general tendency to 
distance the oligarchy from the state will continue along with the 
further strengthening of the role of Putin’s technocracy.
The major 2016 reshuffle became the first practical sign 
of the psychological transformation of the regime that had tried 
to adjust to the changing conditions. One could conclude that 
Vladimir Putin crossed the Rubicon in 2016 when he dismissed his 
own people without fear of the wrath of the offended. Political life 
8 T. Stanovaya, “Sdelka goda,” Politkom.ru, 12 December 2016, http://politcom.ru/ 
21855.html.
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has since been devalued—it has become easier to fire people with 
no compulsory damages involved, unlike in the pre-Crimean days. 
Putin believes9 that he earned a place in history in the aftermath 
of the Crimea annexation. He believes he played the role of 
a missionary. Subsequently, he has been distancing himself from 
“earthly concerns,” reconstructing the pyramid of values whereby 
geopolitics replaces the daily routine of socio-economic life, which 
would free himself to neglect the feelings, emotions and interests 
of his “boyars.” 
THE PEOPLE ANNEXED TO THE MISSION
The distance between Putin and his entourage (or cronies) became 
apparent in 2015–2016, while the distance between Putin and 
society will be a matter of the near future. Missionary work is built 
around global, historic tasks, not social interests. Subsequently, 
society will have to fit into Putin’s global project. In the pre-Crimean 
period the president used to take social sentiment into account 
(public opinion polls were carefully studied). But the interests of 
society ceased to be a reference point in his decision-making after 
2014, and have instead become supplementary to the mission. 
This could be called the Crimean syndrome of absolute legitimacy, 
when one major merit of a politician serves to legitimize all of 
their subsequent actions. In psychological terms, society’s interests 
become synonymous with state interests, whereas private, sectoral 
and corporate manifestations of these interests become an anti-state 
factor. This is why, for instance, the authorities equated protests by 
truck drivers to protests by the opposition. 
Lower sensitivity to social issues and a heightened focus on 
the interests of the state can mean that general social policy will 
become more rigid and unpopular, while grassroots discontent 
will be politicized by the authorities themselves (and not society), 
as seen in the trucker protests. In the truck drivers’ case they had 
appealed to the president for help while the state-owned media 
9 Eadem, ”’Ne znayu’ i ‘ne ponimayu’: chto ne tak s Putinim?,” Carnegie.ru, 
17 December 2015, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=62311.
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accused them of acting in the interests of the U.S. State Department. 
Hence, a loyal and conformist segment of society appealed to the 
supreme authority for arbitration, and was rejected as a hostile 
element by this very authority. Social frustration is mounting. 
However, it could escalate into political discontent only if the state 
fails to fulfill its basic obligations, or generates expectations it fails 
to meet for a long period of time. 
THE AMALGAMATION OF THE MILITARY AND THE SILOVIKI
The barely noticeable distance between Putin and his elite 
(including his “cronies”), as well as the potential growth of alienation 
between the state and society, forms new institutional and political 
foundations for the regime based on the prominent role played by 
both the military and the siloviki (the Russian security forces). This 
has to do with, amongst other things, a problem of total distrust: 
Putin cannot rely on the country’s civil elite since he believes it is 
unpatriotic or not “mature” enough, and is irresponsible from the 
point of view of the interests of the country. 
Putin’s deep distrust of the elite has altered his style of 
governance, with the authorities operating under a regime of 
never-ending special operations10 against the backdrop of a policy 
of sanctions and a “besieged fortress” mentality. This special 
operations logic served as exceptional leverage in past high-risk 
“special cases” (for example, when the head of the government 
changed in 2004 and 2007; when the successor was selected in 
2007 and Yuganskneftegaz was sold, etc.), whereas it has become 
perhaps the most popular problem-solving mechanism nowadays. 
It was precisely this mechanism behind the purchase of Bashneft, 
the arrest of Alexey Ulyukaev and the choice of buyer for the 19.5% 
share of Rosneft. 
A “special operation” as a special style of governance also 
defines the kind of sweeping HR decisions made out of the blue 
and en masse. Putin’s decision on 28 July 2016 to dismiss four 
10 Eadem, “Press-operatsya prikrytiya,” Carnegie.ru, 23 December 2016, 
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=66548.
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governors—the heads of the city of Sevastopol as well as those 
of Kaliningrad, Yaroslavl and Kirov Oblasts, as well as three 
presidential plenipotentiary envoys to the North Caucasian, Volga 
and Northwestern Federal Districts simultaneously—is one of the 
most spectacular examples. Putin also appointed the new head 
of the Federal Customs Service (FTS). Such decisions are focal in 
nature: one focal reshuffle serves as a nucleus, with the rest of 
the peripheral changes following. Such decisions have a negative 
effect on the quality of an HR policy fraught with setbacks when, 
for instance, Yevgeny Zinichev, the former FSO officer who was 
completely unprepared for his new role as the governor of the 
Kaliningrad Oblast had to be replaced just two months after his 
appointment. 
Putin finds it easier to appoint a candidate who is a former 
FSO-FSB officer to a top position than to find a civilian manager, 
believing a civilian manager would be inferior to any “Chekist” 
because of a lack of “nation-focused thinking.” Putin is surrounded 
by the siloviki and military of his own choosing, since he does not 
seem to trust others. And he does not ask them to fill the vacancies 
because he does not know them that well, either.
Promotion of former security officers to civilian posts is not 
a new phenomenon for the Putin regime. However, the geopolitical 
crisis in Crimea and Donbas, as well as the Syrian campaign, have 
together created an amalgamation of the military and the siloviki as 
the basis for discussion and decision-making at government level. 
This is a familiar, comfortable and confidential milieu that Putin 
feels part of. He feels that he is surrounded by people with expert 
knowledge and competence, in demand during “wartime.” 
It is noteworthy that the government has not adopted a single 
strategically important document in the last two years. In contrast, 
in those same two years the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation11—an advisory body that had previously lain dormant—
adopted the military doctrine, the National Security Strategy, the IT 
Security Doctrine, the Concept of Foreign Policy and the Strategy 
for Economic Security. The Security Council has become a forum 
11 Eadem, “Kak Sovet bezopasnosti zamenil v Rossii pravitelstvo,” Carnegie.ru, 
28 January 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=62605.
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for the discussion of food, financial, economic as well as regional 
policy. Putin’s weekly meetings with the members of the Security 
Council have gradually become the main forum for discussion of 
key issues in state policy, especially following the downfall of the 
Cabinet of Ministers after the arrest of then-incumbent minister 
Alexey Ulyukaev in November 2016. 
The military and siloviki are in demand now, given the new 
geopolitical reality associated with Russia’s presence in Donbas 
and the Syrian campaign. This also bolsters their gravitas within 
the country. We are currently witnessing the first wave of an anti-
corruption campaign in Putin’s Russia, which is affecting Putin’s 
entourage and henchmen. This is the other side of the coin, with the 
above-mentioned process of letting go of the defiance of dismissing 
“his own people.” Not only has Putin decided to fire them, he has 
decided to put them behind bars.
The watershed years of 2015–2016 that became a turning 
point in Putin’s relations with the elite, resulted in exclusive 
prerogatives being vested in the FSB. I do not think it makes sense 
to look for a special, secret plan of the president to strengthen the 
security services or scare the regional and federal bureaucracies. 
This process is, instead, spontaneous and haphazard. The FSB offers 
its services in its fight against “politically unreliable individuals” 
with a siege mentality—and the president accepts these services. 
The peculiarity of the situation lies in the fact that the 
system of identifying “enemies” is changing. Before 2014, those 
who were—or even potentially could be—against Putin and his 
political system were regarded as “politically unreliable.” Whereas 
now, after Crimea and the onset of the geopolitical crisis and 
a policy of deterrence against Russia, much wider circles have 
become “politically unreliable,” including both the opposition 
and vulnerable elite. From the perspective of the security services, 
vulnerability has a broader potential for weakness in the event of 
a choice between “self-interest” and the Homeland. Given such 
a perspective, a corrupt official almost immediately becomes 
a potential traitor.
Hence, everyone who steals, who has family, funds or 
property in the West, who shows off a luxurious lifestyle or does 
not fully understand the “acuteness of the wartime moment” 
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becomes suspicious and a priori “politically unreliable” from the 
point of view of the security services. Given the scale of corruption 
in Russia, those at risk are primarily politically weak individuals at 
loggerheads with the authorities, who cannot boast of the highest 
political immunity, or whose patrons have lost their status. Thus, the 
loss of influence of the head of the FSO, Yevgeny Murov, triggered 
a number of corruption cases. His much-publicized case was for 
smuggling, associated with the business Murov was involved in 
(which also saw the arrest of Dmitry Mikhalchenko). This then led 
to the replacement of Andrey Belyaninov, head of the FTS, and the 
subsequent major reshuffle (being, as of 28 July 2016, a whole chain 
of new appointments). Moreover, several high-ranking generals from 
the SKR (the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation) were 
also arrested (as a result of the FSB’s attempts to deprive12 the SKR 
and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, of a degree of autonomy). 
The FSB has become a political factor in the development 
of the country, and this could seriously affect certain existing 
amendments to the Russian legislation13 (such as the anti-terrorist 
and anti-extremist initiatives), the situation of the opposition 
(criminal cases against critics of the government), the role of NGOs 
(the fight against “foreign agents”), as well as the staffing of various 
public offices. In 2015–2016 alone the FSB succeeded in arresting 
three governors, the then-incumbent Federal Minister of Economic 
Development, and the Deputy Minister of Culture. This wave of 
arrests also led to the shake-up in the Ministry of the Interior and 
the SKR. And all of this will determine the vector of further changes, 
both in terms of staffing and institutional transformation. 
LIBERALS NON-GRATA
Post-Crimean Russia exhibits a growing political mistrust of 
systemic liberals who have been forced to become ideological 
12 Eadem, “Gromke aresti v SKR: simptomi sistemnikh problem v silovikh 
strukturakh Rossii,” Politcom.ru, 26 July 2016, http://politcom.ru/21338.html.
13 I. Shumanov, “FSB kak zakonodatel’,” Vedomosti, 10 August 2015, 
www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2015/08/11/604257-protivodeistvie-
korruptsii-fsb-kak-zakonodatel.
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allies of the West, following the geopolitical confrontation between 
Russia and the latter. In other words, they have become “politically 
unreliable.” In the political system, systemic liberals have become 
redundant voices on most issues; they are the unheeded advocates 
of an easing of Russian policy, the ignored proponents of structural 
reforms and change of confrontational rhetoric, and marginalized 
opponents of conservatives and traditional values. 
The role of the systemic liberals has been undermined by 
a stabilizing global energy market, amongst other things, and the 
emergence of hopes for the recovery of economic growth in 2017. 
Moreover, decisions made by Rosneft’s Executive Chairman, Igor 
Sechin, are seen by Putin as the most effective countermeasure to 
perceptions of government incompetence. From the president’s 
perspective, it is Sechin who helped the government close the 
budget gap (by offering a working solution of replenishing the 
budget through sales of 19.5% shares in Rosneft), while the liberals 
continued to offer risky and unappealing solutions. 
So the reforms project launched by Putin in early 2016 was 
borne of severe institutional and ideological competition. Former 
Minister of Finance Alexey Kudrin was invited to the Presidential 
Economic Committee to construct a strategy for the country’s 
development. Eventually, it turned out that Kudrin represented 
only one of a number of centers in charge of the development 
of this important strategy. He had to compete with14 Dmitry 
Medvedev (Presidential Council for Strategic Development), and 
the economic assistant to the President of Russia, Andrey Belousov 
(who is associated with the Stolypin Club). Analytical work in the 
development of the strategy entrusted to the liberals has so far not 
become a political reality. 
The liberals’ ideological mistrust of the siloviki—and vice 
versa—means that the former are at great risk from Putin’s anti-
corruption campaign. It would be a mistake to assume that, for 
example, Alexey Ulyukayev’s arrest was Rosneft’s banal reprisal for 
his stance on Bashneft. Rather, we are speaking here of a conceptual 
14 T. Stanovaya, “Bor’ba strategiy,” Politcom.ru, 16 May 2016, http://politcom.ru/ 
21095.html.
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fight15 between adherents of liberal economic principles and those 
who believe these principles can be forsaken for practical efficiency 
when state interests are at stake. It is wrong to sell Bashneft to 
Rosneft from an economic point of view. However, this deal is 
effective from when trying to maximize budget revenues on the 
spur of the moment, as a last minute quick fix to close a budgetary 
gap. The arrest of Ulyukayev was not an exceptional, private case, 
but a new rule in this new context. This means liberal values will be 
more likely to lose out to these sorts of “efficiencies.” 
FROM RESHUFFLE TO STRUCTURAL SHIFT
The forming of the Russian regime’s new psychology was first 
observed in post-Crimean Russia. Then came the shake-up, from 
both administrative reshuffles and criminal cases. The onset of 
structural and institutional transformation—adjustment of the form 
to the new content—seems to be a logical consequence of this series 
of changes. So far, the decisions on establishment of the Russian 
Guards followed by the liquidation of the FSKN (Federal Drug 
Control Service of the Russian Federation), and the FMS (Federal 
Migration Service, whose functions were transferred to the weaker 
Ministry of the Interior), have been made in line with this logic. 
The Russian Guards are meant to simplify the management of the 
siloviki in the event of the country’s destabilization.
The institutional transformation is intended to go much deeper: 
structural changes based on the accumulation of the regime’s new 
properties are being naturally delayed. In the current situation, the 
system has been held hostage to two fundamental factors: a low-
price energy market, which is keeping the government on “boxed 
lunches,” and the approaching end of Vladimir Putin’s 3rd term. 
These factors have laid the groundwork for radical institutional 
changes in the government’s workings, which should eventually 
lead to an era of maturity in Putin’ regime. The system will then reach 
the next point of bifurcation, when it will have to make a strategic 
15 Eadem, “Kto sdes vlast’, ili zachem Sechinu arest Ulyukayeva,” Carnegie.ru, 
17 November 2016, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=66176.
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choice between structural transformation under the continuation 
of Putin’s rule (including re-editing of the Constitution), and 
transformation of the political leadership (with election of an heir 
to the system of “collective Putin”). In both cases, the country is 
facing huge transformations. Which route is taken will bear a strong 
mark of the events of March 2014, which have become critical to 
development of the Russian state. 
Translation: Natalia Mamul
Tatiana Stanovaya is a political scientist and runs the analysis 
department at the Centre for Political Technologies. She has written over 
2000 publications on Russian foreign and domestic politics (Carnegie.ru, 
RIA Novosti, Republic.ru—former Slon.ru).
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THE STATE DUMA, THE “CRIMEAN CONSENSUS,” 
AND VOLODIN’S REFORMS
On becoming chairman of the State Duma in October 2016, 
Vyacheslav Volodin introduced a range of reforms. In light of these 
changes—and to mark the end of the first session of the Duma’s 
7th convocation—there have been various attempts to evaluate the 
emerging nature of “Volodin’s Duma.”1 Have recent developments 
really affected the Duma’s place in Russian politics; is it all empty 
PR; or is it too soon to tell? This chapter begins by placing recent 
Duma reforms in the context of public opinion and the annexation 
of Crimea, before discussing the details of institutional reforms 
introduced at the beginning of the 7th convocation. The chapter 
also discusses preliminary evidence regarding the effects of these 
changes, with a focus on three subjects: whether the Duma is 
a “place for discussion;” whether the “Crimean consensus” has 
been maintained; and whether the Duma leadership has been 
able to reset relations with the executive. Overall, the evidence 
across these three areas is mixed—something this chapter argues 
is a reflection of timing: it is simply too soon to make authoritative 
judgments on the nature and effects of Volodin’s reforms. 
1 This phrase is the title of the author’s Intersection post from 13 December 
2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/politics/volodins-duma. This chapter 
draws on some of the material presented in that post. 
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PUBLIC OPINION AND THE “CRIMEAN CONSENSUS”
The Russian State Duma has been a much-maligned body. The 
proliferation of derogatory monikers like “rubber stamp,”2 “rabid 
printer,”3 “voting machine,”4 and legal “conveyor”5 belt reflect 
the popular perception that the lower chamber of Russia’s Federal 
Assembly is an ineffectual institution—a body stuffed with inactive 
deputies, whose task is simply to distract citizens from real decision-
making processes.6
This negative portrayal of the Duma was particularly 
pronounced during the beginning of the lower chamber’s 
6th convocation. Protests following the December 2011 
parliamentary elections challenged the Duma’s legitimacy, and, 
although certain opposition politicians attempted to block the 
passage of repressive legislation directed at protestors—most 
notably during the “Italian strike” of 5 June 2012—the legislature 
gained a reputation for quickly adopting bills drafted by the 
Government and the President.7
Russia’s annexation of Crimea altered perceptions of the 
Duma—at least in the eyes of a significant proportion of Russian 
citizens. March 2014 saw the beginning of the only period since 
Vladimir Putin’s first election to the presidency during which 
a majority of Russian citizens viewed the Duma in a positive light 
(see Levada Centre survey data in figure 1). As citizens rallied 
around the legislature—comparatively, at least—so too did political 
parties with parliamentary seats rally around the president, often 
2 See S. Rosenberg, “Russia’s election and the need for legitimacy,” BBC, 
13 September 2016, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37339192.
3 See M. Yepifanova, A. Mineyev, “Vzbesivshiysya printer v roli 
gayechnogo klyucha,” Novaya gazeta, 9 July 2014, www.novayagazeta.ru/
articles/2014/07/05/60224-vzbesivshiysya-printer-v-roli-gaechnogo-klyucha.
4 See G. Kuznetsov, “100 dney posle vyborov,” Nezavisimaya, 17 January 
2017, www.ng.ru/politics/2017-01-17/2_6904_100days.html?print=Y.
5 See “Ot redaktsii: Prazdnik poslushaniya,” Vedomosti, 24 November 2011, 
www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2011/11/24/prazdnik_poslushaniya.
6 See “Pravila zhizni deputatov v Rossii,” Lenta.ru, 2 December 2014, 
https://lenta.ru/articles/2014/12/02/oniskazalipravdu.
7 For a discussion of law-making during the Duma’s 6th convocation, see 
B. Noble, E. Schulmann, ”Parliament and the Legislative Decision-making 
Process,” in: D. Treisman (ed.), The New Autocracy: Information, Politics and 
Policy in Putin’s Russia, Washington: Brookings Institution Press (forthcoming).
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presenting a united front, in what became known as the “Crimean 
consensus.”8  
This more positive evaluation of the Duma did not last, 
however. As figure 1 shows, the balance of approval tilted 
to negative by the end of 2015, albeit slightly less so than pre-
annexation levels. Going into the September 2016 elections, 62% 
of respondents to a Levada survey reported not approving of the 
Duma’s activities.
Figure 1. Approval of the State Duma—Levada Centre survey data, 
2011–2016
Notes: The grey line relates to the response “Do not approve,” the black line to 
“Approve” in response to the question “Do you on the whole approve or not 
approve of the activities of the State Duma of Russia?” Data taken from Levada.ru. 
See www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti. See “Odobrenie organov 
vlasti,” Levada.ru, www.levada.ru/ indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti.
8 See D. Kulikov, “Krymskiy konsensus: politicheskiy smysl i znachenie,” 
RIA Novosti, 24 March 2015, https://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20150324/105418 
1774.html. 
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THE DUMA’S 7TH CONVOCATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
The State Duma’s new chairman, Vyacheslav Volodin, has set 
about to change the body’s standing, both in the eyes of citizens 
and with regard to other political institutions in today’s Russia.9 
Since being elected, Volodin has directed a raft of changes aimed, 
it seems, at raising the Duma’s professionalism and prestige. Efforts 
to increase deputy discipline have included: a ban on voting by 
proxy on the Duma floor;10 a crackdown on deputy absenteeism 
from plenary sessions, by restricting the legitimate reasons for not 
attending sessions and by introducing pay deductions for non-
attendance;11 a cancellation of the Duma’s traditional New Year’s 
party;12 a requirement for deputies to deal personally with appeals 
from citizens;13 the creation of a working group—chaired by 
Communist Party (KPRF) deputy and first deputy chairman of the 
Duma, Ivan Mel’nikov—to develop requirements for introduced 
bills, with a view to improving the quality of law-making;14 and the 
introduction within United Russia of formalised measures to filter 
legislative initiatives, partly with a view to limiting the emergence 
of odd, PR-motivated bills.15 But, on the other hand: deputies have 
9 See O. Churakova, “Deputaty Gosdumy budut yediny v voprosakh  bez-
opasnosti i vneshney politiki,” Vedomosti, 6 October 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/ 
politics/articles/2016/10/06/659809-deputati-gosdumi-edini.
10 See “Gosduma zapretila deputatam golosovat’ po doverennosti,” Vedomosti, 
21 October 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2016/10/21/661949-
gosduma-zapretila-golosovat-po-doverennosti.
11 See I. Rodin, “Yedinorossy obeshchayut vysokuyu yavku v Gosdumu,” 
Nezavisimaya, 17 October 2016,  www.ng.ru/politics/2016-10-17/3_edro.html.
12 See N. Demchenko, “SMI uznali ob otkaze ‘Nochnym volkam’ v zayavkakh na 
prezidentskiye granty,” RBK, 22 November 2016, www.rbc.ru/politics/22/11/201
6/583340e59a79471b53c6771c.
13 See T. Zamakhina, “Deputatam pridetsya lichno rabotat’ s obrashcheniyami 
grazhdan,” RG.ru, 8 November 2016, https://rg.ru/2016/11/08/deputatam-
pridetsia-lichno-rabotat-s-obrashcheniiami-grazhdan.html.
14 See O. Churakova, “Gosdume nadoyel imidzh ‘beshenogo printera’,” Vedomosti, 
16 December 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/12/16/670030-
gosduma-otfiltruet. Deputies will also now be aided when writing bills by 
a dedicated law-making centre, staffed by lawyers and legal experts (O. Churakova, 
“Pisat’ zakony deputatam pomozhet tsentr zakonotvorchestva,” Vedomosti, 
24 January 2017, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/01/24/674578-pisat-
zakoni-deputatam).
15 See T. Zamakhina, “Fil’tr dlya zakonov,” RG.ru, 14 November 2016, 
https://rg.ru/2016/11/14/edinaia-rossiia-postavila-zaslon-ot-strannyh-
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been returned the right to use VIP lounges in airports;16 the number 
of cars with migalki—blue flashing lights with sirens, that give 
priority through traffic—has gone up;17 more money has been made 
available for law-making expertise;18 the number of parliamentary 
advisors and aides has risen;19 deputies might be given the right to 
bestow an honour—blagodarnost’ deputata (deputy’s gratitude)—
on individuals and organisations;20 and Government ministers 
and their deputies are now required to present and discuss their 
legislative initiatives in person in Duma committees.21  
A “PLACE FOR DISCUSSION”?
Moments of reform in the Duma are now ritually signalled by the 
claim that the lower chamber has, once again, become a “place for 
discussion.”22 Sure enough, Volodin has made such a claim in the 
zakonov.html; V. Markova, “Zachem parlamentarii pridumyvayut strannyye 
zakonoproyekty,” MK.ru, 20 April 2016, www.mk.ru/politics/2016/04/20/
zachem-parlamentarii-pridumyvayut-strannye-zakonoproekty.html.
16 See M. Makutina, “Deputaty snova vazhnyye persony,” RBK, 10 November 
2016, www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2016/11/11/582479d79a7947f941592492.
17 See “Putin rasporyadilsya dat’ deputatam bol’she mashin s ‘migalkami’,” 
Meduza, 26 October 2016, https://meduza.io/news/2016/10/26/putin-
rasporyadilsya-dat-deputatam-bolshe-mashin-s-migalkami.
18 See O. Churakova, “Gosduma potratit 100 mln rubley na yekspertizu 
zakonoproyektov,” Vedomosti, 17 November 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/
articles/2016/11/17/665269-gosduma-ekspertizu-zakonoproektov.
19 See I. Nagornykh, “Spiker Gosdumy vospol’zuyetsya sovetami,” Kommersant.ru, 
10 November 2016, http://kommersant.ru/doc/3138111; T. Zamakhina, “U glav 
dumskikh fraktsiy budet po chetyre sovetnika,” RG.ru, 10 November 2016, 
https://rg.ru/2016/11/10/u-glav-dumskih-frakcij-budet-po-chetyre-sovetnika.html.
20 See S. Samokhina, V. Khamrayev, M. Ivanov, “Deputatam vydayut gramotu,” 
Kommersant.ru, 12 December 2016, http://kommersant.ru/doc/3169359.
21 See O. Churakova, “Gosduma samoutverzhdayetsya cherez apparatnuyu 
bor’bu s pravitel’stvom,” Vedomosti, 10 November 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/
politics/articles/2016/11/10/664426-gosduma-samoutverzhdaetsya; P. Panov, 
M. Yurshina, A. Galanina, “Pravitel’stvo mozhet izmenit’’ reglament raboty s 
Gosdumoy,” Izvestiya, 30 November 2016, http://izvestia.ru/news/648486.
22 Boris Gryzlov suggested on 29 December 2003 that the Duma “is not a venue 
in which it is necessary to hold political battles, to assert political slogans and 
ideologies. It is a venue in which people should be occupied with constructive, 
effective law-making activities” (a transcript containing Gryzlov’s remarks is 
available here: http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/1386/). These comments have 
since been condensed into the oft-cited phrase “the Duma is not the place for 
political discussions”—see, for example, the reference on page 97 of the chapter 
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context of his recent reforms.23 However, going by the institutional 
changes already instituted, it seems that, rather than opening up space 
for discussion, the new speaker seems focused on creating a well-
disciplined cadre of deputies, aimed at, inter alia, implementing the 
vision set out in Putin’s address (poslanie) to the Federal Assembly.24 
The Volodin reforms are top-down, bureaucratic-administrative 
reforms, which appear to be motivated more by efforts to consolidate 
the speaker’s power vertikal’, rather than to foster parliamentarians as 
champions of constituents’ concerns and influential political actors 
in their own right. If there is any desire on the Kremlin’s part to make 
the Duma a “place for discussion,” then this renewed debate will be 
tightly controlled. Discussion, according to Putin, should be aimed 
at solving important tasks, rather than being an end in itself.25 And 
there is a sense that deputies will have more room for discussion 
on economic issues important to the regions, whereas they will 
present a united front on security and foreign policy.26 In effect, this 
is an example of something the political scientist Rory Truex calls 
“representation within bounds”—when deputies are encouraged 
to act as genuine citizen representatives, but only regarding areas 
outside the core concerns of the regime, including political reform.27 
Indeed, in an example suggesting that the rhetoric of change might 
have outpaced the reality of reform, a presidential bill regarding 
criminal responsibility for improperly launching criminal cases was 
recently adopted by the Duma without amendment, in spite of calls 
for significant changes voiced by the lead committee and the Duma’s 
Legal Department.28 
by Paul Chaisty in: G. Gill, I. Young (eds), Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics 
and Society, Abingdon–New York: Routledge, 2011.
23 See “Spiker Gosdumy Vyacheslav Volodin nazval parlament mestom dlya 
diskussiy,” RBK, 12 January 2017, www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/587741cf9a79472c
ddb825d7.
24 See M. Yurshina, “Gosduma pristupayet k realizatsii poslaniya prezidenta,” 
Izvestiya, 11 January 2017, http://izvestia.ru/news/656814.
25 See V. Kazantsev, “Gosduma vozvrashchayet status mesta dlya diskussiy,” 
Nezavisimaya, 6 October 2016, www.ng.ru/politics/2016-10-06/1_gosduma.html.
26 See O. Churakova, “Deputaty Gosdumy budut…,” op.cit.
27 R. Truex, Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in 
Modern China, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
28 See M. Ozerova, “Prezidentskiye zakonoproyekty lishayjut deputatov 
golosa,” MK.ru, 1 December 2016, www.mk.ru/politics/2016/12/01/
prezidentskie-zakonoproekty-lishayut-deputatov-golosa.html. This case speaks 
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It is, of course, difficult to measure accurately the level of 
discussion within the Duma. However, if the amount of time taken 
to discuss the budget bill on the Duma floor is any indication of the 
level of scrutiny and discussion by deputies, then the 2017 budget 
bill received less scrutiny than the 2016 budget bill, although more 
than the 2015 budget bill.29 This goes against claims that the Duma 
has become a place for substantive debate when compared to 
the previous, 6th convocation. At the very least, this information 
on budget discussions should make us cautious when evaluating 
claims of the return of healthy debate to the Duma. 
Deputies have themselves grumbled about the new reforms.30 
This is, in part, tied to the difficulties associated with working in 
regional constituencies, now that the number of weeks for such 
work in the monthly parliamentary cycle has been reduced from two 
to one—a particular challenge for deputies representing citizens in 
federal subjects far from Moscow. More generally, some deputies 
have balked at the disciplinary measures introduced during the first 
legislative session of the 7th convocation. Possibly as a result, the 
number of sick days taken by deputies has increased markedly since 
fines were introduced for missing plenary Duma sessions without 
a valid excuse.31 So far, however, no fines have been imposed on 
deputies for absenteeism since 16 November 2016,32 although the 
higher attendance numbers have caused problems in the Duma 
to the absence of a systematic, unified approach to criminal law policy in 
contemporary Russia—something noted by a recent report from the Centre for 
Strategic Research (Razvite sistemy ugolovnogo pravosudya: vektory, mery 
reformirovanya, osnovnyye igroki, http://csr.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/
Report-12.01.2017-2.pdf.
29 See the author’s article—”Amending Budget Bills in the Russian State Duma,” 
Post-Communist Economies 29 (2017) for a defense, and use of, this measure, as 
well as data for previous years. Of course, the measure does not capture activity 
by deputies in Duma committees or in the pre-parliamentary stages of budget 
preparation. 
30 See V. Kholmogorova, M. Makutina, “Deputaty pozhalovalis’ na kontrol’ nad 
distsiplinoy v Gosdume,” RBK, 1 December 2016, www.rbc.ru/politics/01/12/20
16/583ef1cc9a79474bceaba192.
31 See M. Makutina, “Bol’nichnyy vmesto shtrafa,” RBK, 18 November 2016, 
www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2016/11/21/582f1e349a79474ffdb11a17.
32 See “Gosduma: ni odin otsutstvovavshiy na zasedaniyakh deputat s 16 no-
yabrya 2016 goda ne byl nakazan vychetom iz zarplaty,” Nezavisamaya, 
18 January 2017, www.ng.ru/politics/2017-01-18/3_6905_duma.html.
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lifts and dining room.33 One United Russia deputy—Alexandr 
Skorobogat’ko—has even given up his mandate, ostensibly in 
response to the inflexibility of Volodin’s new regime.34 In the words 
of the political commentator Fyodor Krasheninnikov, deputies are 
“simply cogs in the system—officials, and not politicians.”35 And, 
in another metaphor linked to the new disciplinary measures 
introduced by Volodin, deputies have been likened to “soldiers.”36 
MAINTAINING CONSENSUS?
Although the September elections returned a Duma dominated 
by the “party of power,” United Russia (which won 343 out of 
450 seats), UR deputies did not monopolise leadership positions 
in the lower chamber. 13 out of 26 committees were taken up at 
the beginning of the 7th convocation by non-UR deputies—3 for 
Just Russia, and 5 apiece for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) 
and KPRF.37 Distributing posts to nominally “opposition” parties 
is one way by which the Duma leadership—and the curators of 
domestic policy in the Kremlin—can seek to foster the “Crimean 
consensus” in a period during which the urgency of external 
conditions prompting the initial “rally round the flag” effect has 
fallen. At the same time, KPRF deputy Vladimir Pozdnyakov has 
argued that, even “if the head of a committee is from an opposition 
party, then the majority of deputies in the committee are, all the 
same, from United Russia, and they determine all decisions.”38 
33 See “Punktual’nyye deputaty okkupirovali lifty Gosdumy,” Lenta.ru, 
2 November 2016, https://lenta.ru/news/2016/11/02/fullhouse; “V dumskoy 
stolovoy voznikla davka iz-za zapreta golosovat’ po doverennosti,” Lenta.ru, 
21 October 2016, https://lenta.ru/news/2016/10/21/bitvazaedu.
34 See S. Samokhina, Ye. Grobman, “Gosdumu pokidayut milliardy,” 
Kommersant.ru, 28 November 2016, http://kommersant.ru/doc/3156099.
35 See O. Churakova, “Novaya Gosduma nikak ne mozhet izbavit’sya ot 
starykh ‘khvostov’,” Vedomosti, 30 November 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/
articles/2016/11/30/667488-gosduma-starih-hvostov.
36 See G. Kuznetsov, op.cit.
37 See “Komitety i komissii Gosudarstvennoy Dumy,” www.duma.gov.ru/
structure/committees.
38 See M. Makutina, V. Kholmogorova, “V novuyu Dumu vnesli vdvoye 
men’she zakonov po sravneniyu s proshloy osen’yu,” RBK, 21 December 2016, 
www.rbc.ru/politics/21/12/2016/585a9a809a7947a26686175f. Possibly in response 
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This suggests—somewhat unsurprisingly—that formal changes may 
appear less consequential than at first sight. 
Data on voting patterns and evidence of a maintained 
“Crimean consensus” is similarly mixed. According to a joint report 
from the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPI) 
and the Centre of Law-making Assistance (TsSZ), the frequency of 
“consensus voting”—when a majority (more than 65%) of each 
party votes in favour of a bill—was higher in the first session of 
the 7th convocation than during the spring 2016 session for bills 
considered in 2nd reading: 55.5% versus 26.3%, respectively.39 
Although a number of commentators—including the authors of 
the ISEPI/TsSZ report—have attributed this rise in consensus voting 
to the incorporation of opposition party views in the form of 
amendments during 2nd reading, there is no evidence that this is, in 
fact, the reason for the observed voting patterns. 
Moreover, an alternative statistic regarding voter unity—the 
frequency with which votes are unanimous (in practice, when 
95% or more of deputies vote in favour of a motion)—paints 
a different picture.40 Figure 2 presents the percentage of such 
unanimous votes for all previous convocations. The trend over time 
is clear: a rise in the proportion of unanimous votes over time. 
Within the 6th convocation, these same data paint a picture that 
will be similarly unsurprising for observers of Russian legislative 
politics. Figure 3 presents the percentage of all votes that were 
unanimous for each session of this convocation. The lowest point 
to this, the KPRF’s Central Committee has debated whether to shift to a more 
oppositional stance in the Duma, see pp. 13–14 in a joint 2017 report from 
the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPI) and the Center of 
Law-making Assistance (Rejting zakonotvortsev: soderzhatel’nyye i partiynyye 
trendy pervoi sessii Gosdumy VII sozyva, www.doc.knigi-x.ru/22raznoe/54633-1-
reyting-zakonotvorcev-soderzhatelnie-partiynie-trendi-pervoy-sessii-gosdumi-vii-
soziva-yanva.php.
39 See ibidem. Unfortunately, the report does not provide information on 
“consensus voting” in earlier legislative sessions. 
40 Strict unanimity—that is, when 100% of deputies vote in favour of a motion—
will likely give a distorted picture of actual support amongst deputies, given, 
for example, the temporary absence of deputies from the chamber or the fact 
that certain seats are unfilled, pending by-elections (as with the case of Sergey 
Naryshkin’s seat at the beginning of the 7th convocation). 95%, therefore, serves 
as an approximate measure of unanimity which covers such cases, although future 
work should explore how unanimity patterns might vary for different percentages.
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for unanimous votes was the first session following the contested 
December 2011 elections; the highest point came soon after 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
Figure 2. Unanimous voting across Duma convocations
Notes: These data are taken from the Duma’s online archive of voting results: 
http://vote.duma.gov.ru. 
Interestingly, however, the first session of the 7th convocation—
the autumn session of 2016—saw only 11% of votes achieving 
unanimity, which was a marked reduction from the levels observed 
during the previous convocation. At the same time, although this 
significantly lower percentage is interesting to note, it is not yet 
clear whether it is an intimation of voting practices to come. It is 
important to remember that the first session of the 7th convocation 
was unusual, given a number of factors: the early termination of the 
6th convocation; the shortened sitting time of the autumn session 
compared to other years; the significant influx of new deputies, 
unfamiliar with the Duma’s practices and procedures; and the 
session’s focus on passing budget bills—something that takes place 
every year in the autumn session, but not in the first session of 
convocations, which have historically been spring sessions. 
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Figure 3. Unanimous voting across Duma sessions (6th convocation)
Notes: “S” refers to spring sessions of the Duma’s year; “A” refers to autumn 
sessions. These data are taken from the Duma’s online archive of voting results: 
http://vote.duma.gov.ru/. 
RESETTING RELATIONS WITH THE EXECUTIVE? 
The Duma leadership wants a different kind of relationship with 
both the Government and the Presidential Administration. This 
was made apparent at the start of the autumn 2016 session, with 
attempts to restrict access for Presidential Administration officials 
to the Duma Council.41 (As a former first deputy chief of staff in 
the Presidential Administration [PA], Volodin is well aware of the 
PA’s capacity—and desire—to micro-manage Duma politics.) The 
perceived failure of the-then “curator” of relations between the PA 
and the Federal Assembly, Sergey Smirnov, to manage this situation 
effectively led to his removal from office.42 Other changes include: 
41 See O. Churakova, “Gosduma samoutverzhdayetsya...,” op.cit.
42 See S. Samokhina, “Federal’nomu sobraniyu naydut novogo kuratora,” 
Kommersant.ru, 12 December 2016, kommersant.ru/doc/3169217; N. Galimova, 
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requirements for the Government to produce—or inform about 
the preparation of—regulations (podzakonnyye akty) needed to 
implement legal changes at bills’ 3rd reading in the Duma; a shake-
up of “Government hour,” when ministers report on their work 
in front of, and answer questions from, deputies;43 and calls for 
a formalised role for deputy involvement in the pre-parliamentary 
development of key bills, in a practice redolent of “zero readings” 
for budget bills.44 According to the political commentator Konstantin 
Kalachev, the Duma wants to be a partner with the Government, not 
merely an annexe to it.45 That this renegotiation of the relationship 
between the Duma and the executive is even possible speaks—
according to the political commentator Abbas Gallyamov—to 
the personal relationship between Volodin and President Putin.46 
Indeed, this view should temper claims that Volodin’s reforms are 
a manifestation of autonomous parliamentarism. 
This list of challenges also includes the longer-running battle 
by the Duma leadership against covert bill initiation by Government 
departments.47 In order to circumvent the oftentimes arduous 
process of intra-Government sign-off, ministries and other executive 
bodies have reverted to introducing their policy initiatives through 
deputy proxies. Both core executive actors and the Duma leadership 
have complained about this backdoor route, which diminishes 
core executive control over policy-making and can lead to the 
displacement of intra-executive disagreements into the legislature. 
There are three clear problems with attempting to stop this practice, 
“Kurator Gosdumy i Sovfeda uvolilsya iz Kremlya iz-za nedovol’stva Kirienko,” 
RBK, 12 December 2016, www.rbc.ru/politics/12/12/2016/584ecd739a79473cf
03b9a26.
43 See O. Churakova, A. Prokopenko, “Gosduma budet zhestche rabotat’ s 
pravitel’stvom,” Vedomosti, 15 December 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/
articles/2016/12/15/669795-gosduma-zhestche-pravitelstvom.
44 See A. Pestereva, “Deputaty khotyat obsuzhdat’ zakonoproyekty vmeste 
s pravitel’stvom,” Kommersant.ru, 17 January 2017, http://kommersant.ru/
doc/3194841.
45 See O. Churakova, A. Prokopenko, op.cit.
46 See V. Kholmogorova, “Gosduma uskorenno rassmotrit popravki k zakonu 
o kontrole kabmina,” RBK, 20 December 2016, www.rbc.ru/politics/20/12/2016/
5858153e9a7947ad825127e1.
47 See S. Zhavoronkov, “Duma po Volodinu: chetkiye zakony i nikakikh 
korporativov,” Polit.ru, 22 November 2016, http://polit.ru/article/2016/11/22/
duma.
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however. Firstly, executive actors could simply learn to do 
a better job of covering their tracks when introducing bills through 
deputies. Secondly, a united executive occasionally introduces 
initiatives—sometimes unpopular measures—through other formal 
bill sponsors.48 For example, a bill drafted by the Presidential 
Administration (concerning changes to the voting procedures used 
to elect members of the Public Chamber) was introduced into the 
Duma by a group of deputies on 15 December 2016 and signed 
into law on 28 December without amendment.49 If the executive 
itself takes advantage of this covert practice, then it is unlikely to 
be an effective champion of effective reform.50 And thirdly, it is 
not clear whether this clampdown will also involve amendments 
made to bills during second reading, which sometimes modify 
bills beyond recognition.51 If it does not, then the proposed reform 
regarding bills will have little effect, since executive actors will be 
able to achieve the same goal by other means. Alexandr Shokhin—
President of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs—has 
often voiced criticism of such practices in audiences with Putin.52 
In spite of promises for reform, however, little has changed—and 
it is far from certain that significant results will be achieved in the 
near future. Indeed, there is already evidence that—in spite of 
attempts to crack down on the practice—the Duma leadership has 
so far been unsuccessful in the 7th convocation in ending proxy 
bill sponsorhip, as well as preventing the introduction of concept-
changing amendments to bills during 2nd reading.53
48 See “Zakonodatelnaya retseptura,” Kommersant.ru, 26 January 2015, 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2644727.
49 See M. Ozerova, “Zakonnoye kachestvo Vyacheslava Volodina: v Gosdume 
nachinayet rabotat’ ‘pokhoronnaya komanda’,” MK.ru, 10 January 2017, 
www.mk.ru/politics/2017/01/10/zakonnoe-kachestvo-vyacheslava-volodina-v-
gosdume-nachinaet-rabotat-pokhoronnaya-komanda.html. This is the bill’s webpage: 
http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(Spravka)?OpenAgent&RN=55549-7.
50 See A. Mel’nikova, “Poklonskaya priglasila Uchitelya na ‘molitvennoye 
Stoyanie’, chtoby veruyushchiye yego ‘vrazumili’,” Znak, www.znak.com/2016-
12-16/v_gosdume_hotyat_uporyadochit_vzaimodeystvie_ryadovyh_deputatov_s_
administraciey_prezidenta.
51 See “Kak zhe vy besite,” Lenta.ru, 22 March 2013, https://lenta.ru/
articles/2013/03/22/printer.
52 “Rabochiy den’,” http://archive.premier.gov.ru/events/news/18709.
53 Rejting zakonotvortsev…, op.cit., pp. 10, 22–26.
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CONCLUSIONS 
This is not the first time that the Duma leadership has attempted 
to stamp its mark on the lower chamber. Volodin’s reforms are 
an effective way for the new speaker to demonstrate that this is 
his Duma—not Naryshkin’s, not Gryzlov’s, not Seleznyov’s, not 
Rybkin’s. Portraying past actors as ineffective in contrast to the 
promise of the new is a familiar approach: as KPRF deputy Nikolay 
Kolomeitsev has argued, “each new speaker and each new deputy is 
sure that all previous incumbents were time-wasters.”54 But have the 
speaker’s reforms been effective? In his 1 December 2016 address 
to the Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin argued that the 
“role of the State Duma as a representative organ has increased. In 
general, the authority of the legislature has been strengthened.”55 
If Putin is right, that is quite a feat to achieve in two months. On 
the other end of the spectrum of evaluation, however, Fyodor 
Krasheninnikov claims that the new Duma is “boring, predictable, 
and controlled.”56 Who is right? 
This chapter approached the question by looking at three 
areas: the level of discussion in the Duma; indicators of consensus 
between political parties with seats in the lower chamber; and efforts 
by the Duma’s leadership to alter its relationship with executive 
actors. The evidence from the beginning of the 7th convocation 
in all three areas if mixed: it is still too early to tell what long-
term effects recent reforms will have on law-making in the lower 
chamber, as well as perceptions of the body’s place in Russian 
54 See V. Khamrayev, M. Ivanov, “Zakonoproyekty v pervom spisanii,” 
Kommersant.ru, 11 January 2017, http://kommersant.ru/doc/3187994.
55 A transcript of Putin’s speech is available here: http://kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/53379. Putin has previously expressed a desire for the State Duma 
to be more than the supine Supreme Soviet in the USSR: “We need an effectively 
operating State Duma. Not one that obediently rubber stamps any proposal as in 
Soviet times, but one that thinks” (“Putin: Rossii ne nuzhna Gosduma, kotoraya 
‘poslushno shtampuyet’ zakony,” RIA Novosti, 28 October 2011, https://ria.ru/
politics/20111028/473755833.html). At the same time, Putin has praised the lower 
chamber’s support for Government policy, contrasting the Duma’s behaviour 
against that of the Ukrainian Rada (“Putin ne khochet ‘ukrainizatsii’ Gosdumy,” 
Ukrainskaya Pravda, 18 October 2011, www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2011/10/1
8/6680385/?attempt=1).
56 See O. Churakova, “Deputaty Gosdumy stali...,” op.cit.
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politics. In November 2016, approval of the Duma’s activities 
saw an increase to 44%; December 2016 saw the same approval 
level.57 In spite of claims to the contrary in the Russian media,58 it 
is not clear whether these changes can be attributed to Volodin’s 
reforms. A similar rise in approval of the activities of President 
Putin, Prime Minister Medvedev, the Government, and regional 
governors suggests a broader shift in support for political institutions 
and individuals, rather than a localised response to the appearance 
of increased parliamentary professionalism. Recent reforms might 
change the State Duma’s role and place in Russian politics in the 
long-run—only time will tell—but the dominant role played by 
Volodin in their genesis might prove a hindrance to establishing 
lasting, depersonalised sources of legislative autonomy. 
Dr. Ben Noble is a Herbert Nicholas junior research fellow in politics 
at New College, University of Oxford. He is also senior researcher in 
the Laboratory for Regional Political Studies at the National Research 
University—Higher School of Economics, Moscow. His research currently 
focuses on the legislative stage of policy-making in the post-Soviet space.
57 Note, however, that the disapproval level increased from 54% to 55%. 
58 See G. Kuznetsov, op.cit.

9FABIAN BURKHARDT
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PUTIN’S THIRD TERM: 
WAS CRIMEA A CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
 IN DOMESTIC POLITICS?
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 marked a watershed 
in international law and politics. It caused, as the political scientist 
Richard Sakwa puts it, “the most dangerous confrontation since 
the end of the Cold War, if not since the Cuban missile crisis of 
October 1962.”1 At the time, even seasoned analysts were unsure 
what this watershed might entail. Writing shortly afterwards, the 
political scientist Andrew Wilson struggled over whether it meant 
an “immediate end to the post-Cold War order. Or, like the 
original Crimean War in the 1850s, it might mark the beginning of 
a transition to something else.”2 
DID CRIMEA MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS?
While the argument that the first land grab since the end of 
the World War II in Europe marks an international caesura is 
straightforward, the assessment of its meaning for domestic politics 
in Russia demands a closer look. Beyond the obvious observation 
that Russia (de facto, not de jure) incorporated Crimea and the 
city of Sevastopol into its federal system, many aspects of Russian 
1 R. Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, London: I.B.Tauris, 
2015, p. 238.
2 A. Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West, New Haven–London: 
Yale University Press, 2014, p. 205.
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politics were affected. After Crimea, those who had participated 
in the diverse, anti-government “Bolotnaya” protest movement of 
2011–2012 were split over how to respond to Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine; subsequent subnational elections in Russian regions grew 
even less competitive; independent media increasingly came under 
pressure; and the “politics of fear”3 was applied against potential 
challengers of the official policy. This tendency led Vladimir 
Gel’man to conclude that the Ukraine crisis should be viewed as 
a “trigger event that accelerated the Kremlin’s existing trend when 
it came to changing the domestic political agenda.”4
This combination of continuity and accelerated change 
after Crimea sparked divergent assessments of Russia’s regime 
type. While Gel’man sees an increased militarization and 
personalism, he still puts the Russian regime in a bracket of 
electoral authoritarianism, citing its regular multi-party elections.5 
In the view of Lev Gudkov, one of Russia’s leading sociologists, 
state media and social media are both used as an instrument of 
propaganda to manipulate public opinion: Crimea, in this respect, 
marked a return to Soviet paradigms and even a “relapse into 
totalitarianism.”6 Kirill Rogov, an independent analyst and former 
senior research fellow at the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, 
and Nikolay Petrov, a professor at Moscow’s Higher School of 
Economics, take Gel’man’s argument about regime personalization 
and deinstitutionalization a step further. In Putin’s 3rd term between 
2012 and 2016,7 they believe, the regime has transitioned from 
a form of “corporatism” to “sultanism.”8 In sum, those authors 
adhering to cross-national regime type classifications tend to 
3 V. Gel’man, “The Politics of Fear: How Russia’s Rulers Counter Their Rivals,” 
Russian Politics 1, no. 1 (2016), pp. 27–45.
4 Idem, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes, Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, p. 127.
5 Ibidem.
6 L. Gudkov, “Putin’s Relapse into Totalitarianism,” in: The State of Russia: What 
Comes Next?, Houndmills–Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 86–109.
7 The next presidential elections are slated for the 18 March 2018, 
the 4th anniversary of the annexation of Crimea. 
8 K. Rogov, N. Petrov, “Ispolnitel’naya vlast’ i silovyye korporatsii,” in: 
Politicheskoe razvitie Rossii. 2014–2016: Instituty i praktiki avtoritarnoy 
konsolidatsii, ed. K. Rogov, Moscow: Fond “Liberal’naya Missiya,” 2016, 
pp.  133 – 153.
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argue that Russia has remained within the same regime type of 
electoral authoritarianism or personalist dictatorship. Others who 
focus on changes over time from a non-comparative, longitudinal 
perspective seem to stress the qualitative changes Russia has 
undergone after Crimea. In this chapter, I first argue that a before/
after analysis of Crimea as a potential critical juncture in domestic 
politics can be a useful research design for this purpose. In the 
following sections, I divide several key dimensions of presidential 
power such approval ratings, appointment and dismissal powers, 
repression, and presidential legislative success in periods before 
and after Crimea to assess the effect of this “external shock.” The 
conclusion summarizes the findings: Crimea caused a “rally around 
the leader” effect both in terms of presidential approval ratings and 
legislative activity and thus contributed to a more pronounced 
personalist form of authoritarian governance, but other key regime 
characteristics remained in place. Crimea was thus both a trigger 
and an accelerator for domestic politics and presidential power in 
particular. On the other hand, slow-moving, more inert features 
allow the Russian regime to adapt to external challenges, but also 
make wholesale changes even in the face of major external shocks 
improbable.
A BEFORE-AFTER ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER:  
CRIMEA AS CRITICAL JUNCTURE?
This chapter aims to tackle this ambiguity of continuity and change 
in domestic politics by employing a “before-after” research design9 
to assess presidential power in Vladimir Putin’s 3rd term. A single, 
longitudinal case—i.e. Putin’s 3rd presidential term—is divided into 
two sub-cases with the annexation of Crimea as the dividing line. If 
presidential power significantly differs before and after this alleged 
watershed, one could argue that Crimea also marked a critical 
juncture in domestic politics. Critical junctures arise in periods 
9 A.L. George, A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005, pp. 167–167.
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of crisis and are seen to be produced by “generative cleavages”10 
such as Russia’s strained relations with the West. In the course of 
a relatively short window of opportunity “the range of plausible 
choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and 
the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are 
potentially much more momentous.“11 The junctures are critical 
because in the aftermath it becomes increasingly difficult or even 
impossible to return to the status quo ante, and the previously 
available range of choices is narrowed down to the one path 
selected.12 Moreover, change that ensues such critical junctures has 
to be significant, swift and encompassing.13 
With the annexation of Crimea as an exogenous “shock” or 
“treatment”—brought upon Russia and the world by a small group 
of actors which reportedly included president Putin and the four 
officials Sergey Ivanov (head of the presidential administration), 
Nikolay Patrushev (Secretary of the Security Council), Alexandr 
Bortnikov (Director of the FSB), and Sergey Shoygu (Minister of 
Defense)14—a quasi-experimental design can be achieved by 
holding a maximum of potential factors constant across these two 
sub-cases before and after. 
Several challenges arise with this kind of research design. 
Two stand out: firstly, oftentimes more than one variable changes 
at a time making causal inference complicated. The annexation 
and the subsequent conflict between Russia and Western states 
triggered several waves of sanctions by the EU, the U.S. as well 
as other countries with increasing intensity, and counter-sanctions 
imposed by Russia in August 2014 as a response to the second 
sanctions wave launched by Western countries after the downing 
of the Malaysian airliner MH17. According to some computations, 
10 J. Hogan, “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 39, no. 3 (2006), pp. 657–679.
11 G. Capoccia, R.D. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, 
no. 3 (2007), p. 343.
12 J. Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and 
Society 29, no. 4 (2000), pp. 507–548.
13 J. Hogan, op.cit.
14 M. Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: The Four Metamorphoses of Vladimir Putin, 
New York: PublicAffairs, 2016.
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“1.97% of the GDP quarter-on-quarter growth is estimated to be lost 
due to sanctions by Russia.”15 Furthermore, the collapse of the oil 
price in the second half of 2014 until early 2015 was a further shock 
to Russia’s energy-dependent economy. Not only did this mean 
a significant decrease of revenues for Russia’s state budget, but also 
the ruble lost more than 50% of its value against the U.S. dollar, 
a slump that needs to be attributed precisely to the oil price shock, 
and not sanctions.16 Due to these harsh environmental factors, 
Russia’s GDP shrank by 3.7% in 2015, but only 0.9% in 2016 and 
is expected to grow in 2017 again. Over the years, Russia managed 
to adapt to these circumstances due to the “government’s policy 
response package of a flexible exchange rate policy, expenditure 
cuts in real terms, and bank recapitalization—along with tapping the 
Reserve Fund.”17 Hence, proximity to the “trigger event” in March 
2014 might indicate in how far domestic developments are related 
to the critical juncture under review, nevertheless the confluence of 
the mentioned confounding factors (land grab, sanctions, oil price 
shock and slump in budget revenues) call for caution in terms of 
attribution of single causes. 
Secondly, to gauge how significant and encompassing 
a critical juncture is the size of the window of opportunity matters. 
Depending on the demand for change directed at leaders, the 
freedom of action enjoyed by these leaders and the magnitude of 
the “rally round the flag” moment, windows could be micro or 
macro.18 Moreover, “even when political systems as a whole face 
‘unsettled times’, many institutions may remain unaffected.”19 There 
is little doubt that the annexation of Crimea was a swift event. Daniel 
Treisman even described it as a chaotic muddling through, where the 
15 K.A. Kholodilin, A. Netsunayev, “Crimea and Punishment: The Impact 
of Sanctions on Russian and European Economies,” Deutsches Institut Für 
Wirtschaftsforschung Discussion Papers, 2016.
16 Christian Dreger et al., “Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of 
Economic Sanctions and Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble,” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 44, no. 2 (2016), pp. 295–308.
17 World Bank, “Russia Economic Report. The Russian Economy Inches 
Forward,” The World Bank Russia Economic Report, no. 36, November 2016, 
www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer.
18 A.P. Cortell, S. Peterson, “Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional 
Change,” British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (1999), pp. 177–203.
19 G. Capoccia, R.D. Kelemen, op.cit., p. 347.
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political events “revealed an almost farcical lack of preparation.”20 
Putin, according to Treisman, showed himself “ready to gamble at 
moments of high tension, taking actions that were both highly risky 
and hard to reverse.”21 The idea of irreversibility already attests to 
a new path taken with Crimea. Nevertheless, in how far this change 
was all-encompassing for presidential power, one central aspect 
of domestic politics, needs further investigation. This is because 
in theory it is conceivable that for example Putin’s popularity was 
bolstered in the long-term, but party politics or relations between 
the center of power and the regions remained relatively unaltered. 
Presidential power notoriously is a fuzzy concept without 
a universally accepted, clear-cut definition. For the purpose of this 
chapter I propose to scrutinize those aspects of presidential power 
and activism that received broad attention after the annexation 
and were thought to be affected in the aftermath, in particular 
presidential approval ratings, appointment and dismissal powers, 
the fight against corruption and repression, as well as presidential 
success in the Duma. 
PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND LEGITIMACY:  
CRIMEA CHANGED—AND ACCELERATED—EVERYTHING
High presidential approval ratings in Russia are a crucial power 
resource for presidents to show other political actors—such as the 
government, the parliament or business—that their own political 
course taken is perceived to be on the right path by the broader 
population. But ratings can also signal to potential counter-elites that 
rebellion is futile, due to large-scale popular support. As Russia’s 
political system is president-centered, presidential approval is also 
a crucial aspect of regime legitimacy in general. 
Russian pollsters have conducted opinion surveys on 
presidential popularity since the early 1990s, and the overall finding 
20 D. Treisman, “Crimea: Anatomy of a Decision,” Russia Political Insight, 
26 August 2016, p. 13, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55510affe4b06afec 
a50df07/t/57d3917e3e00be430c4c5b4e/1473483134670/Crimea+FINAL+ 
Aug+26.pdf.
21 Ibidem, p. 20.
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about presidential approval in the last quarter century is that Yeltsin 
kicked off his presidency with 81% approval in 1991 with the rating 
plummeting into the single digits by the end of his 2nd term while 
Putin kicked off his 1st term in the early 2000s with approval ratings 
between 60% and 80%. Treisman showed that public perceptions of 
economic performance best explain this glaring difference between 
presidents Yeltsin and Putin.22 Consequently, Putin’s ratings were 
continuously subsiding from well-above 80% in 2008 to record 
low 63% in 2012 when the global financial crisis and Russia’s 
structural reform deficit hit the economy, and, in turn, public 
perception. The regime successfully managed the rokirovka—the 
power transfer from Medvedev back to Putin in 2012—and then 
saw off the street protests in the aftermath of this rokirovka as well 
as falsified parliamentary elections in 2011. But the economy, and 
hence presidential approval, did not pick up again. 
However, as Sergey Guriev noted, Russia’s intervention in 
Crimea in early 2014 “changed everything.”23 Already by March 
2014, Putin’s rating had jumped back to over 80%, and in October 
both VCIOM and independent Levada reported 89% approval. The 
magnitude of this “Crimean consensus effect”24 was not unfamiliar 
to the Putin administration: The Kremlin had experienced before 
how military campaigns such as the Second Chechen War after 
1999, the five day war with Georgia or international disagreement 
with the United States, such as after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
can significantly help boost presidential popularity. Much more 
consequential than the mere “rally around the flag effect” and 
the already proverbial 84% approval was that Crimea helped to 
decouple presidential popularity ratings from the well-being of 
the Russian economy. It was not the perception about expected 
improvement of future public and personal welfare that led 
Russians to rally round their president: The main drivers became 
Russia’s improved international standing in the world. This was 
done through Putin showing off Russia’s defense capabilities and 
22 D. Treisman, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin 
and Putin,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (2011), pp. 590–609.
23 S. Guriev, “In Russia, It’s Not the Economy, Stupid,” The New York Times, 
25 December 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/opinion/in-russia-its-not-the-
economy-stupid.html.
24 See Ben Noble’s chapter in this volume on the Crimean consensus and 
legislative politics. 
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reformed military—both to its people and to the world—with a tour 
de force first in Ukraine, and later in Syria. 
Figure 1. Approval of Vladimir Putin and answers to open questions 
about Putin’s main achievements between 2004 and 2016
Source: Compiled by the author with data from levada.ru and a data set provided by 
Stepan Goncharov: https://infogr.am/2e301a41-6d1e-4a8a-95c1-cd4c2ce98977. 
Figure 1 shows that until 2009, Russians primarily considered 
Putin’s main achievement to be rising living standards through 
wage growth and secure pension plans. Russians approved of Putin 
because they associated him with the country’s wider economic 
development. Another reason Russians approved of Putin back 
then was that he gave Russians reasons to be optimistic about the 
future. While Russia’s international standing became an important 
aspect of Putin’s approval already by the mid-2000s, Russians 
had shifted their focus onto defense and military capabilities only 
in 2014, when 28% said these were Putin’s main achievements. 
By 2016, the reversal of this larger trend had been cemented: for 
a majority, Russia’s military and international standing now comes 
first, and economy and welfare have been pushed into second place 
when assessing the main achievements of their president. Hence, 
for presidential popularity, and for regime legitimacy as a whole, 
Crimea was both an accelerator and trigger at once. 
Presidential Power in Putin’s Third Term… 127
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT AND DISMISSAL POWERS
Appointment and dismissal powers are certainly among the 
most significant ways a president can steer political processes. 
In most general terms, presidents face a dilemma: appoint loyal, 
ideologically close officials from their patronage networks, 
or guarantee competence and performance through a more 
meritocratic choice. In Russia, it is usually assumed that preference 
is given to loyalty over competence25 although meritocratic 
elements also exist.26 A second crucial aspect is the frequency with 
which these appointments occur. Since the mid-2000s a system of 
cadre rotation has been in place,27 which regularly rotates outsiders 
into federal state organs and regional administrations28 to prevent 
departmentalism and localism respectively. When presidents sack 
officials this is oftentimes perceived as a purge or a weakness of 
the president as these subordinates allegedly cannot be trusted 
anymore. On the other hand, regular cadre rotation can also be 
assessed as a “feature of administrative centralization”29 and 
state formation. Moreover, regular rotation has been found to be 
conducive to coup-proofing—i.e. by preventing vested interests 
from coordination and rebellion against the autocrat.30 
25 O.J. Reuter, G.B. Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian 
Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” The Journal of 
Politics 74, no. 4 (2012), pp. 1023–1037.
26 V. Gimpelson, V. Magun, R.J. Brym, “Hiring and Promoting Young Civil 
Servants: Weberian Ideals versus Russian Reality,” in: Russian Bureaucracy 
and the State: Officialdom from Alexander III to Vladimir Putin, ed. E. Huskey, 
D.K. Rowney, Springer, 2009, pp. 231–252.
27 E. Huskey, “Legacies and Departures in the Russian State Executive,” in: Historical 
Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, ed. M.R. Beissinger, 
S. Kotkin, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 111–127.
28 M. Rochlitz et al., “Performance Incentives and Economic Growth: Regional 
Officials in Russia and China,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 56, 
no. 4 (2015), pp. 421–445.
29 D. Siegel, “The Political Logic of Cadre Rotation in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” 
Problems of Post-Communism, 4 April 2017, p. 2.
30 S. Chestnut Greitens, “Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions 
and State Violence,” Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Cambridge–
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
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In the following, I will review presidential appointment 
patterns in the presidential administration, the government, federal 
districts and regions. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
Two major appointments made waves in 2016: in August, the silovik 
heavy-weight Sergey Ivanov was replaced by the young technocrat 
Anton Vayno as new head of the presidential administration (PA).31 
Later in October, Rosatom’s Sergey Kiriyenko became new head of 
the PA’s Domestic Politics Department as Vyacheslav Volodin was 
soon to be elected new chairman of the State Duma after United 
Russia’s landslide victory in the September parliamentary elections. 
Table 1 shows all dismissals and appointments of top officials 
in the PA ranging from the head, deputy heads to department heads.
Table 1. Dismissals and appointments of high-ranking presidential 
 administration officials compiled from presidential decrees
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total Dismissals 4 2 0 1 3
Total Appointments 22 5 1 1 4
What becomes clear is that the year 2016 was not so 
extraordinary after all. Several trends need to be noted: elections 
are important, in particular presidential elections. In the course 
of election campaigns, leading staff in the PA must be dismissed 
and reappointed, which explains the highest figure of 22 in 
2012. Secondly, none of the dismissals can be classified as an 
explicit purge: all officials were transferred and reassigned to 
other positions. These new postings obviously could also be less 
prestigious, such as Sergey Ivanov’s move to special envoy for the 
environment, or the senate mandate given to the former head of the 
31 F. Burkhardt, “Russia’s New Generation of Technocrats,” Intersection, 
16 August 2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/politics/russias-new-
generation-technocrats.
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Domestic Politics Department Oleg Morozov. (Senate mandates 
are often seen as a sinecure. Morozov left this post as well in 
2015.) Thirdly, it is easily observed that in the period between the 
presidential elections of 2012 and the Duma elections of 2016, 
cadre decisions are idiosyncratic. In 2013, for example, Ksenia 
Yudayeva was promoted from the PA’s Expert Department to Vice 
Chairman of Russia’s Central Bank, Yudayeva was replaced by 
Vladimir Simonenko, who had been Deputy Minister of Economic 
Development. Also in 2013, a new department for the fight against 
corruption was created within the PA which was the result of 
a restructuring of the Department for State Service and Cadres, from 
which the new head Oleg Plokhoy was promoted. 
Certainly, Vayno’s style as head of the PA is less hands-on, 
more detached than their predecessors’—and the same goes for 
Kiriyenko in his new role. Nevertheless, it will only be after the 
presidential elections in March 2018 when a definite judgment on 
their appointment strategy and governance style will be possible. 
So in sum, other factors besides Crimea are crucial for assessing 
cadre policy in the PA.
GOVERNMENT
The same logic as with the PA applies to government ministers: the 
government lays down its mandate before presidential elections, 
and the president-elect appoints the new PM and cabinet ministers. 
In contrast to the 1990s, when cabinet reshuffles were frequent also 
in between presidential elections, in the 2000s cabinets usually 
remained relatively stable over the presidential terms, and ministers 
were replaced only on rare occasions.32 
The government under Prime Minister Medvedev was 
installed on 21 May 2012 by presidential decree and consisted 
32 G. Neyaskin, “Rasstrel’nye dolzhnosti: kak chasto rossiyskiye ministry 
ostayutsya bez raboty,” Republic.ru, 1 September 2016, https://republic.ru/
app.php/posts/72647; E. Semenova, “Russia. Cabinet Formation and Careers in 
a Super-Presidential System,” in: The Selection of Ministers around the World, 
ed. K.M. Dowding, P. Dumont, Routledge Research on Social and Political 
Elites 5, London–New York: Routledge, 2015, pp. 139–155.
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of 21 ministers: seven of them had been replaced by the end 
of 2016. The Ministry of Economic Development experienced 
the highest turnover. In June 2013, Alexey Ulyukayev replaced 
Andrey Belousov who became economic advisor in the PA. In 
November 2016, Ulyukayev was arrested on corruption charges; 
his place was taken by the 1982-born Maxim Oreshkin. Already 
by November 2012, Minister of Defense Serdyukov was accused 
of embezzlement in the case of the MoD contractor Oboronservis, 
and was replaced by Sergey Shoygu. Beside these two exceptional 
cases, it was mainly the restructuring of the federal executive 
that affected appointment patterns. This concerned the upgraded 
Ministry for Utilities (ZhKKh) in 2013, and the creation of the 
Crimea Ministry in March 2014 and the North Caucasus Ministry 
in 2014. The Minster for Crimean Affairs Oleg Savel’ev remained 
in office for only 15 months—the ministry was liquidated in July 
2015 after it had launched a 708 million ruble funding program 
for the peninsula, the management and supervision of which was 
subsequently transferred to the Economy ministry. Appointments 
of Alexandr Tkachev (Agriculture) in 2015, Ol’ga Vasil’eva 
(Education) and Pavel Kolobkov (Sports) in 2016 attest to minor 
policy adjustments rather than larger reshuffles with the purpose of 
broader policy shifts. Vasil’eva, for example, was widely portrayed 
as an ideocrat who would give education an increasingly patriotic 
touch. Her main initiative in office, however, was to cut spending 
on education, something her “technocratic” predecessor Livanov 
had resisted. The abolishment of the Crimea ministry and the 
appointment of Tkachev—a staunch supporter of Russian counter-
sanctions, import substitutions, and first and foremost his own 
agriculture business—suggest that already by mid-2015 Crimea 
and its management have been fully incorporated into the federal 
economic policy making routine. More importantly, in the case of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Crimea did have a clear and persistent 
effect, while change at top of the Ministry of Education followed 
a different logic.
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PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND GOVERNORS
A year later, on 28 July 2016 the Crimean Federal District—it had 
been created on 21 March 2014 and comprised the two subjects 
Crimea and Sevastopol—was abolished and incorporated into 
the Southern Federal District. Reducing the number of federal 
districts to seven again and thereby losing its special status, by mid-
2016 also Crimean security and law enforcement related issues 
were managed in conjunction with other federal subjects of the 
Southern District. On the same day, in a “massive cadre reshuffle”33 
a total of 4 governors and 5 presidential representatives in federal 
districts (polpredy) were dismissed and appointed. 
Was this reshuffle in any way unprecedented, and can we 
draw any inferences about a potential coup-proofing strategy, or 
an increased regime personalization after Crimea? Figures 2 and 
3 present annual dismissal rates of polpredy and governors as well 
as exit fates of the latter. As the systematic overview of polpredy 
dismissals since their inception in 2000 shows, by the end of 
2016 Putin has dismissed the same amount of envoys in his 3rd term 
as Medvedev during his presidency: nine each in total. In 2011, 
Medvedev also dismissed four polpredy in the course of four months, 
in particular the two long-time polpredy Poltavchenko (since 2000) 
and Klebanov (since 2003). In Putin’s 3rd term polpredy would 
serve between three to four years, hence over time cadres were 
rotated more frequently than in the previous presidential terms. The 
exit fates of the polpredy dismissed in 2016 also attest to the cadre 
rotation principle at work: Vladimir Bulavin (North-Western) was 
appointed Head of the Federal Customs Service, Sergey Melikov 
(North Caucasian) became 1st Deputy Head of the National Guard 
with Oleg Belaventsev (Crimean) replacing him, Vladimir Ustinov 
was reappointed in the Southern Federal District now united with 
the Crimean District, and Nikolay Rogozhkin (Siberian) left state 
service as he reached retirement age with 65 years. The main 
difference to previous practice was that this occurred on one day 
33 N. Raibman, “Putin provel masshtabnye kadrovye perestanovki,” Vedomosti, 
no. 28, 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/07/28/650900-glavnogo-
tamozhennika.
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while earlier this would have been implemented over the course 
of several months. The following years will show whether this 
practice—which certainly demands more planning ahead from the 
PA—persists in the future. 
Figure 2. Presidential representatives in federal districts (polpredy) 
dismissed per year (by days in office)
Source: compiled by the author based on presidential decrees. 
Figure 3 visualizes governor dismissal data and exit fates. 
Between 2004 and 2012 governors were appointed by the president, 
in late 2011 Medvedev had announced the reintroduction of 
gubernatorial elections that had been in place before 2004. On the 
one hand, the intention of this reform was to increase the legitimacy 
of regional heads of administration, on the other it was rather 
obvious that the PA was concerned with reducing the uncertainty 
related to electoral processes from the very beginning.34 
One of the measures to assert central control was the 
introduction of United Voting Days which combined elections 
in several federal subjects. Another informal institution used has 
been the early dismissal of incumbent governors, which is usually 
accompanied by a presidential appointment to serve as interim 
governor until the next elections. This practice increases presidential 
leverage over governors; presidential endorsement also increases 
34 H. Blakkisrud, “Governing the Governors: Legitimacy vs. Control in the Reform 
of the Russian Regional Executive,” East European Politics 31, no. 1 (2015), 
pp. 104–121.
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the legitimacy of interim governors in the eyes of the electorate, 
and with regard to potential competitors. 
Figure 3. Gubernatorial elections and exit fate of governors in Putin’s 
3rd term. Only first quarter for 2017
Source: compiled by the author. 
Figure 3 illustrates that, in 2014, almost 2/3 of gubernatorial 
elections were held after early presidential dismissals of governors. 
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova argues that this strategy was chosen “in 
order to use the patriotic momentum associated with the Crimea 
annexation (‘krymnash’ effect) and get re-elected before the 
negative impact of Western (and anti-Western) economic sanctions 
were felt in the regions.”35 This Crimea effect was most noticeable 
in 2014 and 2015 when early dismissals were predominantly 
employed to safeguard the reelection of incumbent governors. In 
2016 and early 2017, however, early dismissals were used to replace 
incumbents by new governors and therefore preempt election by 
“quasi-appointments.” 2014 and 2015 were thus more about cadre 
stability while 2016, and in particular 2017, mark a decided return 
to the principle of cadre rotation. 
35 G. Sharafutdinova, “Regional Governors Navigating through Putin’s Third 
Term,” Russian Politics 1, no. 4 (2016), p. 376.
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This informal institution of early resignation certainly did not 
contribute to a heightened legitimacy of governors. Nevertheless, 
it would be an overstatement to argue that the stability trend in 
2014 and 2015 was due to a “scarce gubernatorial cadre pool.”36 In 
fact, only the strategy changed—electoral authoritarianism tweaked 
in order to guarantee an uneven playing field favoring the ruling 
elite. The appointments in early 2017 show, especially, that a new 
cohort of governors born in the 1960s and 1970s is about to replace 
an older one born in the 1940s and 1950s. Figure 3 also illustrates 
that among those who were eased out of their positions, arrests 
and criminal investigation were an exception: two detentions of 
governors in 2014, two in 2015, one in 2016, and two by April 
2017 respectively—i.e. the predominant presidential strategy 
towards governors was an adaptive mixture of stability of cadres 
and rotation, not open repression. 
DISMISSALS AND THE “FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION” IN RUSSIA
The ostentatious arrests of so-called “systemic liberals” like the 
arrest of Kirov’s governor, Nikita Belykh, in June 2016, or that 
of the Minister of Economic Development, Alexey Ulyukayev, 
in November 2016, sent shock waves through Russia’s political 
and economic elite. Was this the beginning of a new purge of 
remaining systemic liberals in Russia’s public administration, the 
start of a major shift in economic policy? After all, Ulyukayev had 
been one of the main pillars of monetary and economic policy 
under Putin when he had served as deputy finance minister, deputy 
chairman of the Central Bank; he was the 1st acting Minister in 
post-Soviet Russia to be arrested on charges of corruption. In the 
aftermath of such high profile arrests, usually a number of theories 
begin to circulate: was it a conflict between the government and 
Rosneft’s Sechin over the privatization of the oil company Bashneft 
in the case of Ulyukayev? Or the misappropriation of informal 
election funds in the case of Belykh? Court trials in such prominent 
cases can drag on for long time and the “rule by law”-logic usually 
36 Ibidem, p. 382.
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determines highly politicized cases, so it is more than difficult to 
determine the true motives behind the arrests. 
The option that these arrests were instances of a systematic, 
consistent campaign against corruption should be excluded; 
this would undermine the basis upon which the current regime 
rests. Instead, it can be argued that graft and corruption are part 
of the “institutional mechanisms used to secure the loyalty and 
obedience of officials.”37 Following this logic, widespread informal 
practices and corruption are accepted or even encouraged, so that 
subordinates in the administrative hierarchy can be blackmailed. 
Prosecution and punishment are suspended, and, as a rule, 
are meted out towards disobedient or even politically disloyal 
subordinates. 
Figure 4. Officials arrested on corruption charges
Source: Based on a data bases collected38 by means of media reporting on such 
cases. 
Bearing in mind Russia’s ongoing economic stagnation 
and the “Crimea consensus effect” potentially subsiding, one 
might indeed surmise that increased punishment and repression 
was needed to control the administrativniki—state officials in the 
37 K. Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State 
Institution,” Politics & Society 36, no. 1 (2008), p. 37.
38 Ibidem.
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federal, regional and local administrations. To track the corruption-
related arrests of bureaucrats over time, I use a data set collected by 
Dmitry Filonov and Anastasiya Yakoreva39 and recoded it to allow 
for a differentiation of arrests on the three levels of administration. 
Several trends can be observed. The first recent wave of 
arrests started already in 2013 and saw almost twice as many 
arrests of local officials than from regional administrations. Being 
a mayor is notoriously dangerous in Russia.40 It is estimated that 
by 2007 every sixth acting mayor had either been in prison, is in 
prison or will likely wind up in prison, a development attributed 
to local conflicts around municipal land or real estate. In the first 
comprehensive academic paper on Russian mayors, it was found 
that between 2000 and 2012, “10% of elected mayors leave office 
under arrest, compared to 4% of appointed mayors.”41 Local officials 
had always been even more endangered. However, the persecution 
of governors, their deputies and regional cabinet ministers appears 
to be a fairly recent phenomenon; by 2016, the majority of arrests 
were largely of this type of official. So far, it seems to be too early 
to say whether regional and even federal civil servants have been 
increasingly persecuted by law enforcement, but the figures for 
2016, at least, point in this direction. In 2014 and 2015, two 
governors were arrested on corruption charges while in 2016 one 
governor, one deputy minister and one minister (Ulyukayev) were 
put on trial. In the first quarter of 2017, already two governors 
(Savel’ev from the Republic of Udmurtiya and Markelov from the 
Republic of Marii-El) were taken into custody, a sign this trend is 
at the very least persisting. Seizures of high-ranking officials are 
usually planned and implemented by the Federal Security Service 
FSB and the Investigative Committee. Often both agencies work in 
tandem, and their increasingly prominent role during these arrests 
indicates that selective repression against a few officials is used to 
discipline the federal and regional executive as a whole. 
39 D. Filonov, A. Yakoreva, “Vse protiv vsekh. Kak sazhayut chinovnikov 
v Rossii,” Republic.ru, 2016, https://republic.ru/posts/76987.
40 V. Leibin et al., “Pochemu sazhayut merov?,” Expert.ru, 2007, http://expert.ru/
russian_reporter/2007/02/pochemu_sazhayut_merov/.
41 N. Buckley et al., “Elections, Appointments, and Human Capital: The Case of 
Russian Mayors,” Demokratizatsiya 22, no. 1 (2014), p. 111.
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Often, a network of closely interconnected officials in one 
region is arrested all at once. This happened, most notably, in 
Voronezh in 2013, in Komi in 2015, and in Sakhalin, Perm, Kirov 
and Vladivostok in 2016. The annexation of Crimea added one 
more region where frequent arrests of officials were used to enforce 
federal control: 6 officials were captured on peninsula in 2015 and 
3 in 2016. In this sense, for the federal center, Crimea became 
yet another problematic region. Officials there were persecuted at 
a higher rate than an average Russian district. Alleged purges of 
prominent officials such as Belykh and Ulyukaev should thus be 
seen in the context of this federal strategy of “discipline and punish 
and make an example”—while regional and local conflicts also 
contribute to a pressure from below on officials at that level. 
RELATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT IN EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE 
RELATIONS: VELOCITY AND VOTING PATTERNS IN THE DUMA
When Crimea was annexed, President Putin initiated three laws 
that were passed in the Russian State Duma with lightning speed. 
Their sole purpose was to formalize Crimea’s status as a part of 
the Russian Federation.42 All bills passed through the Duma with 
a majority of over 98%. Il’ia Ponomarev, who was the only MP who 
voted against the accession of Crimea, was subsequently expelled 
from the Duma and is now living in exile. Several others abstained, 
but as Ponomarev has noted, high pressure was asserted to achieve 
a unanimous vote. Far more meaningful than the percentage voting 
42 These three laws are: (1) Zakonoproyekt No 475944-6 “O prinyatii v Rossiyskuyu 
Federatsiyu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Rossiyskoy Federatsii novykh 
sub’’ektov—Respubliki Krym i goroda federal’nogo znacheniya Sevastopolya,” 
initiated on 19 March 2014, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28Spravka
New%29?OpenAgent&RN=475944-6&02; (2) Zakonoproyekt  No  475948-6 
“O ratifikatsii Dogovora mezhdu Rossiyskoy Federatsiyey i Respublikoy 
Krym o prinyatii v Rossiyskuyu Federatsiyu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii 
v sostave Rossiyskoy Federatsii novykh sub’’ektov,” initiated on 19 March 
2014, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&
RN=475948-6&02; (3) Zakonoproyekt No 484131-6 “O prekrashchenii deystviya 
soglasheniy, kazayushchikhsya prebyvaniya Chernomorskogo flota Rossiyskoy Fede-
ratsii na territorii Ukrainy,” initiated on 28 March 2014, http://asozd2.duma.gov.
ru/ main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=484131-6&02.
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in favor was the speed with which the bills passed the Duma and 
were signed by the president: the two bills on the accession of 
Crimea were rushed through in a record low of two days; the bill 
on the suspension of the Black Sea fleet agreement took just five 
days before it was promulgated.
Analogous to the presidential approval rating discussed 
above, this speedy, unanimous voting pattern begs the question if, 
and for how long, a potential Crimea effect persisted. Unanimous 
parliamentary votes and the pace of legislation are useful indicators 
assessing presidential power. As Paul Chaisty’s research has found, 
higher legislative velocity in particular is a robust way to view 
Russia’s authoritarian turn.43 If there is a persistent sign of this after 
Crimea, that could also hint at further authoritarianism and a further 
shift of relative power towards the presidency.
Figure 5. Velocity of legislation initiated by the president measured in 
days between registration of the bill and presidential sign-off, the years 
indicate when the bills were initiated by the President. N= 407 bills
Source: data compiled by the author. 
Figure 5 visualizes the velocity of all bills initiated by the 
president in the period between the two Duma terms from 2007 to 
September 2016. Quite strikingly, between 2007 and 2010 the 
speed of both domestic legislation and international conventions 
remained roughly equal averaging around 100 days per year. 
43 P. Chaisty, “Presidential Dynamics and Legislative Velocity in Russia, 
1994–2007,” East European Politics 30, no. 4 (2014), pp. 588–601.
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However, by 2013 domestic legislation took more than four 
times as long to make it into law. Backlogs suggest that major 
disagreements existed within the executive that delayed legislative 
policy making. After Crimea, the average annual velocity dropped 
below 100 days and almost converged for both domestic and 
international legislation. The “rally around the legislative leader” 
with Crimea effect is clearly substantial. 
Once we turn to Duma voting results on presidential bills, 
a similar picture emerges. Especially in 2014, before the almost 
unanimous Crimea legislation, the voting rift between international 
and domestic legislation was almost 100 votes on average or 
442 compared to 345. 
Figure 6. Voting results in the Duma for all bills initiated by the president in 
Putin’s 3rd term until the end of the 6th Duma convocation. N = 171 bills
Source: data compiled by the author. 
While the United Russia faction would vote unanimously as 
a rule, at times mostly the Communist faction, a Just Russia, and 
on rare occasions the LDPR voted against or withheld their support 
for presidential initiatives. After Crimea, those of the nominal 
opposition would also rally around the “legislative leader,” and 
only on rare occasions the Communist faction would vote against. 
For instance, their opposition to a controversial anti-corruption 
legislation (Bill 664950-6). However, by 2016 the Crimea effect 
had markedly subsided, and on average, support for domestic 
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presidential bills dropped to 80%. Naturally, this does not mean 
that bill failures became likely. Nevertheless, with the looming 
Duma elections in September 2016, opposition factions—first 
and foremost the Communists—returned to their previous modus 
operandi: that is, signaling to their electorate that they sometimes 
differed from the mainstream. The Communists also used this option 
of voting against legislation as leverage with the PA. United Russia’s 
landslide victory at recent parliamentary elections, where the party 
gained an unprecedented constitutional majority, suggests that 
this endeavor from the Communists largely failed. Nevertheless, 
the increased representation of the Russian regions could lead to 
a situation where “deputies will have more room for discussion on 
economic issues important to the regions, whereas they will present 
a united front on security and foreign policy.”44 More debate within 
the United Russia faction and increased bargaining with the regions 
will only be feasible, however, if no other international adventure 
akin to the annexation of Crimea causes another “rally around the 
legislative leader” effect. 
CONCLUSION
The chapter started with the intention to investigate how far the 
annexation of Crimea affected domestic politics in Russia, and more 
specifically several prominent dimensions of presidential power. To 
answer this question I proposed to carve up Putin’s 3rd presidential 
term by means of a before/after research design to find out in how 
far Crimea was a critical juncture. 
The findings bear implications both for our understanding of 
the annexation of Crimea on Russian domestic politics as well as of 
external shocks and critical junctures more generally. On the one 
hand, the effect of Crimea was consistent and protracted, both with 
regard to presidential approval ratings, velocity of law-making and 
to a lesser degree voting patterns in the Duma. 
44 B. Noble, “Volodin’s Duma,” Intersection, 13 December 2016, http://
intersectionproject.eu/article/politics/volodins-duma.
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On the other hand, for other dimensions of presidential 
power Crimea was less of a caesura: for appointments and 
dismissals of officials in the federal and regional executive electoral 
cycles and the cadre rotation principle were crucial determinants 
of presidential activism. What is more, a gradual increase in rare, 
punctual repressions suggests that the Crimea effect has been 
gradually subsiding and that for policy-making under an ever more 
constrained basis of resources, a “discipline and punish” approach 
is employed as a technique of administrative control. Corrupt 
practices at the core of the system, meanwhile, remain in place. 
Crimea caused a “rally around the leader” effect both in terms 
of presidential approval ratings and legislative activity contributed 
to a more pronounced personalist form of authoritarian governance. 
But other key regime characteristics remained in place: non-
competitive multi-party elections still perform important functions 
for the turnover of personnel in the state administration, and 
selective punishment of officials can be seen as a major instrument 
of governance. Crimea was thus both a trigger and an accelerator 
for domestic politics and presidential power in particular. On the 
other hand, slow-moving, more inert features allow the Russian 
regime to adapt cosmetically to external challenges, but even in 
the face of major external shocks, wholesale change of Russia’s 
governance structures looks improbable.
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Graduate School for East and South East European Studies, Munich.  
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VLADISLAV INOZEMTSEV 
DOWNWARD SPIRAL:  
THE PROSPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 
Russia is marching through 2017 with hopes of vanquishing its 
economic woes. The Kremlin asserts with confidence that the worst 
effects of sanctions and recession have passed, and now is the time 
to start making up lost ground. Russians, the thinking goes, have 
grown accustomed to a “new normality” of international isolation 
and tougher living conditions. The only way is up. Yet it is more 
realistic to view the next two years with much more caution. 
Economic forecasts point to 2017 being part of a “lost decade” that 
dates back to 2008. If you factor in this year’s projected growth rate 
of 1.1–1.5%, then this “lost decade” will have had just 0.7% average 
GDP growth per year. To put that in perspective, it is equivalent to 
around half that of Germany’s growth; exactly a quarter of Poland’s; 
roughly a third of that of the U.S. and around a tenth of China’s.1 
Unless there are active steps to nurture and realign our 
economy, it will also be hard to be optimistic looking further 
into the future. No one today dares to dream of replicating the 
success of Vladimir Putin’s first two terms in office, when average 
GDP growth amounted to 7.1% each year. And not a soul cares 
to mention the notion of catching up with Portugal, for instance. 
This small country is still far wealthier than Russia in terms of GDP 
per capita, and remarkably it is a gap that has grown. Taking into 
1 Russia’s economic growth figures are estimated based on the data of 
Rosstat (the Russian Federal State Statistics Service). Other countries’ results 
are estimated based on data provided by the Trading Economics website: 
www.tradingeconomics.com. 
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account market exchange rates, that gap widened from $9,480 in 
2000 to $11,100 in 2015.2 
So the real objective of policy makers is not a return to the 
boom years of the early 2000s. The goal is much more modest: 
attain at least some growth and avoid sharp dips. However, the 
key question today is whether this modest goal is attainable. I will 
attempt to answer this through a health check of Russia’s economy, 
finding reasons for its strength in the early 2000s, and its relative 
weakness today.
WHAT FACTORS PAVED THE WAY  
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RUSSIA?
Liberals attribute t0he Russian “economic miracle” of the 2000s 
to favorable external conditions, primarily the rise in the global 
price of oil. Statists, on the other hand, laud the genius of President 
Putin. Both stances are feasible, although neither offer a complete 
explanation.
Undoubtedly, oil revenues became the major source of 
economic growth in Russia. The inflow of petrodollars was 
substantial: net additional revenue in Russian oil industry above the 
1999 benchmark amounted to $33.5 billion from 2000–2003. It 
was $223.6 billion from 2005–2008, and as much as $394.0 billion 
from 2011–2013.3 This fueled cross-sectoral investment, especially 
the construction industry, retail and the service sector. Even though 
much of this growth was asymmetrical, it clearly presented wide 
opportunities. The sum of $394 billion was almost equivalent to 
20% of GDP in 2012, quite a significant stimulus. 
2 According to data from the World Bank and national statistical agencies, in 
2000, GDP per capita in the Russian Federation amounted to $1,771 and $11,259 
in Portugal; 15 years later, at the end of 2015, the former figure increased to 
reach $8,100 and the latter—$19,121. Hence, the gap between the two countries 
only increased in absolute terms although Vladimir Putin had announced plans 
to bridge the gap in his famous article published on the eve of his moving to the 
Kremlin (see: V. Putin, „Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletiy,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
30 December 1999, pp. 1, 3). 
3 For more detail, see: V. Inozemtsev, „Chto sdelala neft’ s Rossiyey,” Vedomosti, 
16 December 2014, pp. 6–7.
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Undoubtedly, the government did implement fairly successful 
reforms aimed at normalizing the economic situation, especially 
prior to the notorious YUKOS case. Few remember today that in 
1999, inflation in Russia was as high as 36.5% and up to one-third 
of all transactions between businesses were conducted using non-
monetary means of payment or in lieu payments.4 These sorts of 
barter systems had been eradicated entirely by 2003, and inflation 
had dropped to 12%.5 Federal budget revenues increased 4.2-
fold between 1999–2003 and the period saw a relatively stable 
ruble-dollar exchange rate.6 Delayed payments of remuneration to 
employees of enterprises, including state-owned enterprises, were 
almost unheard of during this period. In fact, the government re-
nationalized the gas industry in 2002–2003 and ensured princely 
rewards for its oil industry representatives in 2004–2005 as well 
as for the banking sector in 2004–2006. Undoubtedly, putting the 
register of property rights in order, as well as the establishment of 
an up-to-date system of cadastral and fiscal accounting also paid 
dividends during this period. 
Yet there is much more to the story. In the 2000s, the Russian 
economy was unrecognizably different to the Soviet model of, let’s 
say, the 1980s. Underinvestment at the state level was vast, and 
this proved helpful in keeping budget deficits down and left less 
scope for wasteful spending. Despite the fact that the period which 
preceded perestroika is believed to have been one of stagnation, 
the economy was treated to significant investment which accounted 
for 31–34% of Soviet GDP, according to numerous estimates.7 The 
effectiveness of these investments was low; funds were mostly 
allocated to the construction industry, while comparatively meager 
4 A description of substitutes for money can be found in: C. Gaddy, B. Ickes, 
Russia’s Virtual Economy, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002, 
pp.  14 – 17.
5 For more details about inflation in 1999 and 2003, see The Russian Statistical 
Yearbook 2005 (online version www.gks.ru/bdg/regl/b05_13/lssWWW.exe/
Stg/22-04.htm).
6 See The Russian Statistical Yearbook 2005 (online version www.gks.ru/bdg/ 
regl/b05_13/lssWWW.exe/Stg/20-06.htm).
7 See M. Goldman, What Went Wrong with Perestroika, New York–London: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1992, pp. 132–134, C. Gaddy, B. Ickes, Bear Traps on 
Russia’s Road to Modernization, London–New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 48–49 
and other.
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sums were spent on the development or manufacture of new 
technologies. Funds for the majority of these investments were 
taken directly from the public purse and represented little value 
for money. Turning to the economy of the early 2000s, we can see 
that investment had fallen to 12.7–16.3% of GDP.8 So when public 
spending increased by 12–15% of GDP, that was only possible 
because it was much lower than before. That allowed the increase 
in public spending to be even greater than the increase in the price 
of export goods, without running up large deficits like in the 1990s. 
Underestimation of this factor seems to be a very common mistake 
made by both Russian and foreign economists9 to this day. 
Another omission: all the rhetoric about Russia’s “rise from 
its knees,” and the image of military revival following victory 
against terrorist militant groups in the Northern Caucasus did little 
to change an economic fact: the early 2000s represented Russia’s 
most “harmonious” period in nearly a hundred years. The average 
military spending in the USSR as determined by Western experts 
amounted to 15–17% of GDP in the 1970s. The 2015 defense 
budget, as estimated by SIPRI analysts, was equivalent to 5.4% of 
GDP.10 Russian military spending however in 2001 accounted for 
as little as 2.7% of GDP—$7.4 billion at the market exchange rate.11 
Like many investments in never-ending Soviet construction projects, 
those aimed at improving the “defense capacity” of the state are 
often a further drain on the public purse, steeped in inefficiency. 
Military spending in Russia has traditionally generated negligible 
economic multipliers and barely contributes to the emergence or 
commercialization of new technologies.12 A breakthrough in the 
attitude to defense spending (i.e. substantial cutbacks) occurred 
8 The share of investments in GDP in Russia in 2003–2004 is estimated based 
on: The Russian Statistical Yearbook 2005 (online version www.gks.ru/bdg/regl/
b05_13/lssWWW.exe/Stg/21-02.htm and www.gks.ru/bdg/regl/b05_13/lssWWW.
exe/Stg/01-01.htm).
9 For more details about savings on investments and their role, see V. Inozemtsev, 
„Zhizn’ za schot budushchego,” Vedomosti, 15 November 2010, p. 4.
10 See ww.sipri.org/databases/milex.
11 Read an analysis of the 2001 defense budget in Russia: www.protown.ru/
information/hide/ 3265.html, the weighted average exchange rate based on the 
data of the Central Bank of Russia.
12 For more details, see: V. Inozemtsev, “Voyennye raskhody w Rossii—eto plata 
za mnitel’nost’ vlastey,” Slon.ru, 8 April 2015, www.slon.ru/posts/50155.
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not in 1992–1993—which might have been expected during the 
turmoil after the Soviet collapse—but in 1998–1999. The first half 
of the 2000s was the time when funds from military spending 
cuts were, to a large extent, injected into the economy. It is also 
perfectly clear that the reversal of the trend, noticeable since 2007, 
coincided with an economic downturn.
Another factor in the 2000s was that new sectors became 
locomotives of the contemporary Russian economy. Both traditional 
and hi-tech services became the main drivers of growth in Russia: the 
rapid development of wholesale and retail trade, banking, the real 
estate sector, mobile networks, the Internet and data transmission 
systems. Virtually none of these sectors existed in their current form 
in the 1990s: having come into being at the turn of the century, 
they produced an economic effect in the 2000s, having accounted 
for between 55% and 60% of cumulative GDP growth in Russia 
for a given period.13 These sectors reached their saturation points 
as the crisis was gaining a grip on the country in 2008–2009. We 
cannot grasp the logic behind economic growth in Russia in 2000–
2008 without taking this into account. In contrast, for example, to 
China, economic growth in Russia was not generated by industrial 
development. In fact, the country significantly lagged behind the 
1989 RSFSR (the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) in 
2005–2006 with respect to most commodities. Unlike Qatar or 
even Kazakhstan, Russia failed to significantly increase oil and gas 
production. In 2012, the corresponding figures were 4.7% lower 
and 6.2% higher than in 1989 while gas production ballooned 25.3-
fold in Qatar and oil extraction surged 3.12-fold in Kazakhstan.14
Thus, the economy of the Russian Federation lived through 
its dix glorieuses15 extremely successfully for a number of reasons 
that are often overlooked. The economic recovery of the early Putin 
period cannot be explained by one of these circumstances alone, 
13 See: idem, „Putinomika rosta,” Вusiness Week (Russia), no. 40, 22 October 
2007, p. 64.
14 Estimated based on: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016 (bp-
statistical-review-of-world-energy-2016-workbook, downloaded from the website 
www.bp.com).
15 I have paraphrased a set phrase trente glorieuses which refers to nearly thirty 
years of sustainable economic growth in France from 1946–1975.
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nor can the subsequent crisis be explained purely by changes to 
some of the abovementioned factors. It is also noteworthy that 
modernization—which is fundamental to the majority of successfully 
developed economies—should not be mentioned here, neither in 
a positive nor negative sense; no new branches of industry have 
emerged nor qualitatively new technologies used in Russia since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. All development has been based 
on exploiting the country’s commodities-based potential, changes 
of direction and intensity of financial flows via the state treasury, 
and occasional innovations in the services sector introduced solely 
due to private business innovations. 
“THE LOST DECADE” OF 2008–2017
All the factors that led to economic growth in Russia in the 2000s 
were transient: oil prices could not go on rising forever; the 
potential of new sectors could not but exhaust itself since they were 
not supported by new, promising technologies; rising incomes 
of the population were destined to conflict with the interests of 
businessmen at some point.
The first signs of economic meltdown emerged back in 2006–
2007. A serious blow was then dealt to Putin’s system in 2008 
with the onset of the global financial crisis, arising from problems 
with the high-risk financial instruments market in the United States. 
These processes fueled the crisis. According to Dmitry Medvedev, 
“if we are to be open and frank, strictly speaking, we have never 
fully recovered from the crisis.”16 
Then Russia was hit by a subsequent crisis in 2014. The 
2008–2009 crisis unveiled certain frailties of the Russian economic 
model: first of all, its dependence not only on the shape of the 
commodity market but also the influx of foreign investment, stock 
market performance and, most importantly, investor expectations. 
Although the government allocated nearly as much as the 
16 A quotation from Dmitry Medvedev cited from www.vestifinance.ru/
articles/50589. 
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developed countries most affected by financial fluctuations17 did, 
the country’s economy plummeted by 7.8% in 2009—a downturn 
unparalleled in any other G-20 country including those which were 
fully dependent on oil prices and the global commodity market.
Actually, Russia and its leadership were faced with a need for 
sustainable growth in 2008–2010 for the first time. President Dmitry 
Medvedev believed that limited liberalizing of entrepreneurial 
activity, the country’s further integration into the global economy 
and, most importantly, advanced technological modernization18 
could ensure sustainable growth. However, a lack of interest of 
the political class and business elite in real modernization, and a 
quick rebound of oil prices and growing political instability in the 
country and in the world, resulted in a speedy abandonment of this 
approach. And the abandoment turned swiftly to condemnation. 
Most of the political elite came to the conclusion that the country’s 
further economic development should be accompanied by 
increased “statism.” Consequently, a historic decision which led 
to Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency was made in the fall of 
2011. 
However, Putin’s third term differed significantly from the 
period of 2000–2007. An element of the elite, entirely dependent 
on control over budgetary funds, had been firmly established 
by the time 2012 rolled around. They were, let’s say, apologists 
for the new form state capitalism that was taking hold, and they 
espoused rhetoric reminiscent of a great superpower. In the early 
days of Putin’s rule, one could say that liberals, realists-technocrats, 
conservatives and the most radical opponents of reform—the 
bigots—were virtually represented in equal measures in the power 
elite. But in 2012, the latter two categories had a firm grip on most 
of the levers of power.19 Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin 
with the intention of “tightening the screws” to the nth degree; his 
17 See: V. Goreglyad, Mirovoy krizis i paradigmy gosudarsvennogo finansovogo 
regulirovaniya, Moskva: FGBOU VP REU, 2013, p. 206, footnote.
18 See: D. Medvedev, Rossiya, vperyod!, 10 September 2009, kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/5413.
19 For more detail, see: V. Inozemtsev, „Progressisty, neutraly, konservatory 
i mrakobesy,” Gazeta.ru, 21 December 2016, www.gazeta.ru/column/vladislav_
inozemcev/10439171.shtml.
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rhetoric rocked the economy instantly. GDP growth slumped from 
4.9% in 2012 Q1 to 2% in 2012 Q4 and from 1.3% in 2013 Q3 to 
0.6% in 2014 Q1. The 2014 results were largely unaffected by the 
reckless policy Russia employed towards Ukraine. 
Despite the economic slowdown, the authorities 
dramatically hiked taxes and increased budgetary spending in 
the least productive areas. In 2009, an entrepreneur had to pay 
110.8 thousand rubles in insurance premiums per annum for an 
employee who earned 900 thousand rubles a year—75,000 rubles 
or 1,700 euros a month—whereas the level of these expenses 
soared to 216,100 rubles—an increase of 95%20—in 2014. From 
2012–2014, more than 20 additional levies were imposed on 
entrepreneurs; the official cadastral value of land increased 
dramatically which resulted in a hike of real estate taxes as well 
as many local taxes. As a result, spending on bureaucracy and the 
siloviki increased: federal budget spending on national defense and 
security ballooned from 1.87 trillion rubles in 2008 to 4.78 trillion 
rubles in 2015.21 Naturally, entrepreneurs began to limit their 
investment and to withdraw capital from the country (outflow more 
than quadrupled from $33.6 billion in 2010 to $151.5 billion in 
2014). 
Russia approached a watershed year in 2014 bearing a huge 
burden—as had been the case long before the drop in oil prices 
and the imposition of Western sanctions. Russia’s economy had not 
been functioning normally since the late 2000s; it had become used 
to generating expenses in order to compensate for low efficiency. 
The 2009 and 2014 crises partially alleviated this problem through 
devaluation (from 24–25 rubles/dollar up to 35–36 in 2008–2009 
and from 34–35 rubles to the dollar up to 64–66 in 2014–2015). 
The grim situation, though, did not change substantially: domestic 
producers need both the undervalued domestic currency and 
imposed restrictions on competitor access to the market in order 
to improve their competitiveness on the domestic market (let’s 
leave the international market aside—total industrial exports from 
20 See: M. Prokhorov, „Pyat’ nabludenniy i chetyre idei dla budushchego krizisa,” 
Kommersant, 29 January 2015, p. 7.
21 See data on the execution of the 2008 budget: base.garant.ru/12171993/5/ 
#block_6000; 2015 budgetary plan: www.aif.ru/dontknows/infographics/1394939.
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Russia is virtually zero). After all, Russia has failed to introduce an 
innovative system and the implementation of new manufacturing 
technologies remains as sporadic as it was in the Soviet days. At 
the same time, the authorities have grown increasingly convinced 
that the economy exists only in order to ensure there is money in 
the coffers to fund spending on political (and geopolitical) projects. 
The annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russia’s aggression 
in eastern Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions imposed 
on Russia greatly exacerbated the economic crisis, although they 
were not the causes by any means. Two decisive factors behind the 
recession, which continues to this day, include the drop in oil prices 
as well as lower prices of the majority of other components which 
make up Russian exports. As a result, exports fell by $239 billion 
from 2013–201622 which equals 17.3% of 2016 GDP calculated 
at market exchange rates. Another important factor is related to 
purposeful governmental actions aimed at augmenting the gravitas 
of the siloviki to the detriment of conditions for entrepreneurial 
activity (at a cost of 4–6% of GDP in 2012–2015). Sanctions put 
paid to the possibility of securing loans from the West, although 
the latter have generally been replaced by Russian currency from 
reserve funds and the printing of money by the Central Bank of 
Russia. The sanctions also contributed towards sliding imports, 
although the absence of financially viable demand within the 
country was a greater problem. In other words, I would say that 
sanctions have been of secondary importance in the context of the 
Russian economic crisis and their impact is incommensurate with 
the effects of the commodity crisis and the unreasonable policies 
pursued by the authorities.
The result is well-known: cumulative economic growth 
amounted to as little as 6.6% in 2008–2016; over the course of 
nine years, GDP was decreasing for three years and increasing 
for six. In fact, not only have the authorities failed to kick-start 
the economy, they have also come to accept that its anemic state 
will continue over the long-term. Projections by the Ministry of 
Economic Development, published in fall 2016, predicted that 
economic growth would remain between 0.6–1.7% per annum 
22 Calculated from the Federal Customs Service data (see: www.customs.ru).
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until 2035. Despite numerous optimistic statements, the prospects 
of sanctions being lifted remain slim. Oil prices have recently 
climbed only thanks to political speculations and the country lacks 
a growth mechanism of domestic origin (it is noteworthy that the 
2016 economic slump to 0.6% at the end of the year occurred 
at the very same time that the government’s economic stimulus 
package was meant to be taking effect at the expense of a budget 
deficit of 3.7% of GDP, unprecedented military spending of 
3.9 trillion rubles (4.7% of GDP), eating away at the reserves (which 
decreased by 2,67 trillion rubles in 2016) and further financing of 
large investment projects such as construction works in preparation 
for the 2018 FIFA World Cup). Should defense industry injections 
remain at the level of 2009–2010 and the budget deficit not 
exceed 2% of GDP, economic growth would have exceeded 2%.23 
Although some ever-optimistic experts believe that “the authorities 
have identified a need to implement reforms to liberalize the 
economy,”24 I personally see no such signs. 
IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS
In 2014–2015, many Russian and foreign experts and politicians 
were falling over themselves to predict Russia’s imminent collapse. 
President Barack Obama uttered the famous words: “Well, today, 
it is America that stands strong and united with our allies, while 
Russia is isolated, with its economy in tatters.”25 Nothing of the 
kind happened. Despite the ongoing economic downturn, Russia’s 
economy remains afloat. The population is willing to put up with 
a more meager real income and the political unity of the nation 
23 For more detail, see: V. Inozemtsev, „Prognozy—2017: pochemu nado  go to - 
vit’sya k sduvanyu ekonomicheskogo puzyrya,” Forbes, 29 December 2016, 
www.forbes.ru/biznes/336393-o-prognozah-na-2017-god-pochemu-nado-
gotovitsya-k-sduvaniyu-rossyiskogo. 
24 See, for example, the opinion of Mikhail Dmitriyev, https://republic.ru/
posts/78056.
25 See: B. Obama, State of the Union address 2015; quotation from the 
original: www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-state-of-the-union-address-
2015-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery/2015/01/20/fd803c4c-a0ef-11e4-b146-
577832eafcb4_story.html?Post%20generic=% 3Ftid%3Dsm_twitter_washington 
post&utm_term=.fc3c3f5b23e8. 
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appears to be much stronger than it was during the “pre-Crimean” 
period. This is precisely why the forecast that economic difficulties 
will not, first of all, trigger a catastrophic recession nor, secondly, 
threaten political stability, remains a realistic forecast. 
The most pessimistic scenarios with respect to both oil prices 
and the geopolitical situation in 2017–2018 will not transpire. Oil 
prices will most probably stay above $50 a barrel this year. Even at 
$50 a barrel, over 2.3 trillion rubles of additional revenue will be 
generated over and above the figures cited in the newly-adopted 
federal budget (as stated by Vladimir Putin—every additional $10 a 
barrel give the budget an additional 1.75 trillion rubles. So I do not 
expect the deficit to exceed 1.5% of GDP and the reserve fund will 
not be fully depleted in 2017—seen as inevitable by the majority 
of experts. The United States can boast of its potential to increase 
extraction capacity. However, at least a year-and-a-half to two years 
will pass before this potential is fulfilled and oil prices are affected. 
Hence, no negative consequences are expected to arise, from 
a Russian perspective, as a result in 2017–2018. 
Russia has the option of curtailing its involvement in the 
Syrian conflict and refraining from escalating the conflict in 
Ukraine; changes in U.S. attitude towards Russia under the Trump 
Administration could also provide a tailwind; elections in France 
and Germany could change the EU’s posture to a degree. In other 
words, the global political climate is apparently neutral at worst for 
the Russian economy. Domestically, the authorities will introduce 
certain deregulatory measures for entrepreneurs and will elevate 
the economy to one of the most commonly visited issues of pre-
election rhetoric. 
The “lost decade” will linger on, however. No sectors which 
have huge potential to become growth drivers will emerge; the 
extraction of commodities is unlikely to increase—in line with 
the agreements between oil exporters, if not for internal reasons; 
political “statism” will remain an obstacle to foreign investment; 
further bureaucratization and the enhanced role of the siloviki 
among Kremlin decision making will continue to cool off 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Without impetus, Russian economy will become a hostage 
toone factor over the course of the next five to ten years: prices 
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of export commodities, and most notably, oil. Rising oil prices 
will result in increased revenues which will provide a boost for 
the budget and increase the average Russian’s disposable income. 
Declining prices will trigger a recession. Russia’s financial authorities 
are striving to normalize the economy today from a formal point 
of view: inflation is falling, an up-to-date banking system is being 
built and the ruble-free floating rate is being maintained. However, 
the problem does not lie with the financial sphere as such. The 
main question is whether the economy is capable of developing 
within the framework of statism in the context of Russia’s growing 
isolation from the outside world. 
My answer is probably not. Russia has entered an era of 
“unseasonable weather.” The country will consistently overcome 
difficulties but will sturggle to keep up with its competitors. Its 
increasing reliance on demand from China is also a cause for 
concern, making Russian fortunes dependent on sustained rapid 
growth in China. 
A POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF DISILLUSION
The fundamental, distinctive feature of the Russian economy since 
the mid-2000s—and perhaps until the mid-2020s or even later—is 
the complete absence of any agenda drawn up with development 
in mind. Neither have the authorities intended to devise one. 
There is no strategy aimed at creating Russian economy capable of 
adapting to its place in the global distribution of labor; no policy 
that addresses and improves Russia’s technological fundamentals; 
no strategy to create a wider system of interrelations with its 
partners and allies, or a more transparent link between business 
and government.
Society largely now believes in the precedence of politics 
over the economy and the supremacy of government over 
business.26 While modernization on this model comes up against 
constant obstacles, this is precisely why the economy “under mature 
26 For more detail, see: V. Inozemtsev, “La modernisation de l’économie russe: 
les causes de l’échec,” Russie.Nei.Visions, no. 96, September 2016. 
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Putin” survives rather than thrives27 and represents such a peculiar 
symbiosis of commodity sectors, state-owned enterprises, and 
companies which emulate Western business models, but remain 
devoid of any spirit of innovation. This type of economic system 
is doomed to lag behind competitors in an open and global world; 
it simply cannot attract the attention of international investors; nor 
are its manufactured goods, services or technologies capable of 
excelling globally.
I have previously described this phenomenon using the terms 
“the economy of hope” and “the economy of disillusionment.”28 
My view was that high growth in the 2000s was not only due 
to an increase in oil prices but also due to the Russia’s status as 
a new, “virgin” economy with a liberal financial and fiscal regime, 
huge stock market potential and an emerging middle class which 
demands world-class goods and services. The inflow of investment 
and the arrival of Western companies to the country was a decisive 
growth factor but the optimism of Russians themselves, who came 
to believe in the “normality” of their country, proved far more 
important. The role of this combination was undermined by the 
2008–2009 crisis and, to an even greater extent, by the 2014–2016 
events. Not only did the “lost decade” halt economic growth, it 
also catapulted Russians’ incomes (denominated in key global 
currencies at the market exchange rate) back to 2005–2006 levels. 
The same goes for key stock market indices; consumption of durable 
goods plummeted and even problems of Russia’s trade partners, 
usually attributed to Western sanctions, were largely generated by 
the shrinking, financially-viable demand in Russia as well as the 
impotence of domestic entrepreneurial activity. And since there are 
no signs that the government’s economic policy will undergo any 
changes, at least until the mid-2020s, disillusion will take hold. 
I am not inclined to state now, as I did a year ago, that the 
next eight years29 will see a constant shrinking of economic activity 
in the country. However, I am convinced that, while Russian 
27 See: idem, „Novaya nenormal’nost’,” Vedomosti, 24 October 2016, pp. 6–7. 
28 See: idem, „Putin’s Self-Destructing Economy,” The Washington Post, 
18 January 2016, p. A15. 
29 See: idem, „Dozhyvyom do 2023: pochemu nastoyashchiy krizis tol’ko 
nachinayetsya,” RBC, 22 December 2015, p. 7. 
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economic growth exceeded that of European countries and Northern 
America 1.5 to 2.5-fold in 2000–2007 and was approximately on 
a par with them or slightly behind them from 2008–2016, the 
Russian economy will lag significantly behind not only the leading 
developing countries, but also the majority of developed ones from 
2018 until 2025, even if the commodities market enjoys a period 
of stability. Although these developments might not be fraught 
with catastrophic consequences for the global economy in purely 
economic terms (contraction of the country’s less than 2% of the 
gross world product will not pose a huge threat) or for Russia itself 
(Russia’s population is used to surviving under complex conditions 
and there is still a huge stock of patience remaining), the problem 
might be much more serious in geopolitical terms. 
By undertaking aggression against Ukraine, President 
Vladimir Putin assumed that Russia could force neighboring 
republics into cooperating. He had a view to reintegrate them 
into an afterglow of the Soviet Union.30 The logic underlying his 
policy was not only determined by a desire to project an image 
of Russia as a superpower which “rose from its knees” in military 
terms, but also to create conditions for the sustainable development 
of the domestic economy in the aftermath of the pre-crisis period, 
aided by the return of oil prices to maximum levels. However, 
it turned out that confrontation with the rest of the world, which 
coincided with adjustments affecting the commodities markets, 
was accompanied by an immediate devaluation of the ruble and 
a significant weakening in terms of influence to affect neighboring 
states. In the late 2010s, Russia found itself in an entirely new 
situation: the ratio of its market-value GDP to EU indicators was 
half of what it was in the early 1990s. Russia’s GDP ratio was 
4.5-times lower than China’s. At the same time, Moscow ceased to 
be the “center of gravity” for post-Soviet countries oriented towards 
Brussels, Beijing or Ankara. Accordingly, the Russia of the 2020s 
will face the unenviable tasks of counteracting the impact of the 
EU on the one hand and China on the other as “centers of gravity.” 
Will Russia be able to retain its status as a self-sufficient economy 
or is it destined to become a “white spot” on the economic map of 
30 See: V. Putin, „Noviy integratsyonniy proyekt dla Evrazii—budushcheye, 
kotoroe rozhdayetsya segodnya,” Izvestia, 4 October 2011, pp. 1, 3. 
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Eurasia? In my opinion, this will be a key problem in the coming 
decade and the expectations of both economic and geopolitical 
actors will play a decisive role. 
***
To wrap up, it is noteworthy that the 2012–2014 economic crisis, 
brought about by both economic and political decisions of the 
Russian authorities, has had a crushing impact on the country and 
its global standing. Russia is now perceived as a country which 
broke free from global economic trends and went on to consistently 
underperform compared to frontrunner countries with developed 
economies. This situation has brought into question Russia’s standing 
both as an economic and political player: this disillusionment can 
be ignored for the time being, but it becomes a key factor in the 
further development of the country. It is precisely in this context 
that Crimea became a “point of no return”—a point when Moscow 
tried to exchange economic for politics, surrendering both. And we 
will all have to await the consequences over the next decade. No 
substantial deviation from the chosen political course is imminent. 
Translation: Natalia Mamul
Vladislav Inozemtsev is a director at the Centre for Post-Industrial 
Studies (Moscow). He is an Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation fellow at 
Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in 
Washington, DC.
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OLGA GULINA
MIGRATION AS A (GEO)POLITICAL CHALLENGE  
FOR RUSSIA
Russia’s annual immigration levels are among the highest in 
the world, consistently in the top three alongside the U.S. and 
Germany.1 The major change in Russia’s migration dynamics over 
the last few years has come from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, 
which has had a dramatic effect on the volumes and composition 
of migration flows. Over the course of 2014 to 2016, migration 
flows from Ukraine outpaced those from Central Asia, traditionally 
the largest source of migration to Russia. There are now 2.5 million 
citizens of Ukraine residing within the territory of the Russian 
Federation (RF), the largest grouping of foreign citizens in Russia.2 
In general, migrants heading for Russia both from Central 
Asian states and Ukraine do not perceive Russia as their new 
homeland, but mostly as a source of income and/or employment. 
In most cases, they are not humanitarian migrants, either—refugees 
or asylum-seekers—not least because granting asylum in Russia is 
a casus extraordinarius.3 
1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, International Migration Report 2015: Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/375).
2 According to Olga Kirillova, Chief of the General Administration for Migration 
Issues of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Russian Federation, www.gazeta.ru/
social/2016/06/30/8348279.shtml.
3 In Russia, refugee status was granted to 239,359 individuals in 1996; to 79,727 
individuals in 1999; to 26,065 individuals in 2000; to 458 individuals in 2005; to 
785 individuals in 2010; to 763 individuals in 2012; to 632 individuals in 2013; 
to 808 individuals in 2014; to 227 individuals in 2015; to 770 individuals in 2016.
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This chapter reveals the specific nature of migration flows 
in Russia from 2014–2016 and answers the question: Why does 
migration remain a demographic, political and social challenge for 
the country? 
DEPOPULATION OF THE COUNTRY:  
MIGRATION AS A DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE
Two factors should be addressed here: the lack of stable, positive 
population growth, and Russians’ unfaltering emigration sentiments. 
The growth or preservation of the population’s size is a priority 
in today’s Russia. The Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) 
has published estimates that outline three scenarios Russia’s 
demographic prospects up to 2050. All are strongly linked to new 
waves of immigration:
– In a low/inertia scenario, a fall in the RF population by 
36.9 million residents will be partially compensated by the arrival 
of 7.7 million new migrants. 
– In a medium/realistic scenario, the decrease in RF 
population by 16.1 million people will be compensated by the 
arrival of 13.6 million new migrants.
– In a high/futuristic scenario, the population growth of 
+3.1 million people in Russia will be accompanied by an inflow of 
19 million new migrants.4 
Any of the three scenarios will have a significant impact on the 
political, legal and socio-economic landscape of Russia. Population 
growth in 2014–2016—self-proclaimed by Russian authorities—
was generated by the annexation of two new entities—the Republic 
of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol (to be noted, these 
territories are recognized by Ukraine as being under temporary 
occupation). This bucked a trend: Russia’s population growth—and 
in particular its labor market—have been dependent on migrants 
4 Russian Demographic Yearbook, Rosstat, 2015, www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_ 
2015/demo15.pdf.
Migration as a (Geo)political Challenge for Russia 161
for years.5 At present, no objective reasons exist which would 
change that overarching trend. According to various estimates, 
the country’s labor resources will have fallen by 18–19 million 
by 2025; the ratio of able-bodied to unemployable residents will 
have reached a critical point: 2:1 by 2022 and 1.6:1 by 2045.6 To 
put that in perspective, the ratio of able-bodied to unemployable 
residents in 2015–2016 was 2.5:1.
Demographic data also show a worsening geographical 
imbalance. The majority of the Russian population—79%—live in 
the European part of the country, while the territories of Western 
Siberia and Russia’s Far East are scarcely populated. 19.3 million 
people live in the Siberian Federal District, while just 6.2 million 
people reside in the Far Eastern Federal District today. Just across 
the border in China, three neighboring provinces—Heilongjiang, 
Jilin and Inner Mongolia—are populated by more than 100 million 
residents. Russia’s population density is 8.4 people per square 
kilometer, which is 18 times lower than that of China; 14 times 
lower than that of the European Union; 6 times lower than the 
world’s average arithmetic density.7 
Population growth at current rates is very low. Since 1992, 
contemporary Russia has consistently witnessed population decline. 
As underlined by Prof. Anatoly Vishnevsky: “simply replacing 
generations was already impossible back in 1964 in the USSR … 
[at the moment] the population growth rate in the RF is negative.”8 
Another concern: Russians’ willingness to emigrate. 
According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center 
(VCIOM), the majority of respondents (86%) have no plans to leave 
Russia entirely, and believe that their children and grandchildren 
would be better off living in the country rather than abroad (75%). 
5 Yu.F. Florinskaya et al., Migratsiya i rynok truda, Moskva: The Institute of Social 
Analysis and Projections, 2015; E.V. Tyuryukanova, Zh.A. Zayonchkovskaya, 
Yu.F. Florinskaya, Trudovaya migratsya v Rossiyu: kak dvigat’sya dal’she. Seriya 
spetsyal’nykh dokladov, Moskva: MAX Press, 2011.
6 S. Aleksashenko, “Kak vymirayet Rossiya: vyvody iz novogo 
demographicheskogo prognoza,” RBK, 30 January 2015, http://daily.rbc.ru/
opinions/economics/30/01/2015/54c8d2459a7947498564d371#%5Blenta.
7 O. Gulina, “Zatrat na rubl’, dokhod—na dva,” Gazeta.ru, 26 September 2016.
8 A.G. Vishnevsky, “Al’ternativy migratsyonnoy strategii,” Rossiya v global’noy 
politike, 2004, no. 6.
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However, 11% of respondents harbor opposing views and would 
like to emigrate. That is a marginal improvement: there were 16% 
of them in 1991 and 13% in 2011; 11% in 2012 and 13% in 2015.9
Table 1. The number of temporary and permanent residence permits 
issued to citizens of the RF by EU member states
Country
Number of tempo-
rary and permanent 
 residence permits issued 
to citizens of the RF
Percentage of temporary/ 
permanent residence permits 
issued to citizens of the RF 
as a % proportion of the total 
number of applications
Latvia 2,084 32.8%
Bulgaria 2,729 29.0%
Estonia 970,000 24.3%
Lithuania 1,108 21.4%
The Czech 
Republic 11,289 16.4%
Cyprus 2,069 13.3%
Malta 902,000 9.0%
Hungary 1,321 6.4%
Croatia 219,000 6.4%
Luxembourg 276,000 5.6%
Switzerland 1,946 4.7%
Slovenia 531,000 4.7%
Germany 9,054 4.6%
Greece 1,175 3.1%
Poland 3,932 0.7%
Source: Eurostat.
However, a substantial amount of this 11% willing to emigrate 
are young people. A report by the Committee for Civic Initiatives10 
notes that data from polls conducted by the VCIOM, Levada Center 
and Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) regarding key indicators 
such as the percentage of those who want to emigrate (11% by the 
9 “Emigratsionnyye nastroyeniya–2016: potiv techeniya,” VTSIOM, no. 3229, 
26 October 2016, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236& uid=115921.
10 O. Vorobyova, A. Grebenyuk, Doklad “Emigratsya iz Rossii v kontse XX 
nachale XXI veka, Moskva: The Committee for Civic Initiatives, 2016, pp. 31–39.
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VTSIOM and 19% by the Levada Center11) and the profiles of the 
respondents inclined to emigrate (on the whole, young people aged 
18–24) are compatible. Eurostat statistics confirm this: Russians are 
high on the list for number of applicants to the European Union for 
permanent or temporary residence12 (Table 1) and they make up 
a sizeable group of naturalized citizens in the EU (Table 2). 
An increasing number of Russians who have left their home 
country are striving to obtain citizenship in EU member states—the 
main countries of destination of Russian migrants.13 
Table 2. Proportion of naturalized Russians among naturalized citizens 
of EU member states
EU member state
Number of naturalized Russians  
among the total number of naturalized citizens 
of a given country*
Lithuania 49.6%
Cyprus 40.5%
Finland 32.4%
Bulgaria 16.4%
Malta 15.1%
Estonia 12.7%
The Czech Republic 12.4%
Poland 9.5%
Hungary 8.4%
Austria 6.8%
Germany 5.9%
Latvia 5.3%
Luxembourg 5.3%
Belgium 4.9%
Slovenia 2.6%
Croatia 1.8%
Greece 1.5%
* Main countries of former EU and non-EU citizenships of persons acquiring 
citizenship in the EU-28 and EFTA, 2014, Eurostat 2015.    
Source: Eurostat.
11 “Emigratsiya,” Levada.ru, 19 July 2016, www.levada.ru/2016/07/19/
emigratsiya.
12 Main citizenships of persons granted first residence permits, in 2015, Eurostat 2016.
13 “Emigratsiya,” op. cit.
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There is a significant demographic surplus of Russians 
in other states whereas in Russia itself, there is a demographic 
deficit. 4.5 million Russians left the country from 1990–2014. 
308,475 citizens left Russia in 2014; 257,324 of whom emigrated to 
CIS countries and 51,151 of them—to non-CIS countries.14 Russian 
statistics, it should be noted, do not determine the nature or purpose 
of the emigration dynamics, since the purpose of entry/exit is not 
identified. It would, therefore, be more accurate to use statistical data 
from destination countries (Table 1, 2) when looking at Russians’ 
emigration sentiments and the dynamics of outflows from Russia. 
Experts from the Committee for Civic Initiatives note that four 
waves of emigration of citizens of post-Soviet Russia can clearly be 
identified after the collapse of the USSR. The first wave of emigration 
(1990–1994) comprised of refugees, migrant workers, scientists 
and ethnic emigrants returning to historic homelands (for the most 
part, Germany and Israel, but also other countries). The second 
wave of emigration, from 1995 to 2000, had a similar makeup of 
refugees, migrant workers, ethnic emigrants, scientists and highly-
qualified specialists, students, and entrepreneurs. The composition 
of those willing to leave their homeland changed starting with the 
third wave of emigration, from 2001 to 2005: the number of young, 
able-bodied Russians choosing to emigrate increased. A similar 
tendency persisted among emigrants during the fourth wave of 
emigration from 2006 to 2010. 
Experts from the Committee for Civic Initiatives have 
overlooked one more wave of emigration: Russians seeking 
asylum in the West. In the fiscal year of 2016 which ended on 
30 September 2016, there were 1,912 Russians applying for asylum 
in the U.S. That is an increase of 31% year on year—and up 164% 
compared to the same period in 2012.15 In the EU, 7,510 citizens 
of Russia applied for asylum during the first ten months of 2016—
14 Chislennost’ i migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 2014 godu, 
Federal’naya sluzhba gosudarstvennoy statistiki, www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_107/
Main.htm.
15 C. Schreck, Russian Applications for U.S. Asylum Surge Again in 2016, Radio 
Free Europe, 6 December 2016, www.rferl.org/a/russia-increase-seeking-us-
asylum-in-2016/28159435.html.
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up 31% compared to the same period of 2015.16 Within the EU, 
the most popular destination countries for asylum-seekers from 
Russia were Germany, which registered 4,435 asylum applications 
(59% of all asylum applications submitted by citizens of the RF 
in the EU), Poland—with 1,860 asylum applications (25%), and 
France—395 applications (5%).17
The population decline, combined with the emigration of 
mostly working-age citizens from the country, may lead to a situation 
where scarcely populated areas of the Russian Federation (with its 
average population density of 8.4 people per square kilometer) 
become the targets of geopolitical interest from Russia’s neighbors. 
Most notably, that’s China (population density: 139 people per 
sq. km) or even Japan (336 people per sq. km).18 Russia’s future, 
therefore, rests on a surge of migration, since only new immigrants 
can become a replacement mechanism for an emigrating, ageing 
and dying population, or even just a mechanism to slow down the 
depopulation process. 
MIGRATION AS A POLITICAL CHALLENGE
The topic of political challenges posed by migration has many 
facets in domestic and foreign policy. The migration flow between 
Russia and independent states which emerged from the rubble of 
16 First-time asylum applicants in the EU-28 by citizenship, Q3 2015–Q3 
2016, Eurostat 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ 
File:First_time_asylum_applicants_in_the_EU-28_by_citizenship,_Q3_2015_% 
E2%80%93_Q3_2016.png 
17 Thirty main citizenships of first-time asylum applicants by destination country 
in the EU 28, 3rd quarter 2016, Eurostat 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/images/6/6a/Thirty_main_citizenships_of_first_time_asylum_
applicants_by_destination_country_in_the_EU_28%2C_3rd_quarter_2016.png.
18 For more details see: N. Mkrtchyan, “Goroda vostoka Rossii ‘pod natiskom’ 
demographicheskogo shatiya i zapadnogo dreypha,” in: Pereselencheskoye 
obshchestvo Azyatskoy Rossii: migratsii, prostranstva, soobshchestva. Rubezhy 
XIX–XX i XX–XXI vv., eds V.I. Dyatlov, K.V. Gri gorichev, Irkutsk 2013, 
pp. 41–61; L. Karachurina, N. Mkrtchyan, “Dinamika chislennosti naseleniya 
munitsipal’nykh obrazovaniy RF kak otrazheniye tsentro-peripheriynoy kontseptsii 
prostranstvennogo razvitya (1989–2002 gg.),” Demoscope 2010, no. 437–438.
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the USSR has always been one-directional.19 Russia has always 
been, and still is, a magnet for migrants from the countries of 
Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The dynamics 
of these migration flows has recently been influenced by the events 
and circumstances both in the countries of origin and in Russia 
itself. These included military conflicts in South Ossetia and the 
introduction of two-way entry visas between Russia and Georgia; 
the 2008 financial crisis; the devaluation of the Russian ruble and 
stagnation of Russian economy during 2014–2015. 
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict stands out as a political event 
that has affected migration flows. From 2014–2016, migration from 
Ukraine surpassed immigration flows from Central Asian states 
which dominated through the preceding ten-year period. Economic 
recession, the imposition of EU and U.S. sanctions, devaluation 
of the Russian currency and a tightening of migration legislation 
diminished the demand for the labor from Central Asian countries 
at a time when migrants from Ukraine flooded into Russia.
According to Rosstat, the migration balance (the difference 
between the number of immigrants and emigrants) between 
Ukraine and Russia looked as follows: +36.4 thousand people 
in 2013; +84.9 thousand people in 2014; +146.1 thousand 
people in 2015; +93.6 thousand people in 2016. To compare, 
the migration balance between Uzbekistan and Russia comprised 
+67.3 thousand people in 2013; +36.7 thousand people in 2014; 
–(minus) 20.6 thousand people in 2015; +14.2 thousand people in 
2016. The migration balance between Tajikistan and Russia was as 
follows: +33.7 thousand people in 2013; +19.3 thousand people 
in 2014; +11.3 thousand people in 2015; +19.4 thousand people 
in 2016.20
As of 1 October 2016, 531,471 citizens of Azerbaijan; 
523,124 citizens of Armenia; 741,453 citizens of Belarus; 
613,067 citizens of Kazakhstan; 582,863 citizens of Kyrgyzstan; 
490,844 citizens of Moldova; 999,035 citizens of Tajikistan; 
19 Kazakhstan is the only exception. In the 2000s, Kazakhstan also became 
a recipient country and is still receiving migrants from other Central Asian 
countries, although far fewer than Russia. 
20 Official data by Rosstat from 2013–2016, www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/
rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/. The 2016 data will be updated. 
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1,779,002 citizens of Uzbekistan and 2,581,380 citizens of Ukraine 
registered in the RF.21
Such a transformation of migration flows has served Russian 
interests, not least because of the cultural affinity and linguistic unity 
of Ukrainians and Russians. However, according to the majority 
of experts, Ukrainian migration to Russia has become a burden 
rather than a blessing due to complex migratory regulations and 
bureaucratic procedures. These have prevented Russia from 
leveraging the full potential of well-qualified and highly-educated 
Ukrainian migrants.22 
Migrants without qualifications and low levels of education 
have been a serious problem, in general. Migration to Russia, on 
the whole, does not contribute sufficiently to dealing with the 
current shortage of professional staff. Nearly 90% of migrants 
entering Russia arrive from countries with a lower average level 
of employee skills.23 Every second citizen of Tajikistan (53%) and 
every third citizen of Kyrgyzstan (38%) focus on migration to Russia 
in search of work, education and/or new place of residence.24 At 
the same time, the level of education of the majority of migrants is 
far lower than that of Russian citizens.25 In 2010, as few as 14.3% 
of migrants residing within the territory of the RF could boast of 
having completed higher education whereas 23.1% had completed 
vocational training.26 Nearly 63% of migrants arriving in Russia 
only have a high school certificate.27
21 Stay of citizens of the CIS in the RF as of 1 October 2016. Statistical data of the 
Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Central Database of the 
Registration of Foreigners.
22 V. Malakhov, Otsenka riskov, ugroz i zadach migratsyonnoy politiki 
v usloviyakh dolgosrochnogo massovogo prisutstviya na territorii Rossii bezhentsev 
iz sopredel’nykh gosudarstv, Moskva, 2016, https://komitetgi.ru/analytics/2557.
23 The Russian Federation. Systemic country diagnostic, World Bank 2016, 
p. 119; Developing skills for innovative growth in Russia, Moscow, World Bank, 
2015, p. 12.
24 EDB Integration barometer, Eurasian Development Bank 2015, www.eabr.org/
general//upload/EDB_Centre_Analytical_Report_33_Full_Rus.pdf.
25 M. Lokshin, E. Chernina, “Migranty na rossiyskom rynke truda: portret 
i zarabotnaya plata,” Ekonomicheskiy Zhurnal WShE, 2013, no. 6 (3), pp. 41–73 
[59–60].
26 Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, Migratsya v sovremennoy Rossii, vol. 1, Moskva: 
Russian International Affairs Council, 2013.
27 N. El-Sibai, Fundamental’nyye issledowaniya, 2015, no. 2 (25), pp. 5689–5692.
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On the one hand, this creates conditions for the expansion 
of a shadow labor market while, on the other, it increases tension 
in the legal sector of the labor market. According to Russian 
specialists, the problems of legalizing employment and the influx of 
undocumented migrant workers from CIS countries became even 
more acute in 2016, since the number of migrant work permits 
issued in the RF bears no resemblance to the real number of migrants 
who enter the country with the intention of gaining employment.28
The opposite side of the process which creates serious tensions 
in the Russian migration field are the demands to introduce a visa 
regime for Central Asian states. Some of the political beau monde 
perceive migrants from Central Asia as magna bestia, encroaching 
on the interests of Russians. A Senator, the First Deputy Chairman of 
the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security Frants 
Klintsevich (United Russia),29 Valery Rashkin (the Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation—the CPRF),30 Sergey Mironov (Just Russia) 
and many others are convinced that “a visa regime with Central 
Asian countries should be re-introduced … fingerprints definitely 
have to be taken from everyone who enters our country and 
leaves it without a visa.”31 Leaders of opposition parties compete 
with representatives of pro-government factions when it comes to 
proposals for limiting the number of immigrants entering Russia. 
In his election manifesto “Navalny 2018,” Alexey Navalny stated 
that it was not only necessary to introduce a visa regime for Central 
Asian countries but also for Transcaucasian states.32 
At the same time, a visa regime for Central Asian countries 
does not meet the interests of Russia; those in the high echelons 
of executive power are well aware of this. Prime Minister Dmitry 
28 Yu. Florinskaya, N. Mkrchyan, “Migratsya v Rossii. Staryye trendy, novyye 
problemy,” Monitoring ekonomicheskoy situatsii v Rossii. Tendentsii i vyzovy 
sotsyalno-ekonomicheskogo razvitya, The Russian Presidential Academy of 
National Economy and Public Administration, 2016, no. 19 (37).
29 “V Sovfede vystupili za vvedeniye viz so stranami Sredney Azii,” Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 2 May 2016.
30 V. Rashkinn, A profile page on the website of the CPRF, https://kprf.ru/personal/
rashkin.
31 “Mironov predlozhil vvesti vizovyy rezhim so stranami Sredney Azii,” RIA 
Novosti, 29 August 2016, https://ria.ru/society/20160829/1475572857.html.
32 The key issues of Alexey Navalny’s election manifesto, https://2018.navalny.com/ 
platform.
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Medvedev and President Vladimir Putin have repeatedly stated that 
Russia was not going to introduce visas for citizens of Central Asian 
states, since it would “put off former Soviet Republics.”33 Besides, 
the only land border between Russia and Central Asian states is 
shared with Kazakhstan. So far, the border between Kazakhstan 
and Russia has not been equipped with special border security 
measures, which means that considerable financial investment 
would be needed to organize passport and visa controls—
investment which has not been provided for in the Russian 
budget. The visa regime for Central Asian states could not only 
seriously affect the role of Russia on the Eurasian “chessboard,” it 
could also destroy integration unions: namely the Customs Union 
and the Eurasian Economic Union, which unite Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia for the purpose of establishing 
and maintaining free movement of goods, works, and services, 
including free labor turnover. 
“US” AND “THEM.” MIGRATION AS A SOCIAL CHALLENGE
Over the past few years, one of the most common concerns of 
the average Russian citizen is related to the change in the ethnic 
composition of the country’s population—largely due to the arrival 
of immigrants, mainly from the former Soviet states. Should current 
trends continue, including population decline and its substitution by 
migratory influx, migrants and their descendants will have indeed 
made up one-third of Russia’s population by 2050 and will have 
become the backbone of Russian society by 2100.34 Thus, growing 
anti-immigrant sentiments among Russian society is ominous.
According to a 2016 survey by the Levada Center,35 the idea 
of “Russia for the Russians” was accepted by 38% of respondents. 
33 “Putin o migratsii: vizovyy rezhim lish’ ottolknet partnerov po SNG,” RIA 
Novosti, 8 October 2013, https://ria.ru/society/20131008/968476674.html.
34 E. Andreyev, A. Vishnevsky, “Demograficheskiye perspektivy Rossii do 
2050 g., Naseleniye Rossii 2006,” Chetyrnadtsatyy yezhegodny demograficheskiy 
doklad, 2008, pp. 265–286).
35 “Intolerantnost’: i ksenofobiya,” Levada.ru, 11 October 2016, www.levada.ru/ 
2016/10/11/intolerantnost-i-ksenofobiya.
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This is up from 35% in 2015, and 36% in 2014. Levada also asked 
whether this idea was “fully supported,” not just accepted. 14% 
responded that it was, which represents a continued level: 16% 
in 2015 and 18% in 2014. Russians believe it is necessary to limit 
the number of the following ethnic groups (listed in Table 4) from 
entering the country. 
Table 4. Ethnic groups, whose number should be limited within 
the territory of the Russian Federation, in the opinion of Russian 
respondents
Ethnic group / Year 2016 2015 2014
People from the Caucasus  34% 29% 38%
People from Central Asia 29% 29% 29%
Chinese 24% 24% 33%
Jews   6%   7% 8%
Ukrainians 13% 14 % 8%
All nations except for the Russians 18% 15 % 14%
Source: the Levada Center.
Two contrasting trends can be observed in Russia today. The 
first: A majority of Russians—66% of respondents in 2016, 68% of 
respondents in 2015 and 76% of respondents in 2014—were in 
favor of restricting the entry of members of certain ethnic groups 
into Russia.36 The second: a majority of Russians is interested in the 
return of “direct descendants of those who were born in the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union and are Russian native speakers 
and bearers of Russian culture.”37 This contradiction strengthens 
the ethnicization of migration legislation, exacerbates the social 
opposition between “us” and “them” and turns migration policy 
mechanisms (the institutions of citizenship and asylum) into foreign 
policy instruments.38 
36 “Intolerantnost’: i ksenofobiya,” Levada.ru, 11 November 2016, www.levada.ru/ 
2016/10/11/intolerantnost-i-ksenofobiya/#_ednref3.
37 The draft federal law no. 69201-7 “On the amendments to the Federal Law as 
of 31 May 2002, no. 62-FZ ‘On citizenship of the Russian Federation’ and to the 
Federal Law of 25 July 2002, no. 115-FZ ‘On the legal status of foreigners in the 
Russian Federation’ in relation to Russian native speakers.” 
38 See The draft Federal Law no. 54735-7 “On the amendments to Article 14 and 
35 of the Federal Law ‘On citizenship of the Russian Federation’.”
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Today, internal and external migration flows and migration to 
Russia are managed on an ad hoc basis, according to the necessity 
to resolve a given problem. The cooling of Russian-Turkish relation 
in 2015 was accompanied by a ban on employing citizens of the 
Republic of Turkey. Namely, those who were not involved in labor 
and/or civil law relations with Russian employers on the territory 
of Russia as of 31 December 2015.39 The Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, which triggered growing flows of migrants from Ukraine 
to Russia, once again demonstrated the ability of Russian migration 
management to serve political interests of the country. 
“US” AND “THEM.” UKRAINIAN MIGRATION TO RUSSIA
According to the RF’s Migration Department of the Ministry of the 
Interior (GUVM MVD), Ukraine was the main migration donor for 
Russia from 2014–2016. As stipulated in the legislation of the RF, 
migrants from eastern regions of Ukraine are “citizens of Ukraine 
and stateless persons arriving on the territory of the RF en masse 
in an emergency.”40 However, the definitions of “the mass nature” 
and “emergency” of these inflows to Russia make it impossible 
to regard citizens of Ukraine as refugees. To begin with, refugee 
status is granted by Russia only under exceptional circumstances 
(Table 5). Secondly, a few citizens of Ukraine who were granted 
refugee status in Russia were previously employees of the Ukrainian 
state apparatus in the days of President Yanukovych.41 
39 The Decree of the President of the RF no. 583 as of 28 November 2015, “On 
measures to ensure the national security of the Russian Federation and to protect 
citizens of the Russian Federation against criminal and other illegal acts and on the 
adoption of special economic measures against the Republic of Turkey.” 
40 See The Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation as of 
22 July 2014, no. 691 “On citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons who used 
to permanently reside on the territory of Ukraine and arrived on the territory 
of the Russian Federation en masse in an emergency to be located in different 
territorial entities of the Russian Federation;” the Resolution of the Government of 
the Russian Federation of 15 September 2014, no. 936 “On assistance granted to 
citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons who used to permanently reside on the 
territory of Ukraine and have arrived in the territory of the Russian Federation en 
mass in an emergency in ensuring their travel and transportation of their luggage 
to their place of stay on the territory of the Russian Federation.”
41 E.Yu. Burtina, E.Yu. Korosteleva, V.I. Simonov, Rossiya kak strana ubezhishcha, 
Moskva: Vash Format, 2015.
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Table 5. Comparison of the number of citizens of Ukraine, Syria,  
and Afghanistan to have been granted asylum and temporary asylum
Ukraine Syria Afghanistan
Refugees  
as of 1 January 2015 227 2 414
Temporary asylum  
as of 1 January 2015 234,360 1,924 693
Refugees  
as of 1 January 2016 273 2 352
Temporary asylum  
as of 1 January 2016 311,134   
1,302 572
Temporary asylum  
as of 1 October 2016
approximately 
329,900*
* Yu. Florinskaya, N. Mkrchyan, “Migratsiya v Rossii. Staryye trendy, novyye 
problemy,” Monitoring ekonomicheskoy situatsii v Rossii. Tendentsii i vyzovy 
sotsyalno-ekonomicheskogo razvitya, The Russian Presidential Academy of 
National Economy and Public Administration, 2016, no. 19 (37), p. 17.   
Source: Rosstat.
Refugee status and temporary asylum differ from a legal 
standpoint; they have different deadlines for reviewing applications, 
offer different protection mechanisms and imply different legal 
consequences.42 Implied by the Law “On refugees,”43 an individual 
should submit an application for refugee status to the local office 
of migration services [the former Federal Migration Service (FMS), 
currently GUVM MVD]. A review of the merits of the application 
is carried out within 3 to 6 months. Refugee status is granted for up 
to three years and can be extended in the case of life-threatening 
circumstances. A refugee identity card is issued. 
The procedure for granting temporary asylum is stipulated in 
the Resolution of the Government of the RF no. 690.44 Decisions on 
granting temporary asylum are taken by the local office of migration 
services within 3 working days from the day of the application’s 
submission. Temporary asylum is granted for up to 1 year and can 
be extended subject to a positive decision by a local office following 
42 O. Gulina, “Humanitarian Migration from Ukraine,” Russian Analytical Digest, 
2014, no. 157, pp. 17–22.
43 The Federal Law as of 19 February 1993, no. 4528-I “On refugees.”
44 Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF of 22 iyulya 2014 g. N 690 “O predostavlenii 
vremennogo ubezhishcha grazhdanam Ukrainy na territorii Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
v uproshchennom poryadke,” http://base.garant.ru/70701742/#ixzz4YfgmRrZD.
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the submission of a written application by an applicant. A temporary 
asylum certificate is issued. However, such an individual remains 
a citizen of Ukraine after having obtained the right to temporary 
asylum. An individual can abandon the temporary asylum status 
at any time, receive a national ID and regain the status of a person 
temporarily staying on the territory of Russia. At the same time, 
such a person cannot be employed without having been granted 
temporary asylum. 
Citizens of Ukraine employ other means when it comes 
to legalizing their stay within the territory of Russia: they apply 
for a work permit; a temporary residence permit; citizenship of 
the RF; participation in the State Program to Facilitate Voluntary 
Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF. The State 
Program, notably, was amended back in 2014 based on Presidential 
Decree no. 531. According to the amendments, foreigners and 
stateless persons who have obtained temporary asylum in Russia45 
can become beneficiaries of this State Program. 
It is clear that migration from Ukraine was the focus of strategic 
attention and interest in Russia in 2014–2015: 321 temporary 
accommodation facilities (TAFs) were established in 69 territorial 
entities of the Russian Federation housing 18,156 citizens of 
Ukraine. An additional 569,566 individuals found accommodation 
in the private sector. 
Migratory privileges for Ukrainian citizens were revoked on 
31 October 201546 and all TAFs had been closed by late 2015.47 
The closure of TAFs meant that citizens arriving in Russia from 
Ukraine were left with a choice: either return to Ukraine or legalize 
45 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 25.07.2014 g. No 531, 
http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38741.
46 “Izmenililis’ usloviya prebyvaniya na territorii Rossii dlya nekotorykh grazhdan 
Ukrainy,” GARANT.RU, 2 November 2015, www.garant.ru/news/668627/#ixzz4 
WQ0DWrIK.
47 Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF ot 31 oktyabrya 2015 g. N 1177 “O vnesenii 
izmeneniy v Pravila predostavleniya v 2015 godu iz federal’nogo byudzheta 
byudzhetam sub’’ektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii inykh mezhbyudzhetnykh 
transfertov na finansovoye obespechenie meropriyatiy po vremennomu social’no-
bytovomu obustroystvu grazhdan Ukrainy i lits bez grazhdanstva, postoyanno 
prozhivavshikh na territorii Ukrainy, pribyvshikh na territoriyu Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii v yekstrennom massovom poryadke i nakhodyashchikhsya v punktakh 
vremennogo razmeshcheniya,” http://base.garant.ru/71238722/#ixzz4YHH3Ldg7.
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their stay in the RF. At the moment, citizens of Ukraine are in 
the same situation as citizens of other independent states of the 
former USSR which are not members of the Eurasian Economic 
Union and have to apply for a temporary residence permit; work 
permit; participation in the State Program to Facilitate Voluntary 
Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF or apply for 
Russian citizenship. 
Residents of Eastern Ukraine from the Luhansk and Donetsk 
Oblasts enjoy some legal privileges. Despite non-recognition of 
the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk 
People’s Republic (LNR), the Russian Federation does recognize 
legal documents issued by state bodies of the above-mentioned 
republics. In 2016, approximately 40 thousand people were granted 
DNR passports48 and 10 thousand residents of the LNR obtained 
LNR passports.49 Identification documents issued by the LNR and 
DNR such as passports, driving licenses, birth certificates, death 
certificates, certificates of change of name, certificates of marriage 
and divorce entitle persons to purchase tickets for all means of 
road, rail and air transport from all Russian carriers as well as the 
right of the freedom of movement within the territory of the RF. All 
Russian airlines: S7, Aeroflot, Pobeda and UTair admit passengers 
from the self-proclaimed republics based on documents issued by 
the LNR and DNR.50 It turns out that Ukrainian migration to Russia 
has its own specificity and citizens of eastern Ukraine from the self-
proclaimed LNR and DNR belong to the category of “us” rather 
than “them” from the point of view of Russian authorities. 
48 “Pasport grazhdanina DNR v 2016 godu poluchili boleye 40 tysyach 
zhiteley–migratsionnaya sluzhba, Dan-News, 10 January 2017, http://dan-news.
info/politics/pasport-grazhdanina-dnr-v-2016-godu-poluchili-bolee-40-tysyach-
zhitelej-migracionnaya-sluzhba.html.
49 “Pasporta LNR poluchili boleye 10000 zhiteley Respubliki,” NewsRussia.
Today, https://newsrussia.today/donbass/742-pasporta-lnr-poluchili-bolee-10000-
zhiteley-respublikihtml.
50 “Rassledovanie RBK: Kak v Rossii priznali pasporta DNR i LNR,” RBC.ru, 
www.rbc.ru/politics/02/02/2017/587cf9159a7947e5f86ee045.
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CONCLUSIONS
Migration in contemporary Russia constitutes a demographic, 
political and social challenge, largely because the ruling elite is 
not responding sufficiently to the dynamics and characteristics of 
migration processes going on within the country and abroad. 
Migration is the only way of replenishing an aging labor force 
and repopulating Russian regions such as Siberia and Russia’s Far 
East. Russia has been the country of destination for migrants from the 
independent states of the former USSR, and it has been a country with 
a high population outflow index over the course of the last twenty-
five years. A multitude of circumstances influence the trajectory 
and dynamics of migration processes. The tightening of migration 
legislation in the RF, the devaluation of the national currency, and 
difficulties in the execution of migrant rights have all had an impact 
on quantitative and qualitative characteristics of migration flows. 
The Russian-Ukrainian crisis has become a trigger for the 
transformation of migration flows across the post-Soviet space. It 
has affected both the recipient countries and the countries of origin 
of migrants (Central Asian states, the Caucasus and Ukraine). From 
2014–2016, Ukraine became the main donor country of migrants to 
Russia. Ukrainian migration to the RF has its own specifics. Unlike 
other citizens of Ukraine, migrants from the self-proclaimed LNR and 
DNR enjoy a number of legal privileges within the territory of Russia. 
Migration management in today’s Russia focuses on meeting 
the political needs of the country, which is detrimental to Russia’s 
demographic, socio-cultural and other interests and diminishes 
the institutions of citizenship and asylum to purely foreign policy 
instruments. 
Translation: Natalia Mamul
Olga Gulina is a director and founder of the RUSMPI—Institute on 
Migration Policy. She holds a PhD in Migration Law from the University 
of Potsdam, Germany, and a PhD in Constitutional Law from the Bashkir 
State University, Russia. 
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OLESYA ZAKHAROVA
HUMAN RIGHTS IN “POST-CRIMEAN” RUSSIA:  
READING BETWEEN THE LINES
The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was one of the key 
turning points during Vladimir Putin’s 3rd presidential term, and 
a watershed moment in Russian history. The Western liberal world 
unequivocally deemed this an act of aggression and violation of 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, Russia hijacked Europe’s 
human rights rhetoric; Vladimir Putin claimed the action was 
primarily aimed at defending human rights: “... we have to do 
everything,” Putin said live on TV on 17 April 2014, “to help these 
people defend their rights and decide on their own future. This is 
what we are going to fight for.”1
The referendum itself he described as a vital means of freedom 
of expression: “… it was impossible in any other way to conduct the 
referendum openly, honestly and with dignity, and help people to 
express their opinion,” he said in the same speech. 
Using the concept of human rights for political purposes is 
a well-known rhetorical trick. It is unlikely, however, that many 
from an international audience found this argument from Putin’s 
speeches very convincing. Russian internal policies initiated by 
Putin at the start of his 3rd presidential term, in particular those 
concerning human rights, were far from democratic. Russia entered 
its watershed year of 2014 with a whole range of new laws limiting 
rights and freedoms. There were stricter regulations on large scale 
1 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/20796.
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events, which virtually equate the freedom of association with 
extremism. A ban on distribution of materials related to non-
traditional sexual relations was introduced, which in practice 
authorized discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
provoked aggression towards LGBT members of Russian society. 
Also introduced was a “foreign agent” category in the legislation on 
non-profit organizations, and the introduction of criminal liability for 
anyone “insulting the feelings of believers” and a criminalization of 
slander, which limited media freedoms and freedom of expression. 
Added to this were laws that violated the rights of migrant workers 
and a number of other repressive measures. According to Freedom 
House data for 2014, the general freedom rating for Russia was 
5.5 (1 = most free and 7 = least free), while civil liberties scored 5, 
and political liberties—6. Consequently, Russia received an overall 
ranking of “Not Free.”
Greater infringement of rights was accompanied by an 
intense “securitization” of political discourse, in which the exercise 
of most rights and freedoms started to be portrayed as actions that 
pose “serious” threats to citizens, and from which the state has to 
protect them. Legal acts limiting rights were presented as actions 
necessary to protect society from approaching, inevitable threats. 
All in all, at both institutional and discourse levels, a “state-centrist” 
form of human rights representation was established. The idea of 
strong statehood, which was characteristic for Putin’s discourse 
from the start of the 2000s, was tightly combined with prioritized 
respect for human rights, in effect forming a state-center structure 
with a humanistic focus: a “strong, effective” state was presented 
as a necessary and obligatory condition for securing human rights. 
Consequently, to guarantee respect for human rights, it was 
necessary to guarantee a “strong” state. Nevertheless, human rights 
were presented as a state priority, and citizens themselves were 
viewed as active participants in the process of building a “strong 
state.” At the start of Putin’s 3rd presidential term, liberal elements 
were removed, and the discourse set forth a purely state-center 
paradigm in which the concepts of sovereignty and human rights, 
rather than complementing each other, become rivals, with the 
former clearly dominant.
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The rest of this article will consider whether and how the 
annexation of Crimea affected Russian domestic policy and official 
discourse. 
HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN “AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN INFLUENCE”
The official human rights paradigm is “stripped” of any ambiguities 
or tolerance of rival concepts in the “post-Crimean” period; the idea 
of clear domination of state interests over human rights principles 
has crystallized as the highest state value. The proposed concept 
is being legitimized through the rhetoric of threats, combined 
with the traditional dichotomy of Russia and the West. The only 
difference is that “after Crimea” the security aspect of the discourse 
became much stronger, since the “Us-Them” dichotomy presented 
to the public, previously based on a rather historical narrative that 
the West has always wanted a weaker Russia, has now become 
obvious and quite real. The Maidan, Ukraine’s revolution of 2013–
2014, has become the main bogeyman for Russian citizens, and an 
example that threats from “so-called democratic” (as Putin describes 
them) “orange revolutions” exported by the West are real, and their 
only outcome is devastation and human rights violations. Putin 
vividly described the negative consequences of Western influence 
in a speech at the UN General Assembly on 28 September 2015:2 
“The export of the so-called ‘democratic’ revolutions continues. … 
But what happened in reality? Aggressive intervention from abroad 
instead of reforms brought presumptuous destruction of state 
institutions together with the way of life itself. Instead of triumph of 
democracy and progress we see violence, poverty, social disaster, 
and utter disregard for human rights, including the right to live.”
To counterbalance these “orange revolutions,” Russian 
discourse proposes the principle of integrity of state sovereignty, 
presented in terms of progress, freedom and free choice for everyone, 
as Putin announced to the world: “What is the state sovereignty that 
has been discussed by colleagues here today? Above all, it is an 
2 Putin’s adress on 70th session of the UN General Assembly, http://en.kremlin.ru/ 
events/president/news/50385.
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issue of freedom, freedom of every person, every nation, every state 
to choose its own fate.”
The negative image of the West, which is exposed by state 
discourse as the main culprit of “orange revolutions,” has inevitably 
affected the presentation of the human rights concept itself. 
Human rights, which the public firmly associates with the West, 
are increasingly presented as Western ideas, alien and harmful to 
Russia, which: a) does not correspond to unique Russian values, and 
is therefore threatening to Russian culture; and b) is an instrument of 
Western opponents that is used to undermine and deter Russia. This 
idea has been expressed by both federal and regional politicians. 
For example, commenting on the Germanwings A-320 crash that 
happened in March 2015, Vladimir Zhirinovsky listed “a timid 
commitment to respect human rights” as one of the causes. The 
LDPR leader criticized the pilot who left the cabin during the flight 
to “relieve himself,” leaving the young co-pilot on his own. “This 
is also a type of culture: the human right to comfort at the expense 
of security.” As a result, negative “labelling” was used to juxtapose 
human rights and security. 
In one of his speeches, Vitaly Milonov, a member of the 
legislative assembly of Saint Petersburg, described freedom of 
speech as “beautiful labels covering up ideological ‘carcinogenic 
E food additives’,” thus portraying one of the key human rights as 
something dangerous, and “carcinogenic.”
SIDELINING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH LEGISLATION
The marginalization of human rights was facilitated by a range 
of legal acts, which in effect institutionalized a “Russia-West” 
juxtaposition, and focused political discourse on the preeminence 
of security. The law introducing the category “foreign agent” into 
the legal system back in 2012 was one of the first. Since the Crimean 
crisis, this process has accelerated. 
Amendments to the federal Act on Sanctions for Individuals 
Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of Citizens 
of the Russian Federation were a significant contribution to this 
process. Signed by the president on 23 May 2015, the new law was 
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described by the media as a law on “undesirable organizations.” The 
main targets were international and foreign non-profit organizations, 
as well as non-profit organizations that receive funding from the 
U.S.: according to the new standards, their activities could be 
suspended without a trial if the prosecutor’s office decides that they 
threaten the interests of the Russian Federation. Representatives of 
the Russian political elite presented this law as necessary not only 
for guaranteeing national security, but also for defending citizens’ 
rights. For example, this is how Federation Council Chairwoman 
Valentina Matviyenko commented on the act: “This law aims to 
defend our state, citizens of our state. It corresponds to international 
practices.” 
Speaking about this law being aimed at the defense of citizens, 
Matviyenko passes on a message to society that the West and pro-
Western organizations, and, therefore, their ideas and principles, 
pose a threat to Russia and its population. Human rights are among 
those ideas. It is no coincidence that organizations which promote 
human rights—the Soros Foundation (Open Society), the Andrey 
Rylkov Foundation for Health and Social Justice, the MacArthur 
Foundation, the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs and similar organizations—were among the first to receive 
the status of “undesirable.”3 
It is also quite significant that these new provisions of the 
law were included in the federal Act on Sanctions for Individuals 
Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the 
Citizens of the Russian Federation. The first two articles of this law 
correspond to its title, while the language of the following articles 
on “undesirable organizations” does not include “human rights 
and freedoms of the citizen of the Russian Federation.” According 
to articles 3 and 3.1, the new regulations are aimed at protection 
of the country’s defense capacity and national security. The term 
“human rights” is not used in those two articles. It is unlikely 
that these two regulations were included in this law by chance, 
because they could have been added to the federal law “On non-
profit organizations.” Nevertheless, the legislature chose to include 
3 List of all the undesirable organizations, http://minjust.ru/activity/nko/
unwanted.
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those regulations in this law, which has not only symbolic but also 
practical meaning. 
First, including the rules on undesirable organizations in this 
law allows it to be presented to the public as aimed at defending 
human rights, and politicians have already exploited this. At the 
same time, while hinting in the title that the law will affect those 
who violate human rights, the wording of articles 3 and 3.1 point to 
interests of the Russian Federation and national security as objects 
to be defended. It follows that the legislature mixes up the concepts 
of human rights and state interests, shifting the focus toward state 
interests. State interests are made virtually equal to human rights. 
As a result, the main provisions of liberal theory are put aside—
the provision that human rights are primarily the rights of separate 
individuals, citizens, and that their defense is first of all aimed at 
defending citizens’ interests with respect to the state, and limiting 
the latter. 
Similar arguments were used when adopting the 23 May 
2015 decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 
which provided a justification for the Russian government’s refusals 
to comply with decisions from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), whose jurisdiction Russia recognized in 1996. Bear in 
mind that in that decision, the Constitutional Court explained that 
the Constitution has priority over the Convention on Human Rights, 
and therefore, if an ECHR decision goes against the provisions of the 
Russian Constitution, it may not apply. On the one hand, the reasoning 
behind this decision was that ECHR’s decisions concerning Russia 
are biased and politically motivated: “…collaboration of European 
and constitutional rule of law is impossible under conditions of 
a chain of command, because only dialog between different legal 
systems is the basis of adequate balance.”
On the other hand, the Court repeated a common refrain 
of parliamentarians about the decision being made primarily to 
defend Russian citizens’ rights: “What did the Constitutional Court 
articulate?” asked Chief Justice Valery Zorkin. “We will be able 
to say how enforceable this part of the decision is only when, for 
example, the Constitution and legislation based on it is better at 
defending citizens’ rights. This part is ignored, and we only hear 
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about the Constitutional Court turning against Europe, undermining 
everything European, and so on.”4 
Together, all these legal acts not only constructed a specific 
official discourse devaluing the liberal concept of human rights. 
They added to the transformations that were taking place at the 
institutional level.
TINKERING THE CONCEPT OF “HUMAN RIGHTS”
It is impossible to avoid human rights rhetoric altogether in today’s 
Russia, given its place in current Russian legislation. Yet the 
focus of Russia’s policy making elites has been on granting these 
concepts a new meaning. The aim is to replace a liberal concept of 
human rights with something that sounds the same but much more 
convenient for Russia’s rulers wanting to wield extensive power. 
This resulted in a specific reframing of the liberal concept of human 
rights. On the one hand, the traditional human rights vocabulary—
freedom, human rights, social injustice—was preserved, although 
expanded to include moral5 categories, which are mostly alien to 
the liberal concept. On the other hand, the “lenses” through which 
the substance and understanding of human rights are interpreted 
were switched, and something similar to Soviet human rights 
doctrine emerged.
What exactly is this doctrine? Its main trait is a focus on the 
social and economic rights of the citizen, which sounds relevant 
to the public, taking the recent economic crisis into account; and, 
on the other hand, it syncs well with the population’s habitual 
paternalism. A tilt towards social and economic rights, to a varying 
degree, undoubtedly has always been a characteristic of Russian 
official rhetoric in the human rights field, but now the status of such 
rhetoric is advancing from being just one element of the discourse 
to a its centerpiece.
4 V. Putin, Meeting of the Human Rights and Civil Society Council, 2015, 
www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/50925.
5 O. Zakharova, “Na raznih yazikakh,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 March 2013, 
www.ng.ru/ideas/2013-03-25/9_values.html.
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This paradigm shift is evident both in the topics chosen by 
officials, and in the terminology used by speakers describing issues 
related to human rights. Social and economic topics dominate, 
and political rights are omitted in the president’s speeches at 
conferences with bodies whose statutory function is to promote 
human rights. These include, for example, his speeches at the Civic 
Chamber, the All-Russia People’s Front, the presidential Human 
Rights and Civil Society Council, meetings with the Commissioner 
for Human Rights. This is also reflected in the president’s remarks. 
At a meeting of the Human Rights and Civil Society Council, 
when Putin mentioned that the state pays special attention to the 
development of human rights institutions by allocating grants, he 
only mentioned issues related exclusively to social and economic 
security, thus reducing the “human rights” concept to mere social 
and economic rights, and the third sector—to only NGOs focused 
on social issues:
I want to emphasise that the state will continue to pay 
special attention to the development of human rights 
and civil society institutions. … Let me remind you that 
starting from 2015, the list of priorities for grant allocation 
is extended to include the defense of workers’ rights, 
identifying and supporting talented children and youth, 
assistance to people with limited physical abilities and 
retired people. Overall, we should note that the role of 
social-oriented organizations, the so-called third sector, is 
growing worldwide. Russia is not an exception. 
This thought is repeated in many other statements by Putin, 
including his last message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation on 1 December 2016, in which he encouraged “full 
assistance” exclusively for social-oriented NPOs, i.e. those that 
don’t influence political decisions. 
When Putin is asked about political rights, for example during 
public discussions, as a rule he does not change the subject; instead 
he leaves the question unanswered.6 
6 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, 1 December 2016, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53379. 
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The trend of reducing the interpretation of human rights to 
social and economic security has been picked up by other officials, 
including the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian 
Federation. This tendency was already present to some extent in 
the language of the previous High Commissioner, Ella Pamfilova. 
Although in her report on the situation of human rights in Russia in 
2015 attention was paid to all categories of rights, in public meetings 
with Putin she has focused mostly on social and economic issues. For 
example, in their May 2015 meeting, Pamfilova mainly discussed 
the topics of access to medical services, education, housing, and the 
unacceptably low minimum wage. However, together with social 
and economic problems, from time to time issues of the relationship 
between the state and its citizens have also been mentioned, such 
as “social contradictions between chinovniki and the population,” 
the over-broad legal definition of political activities, and excessive 
control of NGO activities by administrative bodies. In relation to 
the case of Yevgeniya Vasilyeva, the Commissioner also raised 
issues of flaws in the judicial and law enforcement systems and the 
problem of “separation of investigations and proceedings into two 
levels—‘elite’ and ‘for the rest of the people’.” 
With the appointment of the new Commissioner for Human 
Rights Tatyana Moskalkova on 29 April 2016, the Commissioner’s 
discourse became more homogenous, with Moskalkova setting 
a narrow range of topics as priorities after taking the office: 
“protection of employment rights, health care, education, utility 
services, migration, penal enforcement and criminal proceedings.” 
The Commissioner’s discourse has developed in the direction 
she announced. An analysis of her interviews and public meetings 
with regional commissioners, as well as representatives of foreign 
delegations, shows that when talking about human rights, Moskalkova 
means “social support,” “utility services,” “re-housing residents of 
houses unfit for human habitation,” “social benefits to vulnerable 
citizen groups,” unpaid wages and other social problems. 
For example, the Commissioner’s website states:
On August 18, Tatiana Moskalkova met with Governor of 
Vladimir Region Svetlana Orlova. The head of the region 
and the High Commissioner exchanged their views on 
a wide range of human rights issues ... In particular, they 
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discussed interaction in the field of social support, public 
and utility services.
The second most frequently mentioned topic was the rights 
of people in detention and prisoners.
The attention of regional commissioners has also been 
focused on issues related to improving living conditions, labor 
and migrants’ rights. It appears that the current discourse of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia completely avoids 
such topics as political rights, freedom of expression, media and 
accountability of the state authorities, which should be the main 
spheres of a national ombudsman’s attention, according to the 
liberal concept.
If civil and political rights are briefly mentioned in some 
politicians’ speeches, it is, as a rule, done in a context of their 
irrelevance to the population. For example, during his meeting 
with Putin, Chief Justice Zorkin stated:
As to our internal problem, of course, above all citizens 
are interested in their rights and freedoms. This is 
understandable. I would say that the most complaints 
are connected to the right of ownership in particular, 
and generally rights on property, civil and employment 
rights, criminal proceedings and criminal legislation. This 
is the traditional list, and it remains the same. It should be 
mentioned that from the point of view of political rights, 
they occupy one of the last places in disputes. I am not 
saying this because we refuse to admit something, this is 
not what I am saying; I am talking about the statistics on 
complaints we receive.
SO WHAT DO HUMAN RIGHTS MEAN NOW?
Under the “post-Crimean” isolationism and full-blown 
“securitization” of political discussion the long-running process 
of “reviewing” the human rights concept has become more 
pronounced. 
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As mentioned, the authorities have not discarded the liberal 
vocabulary, and the political elite is still happy to use the terms 
“human rights,” “freedom” and “freedom of choice,” which 
has been clearly demonstrated in President Putin’s last address. 
However, the meaning Russian politicians place on these terms 
is far from what is understood by “human rights” in international 
practice. 
This concept is represented in Russian political discourse by 
a special state-oriented structure in which a strong state becomes 
not just a condition for respect of human rights (as it was at the 
beginning of 2000s), but a central ideological concept. Compared 
to the strong state, human rights become secondary, and should 
be respected only in cases where they are compatible with state 
interests. Occasionally, the discourse takes this thought to the 
extreme, and there are glimpses of the idea that human rights 
are equivalent to state interests, which allows the political elite’s 
aspirations to be disguised as human rights.
Alexey Pushkov provided the clearest definition of the idea of 
the priority of state sovereignty over human rights in his interview 
with Izvestiya in March 2015, where he proposed promoting 
such values as “state sovereignty and independence:” “The BRICS 
countries have their own system of values, and it differs from the 
Euro-Atlantic one. It is, let’s say, prevention of “orange revolutions,” 
i.e. changes of government and authorities of other countries with 
outside influence. Why couldn’t that be a value?”
In his comments on the ruling that European Court decisions 
are not binding, Zorkin also puts “capacity of the state” in first 
place, calling it “balanced opinion:” 
We are not shying away; we believe that we apply 
constitutional criteria, of course taking the capacity of the 
state into account.
In cases where human rights to not overlap with state interests, 
their content boils down to social and economic rights, which suits 
the Russian authorities very well. On one hand, in an economic 
crisis, social and economic security becomes relevant to the public. 
On the other, due to the paternalism and demonization of the West 
that are deeply rooted in public consciousness, juxtaposing political 
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rights with social and economic rights is a lost cause, and discourse 
returns to the antagonism between the USSR and the West, further 
fuelling the rhetoric of hostility and isolationism. 
This kind of reframing of human rights not only changes 
the main meaning of this concept, but transforms the principle 
of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The liberal 
concept sees the latter as an instrument for a citizen to express their 
discontent at state abuse, and one that guarantees the accountability 
of state institutions. The state-centrist frame, with a paternalistic tilt, 
pictures the state not as the main entity against which human rights 
should defend the citizen, but as the entity that provides these rights 
and serves as their main defender. It is no coincidence that law 
enforcement agencies are presented in the discourse as defending 
human rights, which has been repeatedly articulated by Putin in his 
speeches. Nor is it surprising that a police colonel was appointed 
as Human Rights Commissioner.
In this way, a peculiar formula is presented to the public: 
Since the state is the main defender and “donor” of rights, it cannot 
be viewed as a potential violator of human rights, and, therefore, it 
is impossible to claim or demand anything from it. In this way, the 
highest authorities and officials representing the state are excluded 
from accountability. 
Human rights, as they are known in international practice 
are seen as an instrument to ensure the accountability of 
authorities through guarantees to freedom of assembly, freedom 
of expression, and freedom of the press. These are rights which 
ensure communicative freedom, using Habermas’s terminology. 
Yet Russia’s state discourse sees this championing of human rights 
as attempts to organize “orange revolutions,” i.e. destabilization of 
the society, a threat to the principle of sovereign integrity.
Translation: Alexandra Godina
Olesya Zakharova is a fellow at Irkutsk State University. Formerly she was 
a visiting researcher at the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), Vienna.
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VALUE SYSTEMS  
WITHIN RUSSIA’S NEW NORMALITY
The basis for a robust system of international relations, as Pitirim 
Sorokin wrote in his work The Cause of War and Conditions of 
a Lasting Peace, “…is the existence of a complete, well-connected 
and integrated … value system … in each functioning society, and, 
what is more, these systems should be compatible.” If not, the 
author warns, war is inevitable—a civil war if a value-based conflict 
arises inside a society, or an international war if the conflict affects 
different societies.
At the end of 2015, Levada Centre sociologists published 
their work War Instead of Future: The Solution for the Anomic 
Consciousness,1 where the combination of civil and international 
war is described as a self-regulating instrument for Russian society. 
Support for military action from Russian society is exclusively an 
initiative of the state and its propaganda machine. However, the 
reasons behind the events that unfolded following the annexation 
of Crimea in March 2014 are to be found in the peculiarities of the 
Russian social order.
Russian society is rejecting elements of the modern social-
organization system imported in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
At first glance, such a statement would suggest a barbarization of 
society—i.e. it is returning to a “natural state” in the idealist terms of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Nevertheless, I will defend the point of view 
1 A. Levinson, S. Goncharov, “War Instead of Future: The Solution for the Anomic 
Consciousness,” The Russian Public Opinion Herald. Data. Analysis. Discussions, 
2015, no. 3–4, pp. 45–66, www.hse.ru/pubs/share/direct/document/174201723.
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that these circumstances in no way confirm the naïve, idealistic 
aspirations of society and its leaders under the motto “back to 
nature.” Obviously, in place of formal legal and moral Western-
type guidelines, home-grown institutions are being developed 
according to formal and informal legal practices.
If there was a Russian equivalent of the Oxford Dictionary’s 
word of the year, the term “import-substitution” might well have 
received the award in 2015. According to Google.Trends data, this 
was the most searched-for word in Autumn 2015, corresponding 
to interest from the media and state policy priorities. “Import-
substitution” was initially a purely economic-related term but, in 
keeping with historical materialist traditions, Russian society has 
expanded its use to encompass all spheres of life. There is talk of 
creating a Russian Internet, and a Russian payment system; Russia 
is withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, and dialog on a whole range of other issues is being 
discontinued. In general, the tendency towards economic and 
value-based autarky is increasing. At the same time, imperialistic 
ambitions are on the rise, becoming a feature of domestic policy— 
the Russian population itself has become the target of war 
propaganda, since the country’s authorities have no economic 
motivation to be involved in any military campaigns abroad. All the 
military ventures in the last two years have obviously been populist 
moves.
THE ESTABLISHED SYSTEM OF RULES
Starting from the mid-1990s in Russia, there has been a gradual 
refusal to adhere to the liberal standards of a law-governed 
state. The president’s power has been bolstered excessively, the 
media monopolized, and watchdog institutions degraded. Each 
subsequent electoral cycle is accompanied by changes to the 
electoral regulations. Businesses become directly dependent on 
the make-up of Vladimir Putin’s entourage, which is defined by 
personal connections.
However, these volatile conditions and planning timeframe 
affect not only businesses, but also a significant part of Russian 
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society as a whole. Only slightly over two-thirds of Russians (36%) 
are able to envisage their future in one year’s time or a longer 
period. This indicator has remained stable for the past few years. 
Furthermore, the near future that Russians anticipate is marred by 
a lack of any outside support2 should any difficult situations arise: 
70% of Russians count only on themselves, 60% rely on support 
from their relatives and friends, while only 4% count on support 
from state social security. Although this figure is higher than at the 
end of the 1990s, its stabilization at the current level points to a lack 
of significant changes in the consumption model in recent years. 
Three-quarters of the Russian population (76%) claim to experience 
difficulties in purchasing expensive household goods (refrigerators, 
TVs, etc.).
The spike in positive expectations observed after Crimea’s 
annexation was replaced at the end of 2014 by fear of abrupt adverse 
economic changes and panic caused by currency exchange-rate 
volatility. In the first half of 2015, the economic problems became 
less salient, and Russians gradually adapted to their worsening 
standard of living by trying to replace their usual assortment of 
consumer goods and services with cheaper alternatives. On the 
whole, this has allowed a controlled economic recession with 
a high level of support for the authorities to be maintained, although 
society’s attitudes towards the country’s leadership are also being 
eroded. The overwhelming majority of Russians (80%)3 would 
rather be politically unengaged, while 69% admit that they prefer 
to avoid all unnecessary contact with the state.
The theory that the social contract (according to which social 
loyalty and readiness to comply with rules laid down by the state 
is “traded” for the authorities’ commitment to sustain a certain 
standard of living) seems untenable. Even in December 2014, 
when we registered the highest fear of economic collapse, we also 
recorded the least readiness to protest. We certainly cannot claim 
2 See “Na chyu pomoshch rasschityvayut rossiyane v trudnoye vremya,” 
Levada.ru, 16 December 2014, www.levada.ru/2014/12/16/na-chyu-pomoshh-
rasschityvayut-rossiyane-v-trudnoe-vremya.
3 S. Goncharov, “Russia’s Opposition: Can It Be Great Again?,” Intersection, 
20 March 2017, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/russias-opposition-
can-it-be-great-again. 
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that there is no connection between the state of the economy and 
public attitudes, but a minor decrease in the standard of living 
can be compensated by re-focusing public attention onto different 
issues. An overwhelming majority (81%) of Russians report4 
a lack of opportunities to influence life in their country or even 
their own cities; 69% state that the majority of Russians would be 
unable to survive without state assistance—all this emphasises that 
a significant part of the Russian population is wholly dependent on 
external factors, despite the clear absence of state support.
Another widespread theory regarding the relationship 
between state and society, directly connected to the previous 
one, is that “TVs” are competing with “refrigerators,” where “TVs” 
mean state propaganda and “refrigerators” are a metaphor for 
basic needs. The main difference in this case is that the people 
are not considered as equal partners in their “dealings” with the 
state. No matter what, they are controlled: either by propaganda or 
a self-preservation instinct. Even though the theory of competition 
between “TVs” and “refrigerators” is not entirely unfounded, this 
model of society’s behavior as a reaction to stimuli seems to be an 
oversimplification. In my opinion, it is related to the profoundly 
socio-cultural basis for the current authorities’ support, rooted in 
a specific perception of history and the role of the state. Indeed, 
propaganda appears to be a highly effective tool for controlling the 
attitudes of the public. However, “TVs” are only effective when 
society endorses a certain narrative. In this case, annexation Crimea 
to compensate for the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The annexation of Crimea acted as a symbolic repayment 
for lost feelings of belonging to a great empire. The almost 
unanimous popular support for Crimea annexation demonstrated 
how important the issue of “correcting historical mistakes” is to 
Russians. Trying to dispute the theory that “it is impossible to 
step into the same river twice,” Russians are seeking to revive the 
situation of 25 years ago and, obviously, alter the consequences of 
what they consider to be the tragedy of the 1990s. For Russians, 
social development stalled after the “largest geopolitical disaster of 
4 See “Rossiyane ne khotyat mitingovat’,” Levada.ru, 15 November 2016, 
www.levada.ru/2016/11/15/rossiyane-ne-hotyat-mitingovat.
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the 20th century,” as Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the USSR. 
On this issue, Russian society concurs with the state, so the attack 
on liberal values is coming from both sides.
PUBLIC DEMAND FOR DE-LIBERALIZATION
On the one hand, liberal methods have been rejected by public 
opinion since they contradict long-standing habits and standards of 
a non-historical nature. Russians are unaware of when those habits 
and standards were established, and consider it unimportant. They 
have always existed and are hence contrasted with the formal law 
which, when it was amended, led to the social upheavals of the last 
century. The legal basis for interaction between individuals and the 
state seems precarious to the majority, and citizens are skeptical 
about their ability to apply the law to influence any serious decision-
making. Focus-group respondents remarked: 
“– If the authorities are involved in a matter, resolving it 
through the courts is probably impossible.”
A phenomenon of “time standing still” is developing—the 
absence of a future, which Russians no longer need because basic 
relations are not intended to go beyond mundane tasks. The very 
existence of particularistic relationships is limited by the period 
of time during which connections function within private circles. 
These standards make up Russian society, constituting its real 
nature and considerably limiting its planning timeframe. We should 
not forget that the power of modern law significantly narrows the 
margin between rulers and subordinates, and, ideally—erases it: 
each person has a chance to progress to any level in the hierarchy 
of power. The bureaucratic system idealized by Max Weber allows 
appeals from citizens to reach the relevant authorities. The current 
Russian system, built on informal relations, radically reduces the 
effectiveness of bureaucratic mechanisms and heightens the role of 
corrupt connections and nepotism. Citizens’ opportunities become 
directly dependent on the scope and “quality” of their social circles. 
Once again, it is worth pointing out that the overwhelming majority 
(70%) of Russians claim they can only count on themselves. 
Likewise, over 70% of residents in large cities believe that the most 
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effective ways to solve social problems are help from relatives and 
friends (75%), nepotism (71%) and bribes (63%).
“Written appeals,” which Russians usually threaten to send to 
“the president himself,” have acquired the mystical meaning of the 
most powerful non-legal instrument for solving social problems. 
If what people are saying is true, this ritual has the same sacred 
significance for careless chinovniki, who also live above the law and 
are therefore afraid of their superiors’ changing moods. Replacing 
the law with informal social relations drastically decreases average 
Russians’ range of possibilities, since they usually have no means of 
contacting the powers-that-be. Considering that citizens’ political 
functions are reduced to minimal participation in the distribution 
of power, and their social functions are also pretty much limited 
by the widespread culture of non-participation in public affairs, 
people are meant to keep silent about social problems, sneer at 
them, or elevate them to the status of national exceptionalism, 
which everyone is supposed to be proud of. Russians articulate this 
as follows:
“– Optimism, because the Russian people only stay afloat 
thanks to optimism.”
“– Why is our country the way it is? Who is guilty – the 
president or the administration? It is our fault, because the majority 
doesn’t care about anything.”5
Powerlessness and the inability to fix anything inside the 
country, in my opinion, are directly connected to attitudes towards 
Russian foreign policy. The absence of effective legal means to 
control the authorities, coupled with an unwillingness to play an 
active part in any forms of civic self-organization result in growing 
cynicism and apathy. The lack of experience, and reluctance to 
accept that society could possibly function in any other way, have 
resulted in a prevailing opinion that the rest of the world is not 
much better off: “there is no democracy,” “freedom of expression 
does not exist.” This convenient, morally relativist attitude removes 
the onus to act from citizens’ shoulders, turning them from actors 
into passive observers. It is also important to take into account that 
5 From focus-group respondents’ answers.
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young people are one of the most apolitical social groups, and are 
susceptible to information attacks. They show the highest level of 
support for the president and the least willingness to take part in 
politics. While there is a common psychological term “learned 
helplessness,” when analyzing public opinion we should rather 
speak of “perceived helplessness,” because this state is transmitted 
together with public attitudes, and does not imply personal negative 
experience in attempts to change one’s own situation. Crimea 
annexation and the phenomenal support for Russian military 
operations are caused in part by shifting particularistic relationships 
to a global level and dividing standards into “ours” and “theirs”—
the only means available to rationalize what is happening in the 
world. This norm for international relations appears to be eternal 
and, therefore, unchangeable.
“– You see, all countries, whether it’s the USA or Russia, 
have their own specific interests. The Middle East is in flames, it 
always has been and always will be, no matter whether it was two 
thousand years ago, a thousand, or nowadays.”6
Russians find it hard to believe in the existence of unbiased 
international arbitrators, and Russia is perceived as being 
surrounded by enemies. In this case, annexation of Crimea was 
in defense of national interests, not an attack. Uniting around the 
Crimean issue is seen to be much more significant than a simple 
restoration of justice; it is a way for society to “build a nation” in 
which the narrow particularistic interests of various individuals and 
elite groups find common ground.
DELIBERALIZATION AS A MEANS OF REMAINING IN POWER
On the other hand, developing particularistic standards turns out 
to be very advantageous to those in power who define the rules 
of the game. What Simon Kordonsky called a “class”7 in modern 
Russia consists of servile layers of society which have duties to 
6 From focus-group respondents’ answers.
7 S.G. Kordonsky, Soslovnaya struktura postsovetskoy Rossii, Moskva: Public 
Opinion Foundation, 2008, p. 216.
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the central authorities in exchange for certain exclusive rights and 
privileges for each of their legally autonomous factions. These rights 
and privileges are not unlimited, but correspond to conventional 
practices for interaction between institutions delegating authority 
and certain classes. The standards for interaction can change, 
similarly to what is happening in the struggle between “system 
liberals” and “siloviki.” As demonstrated by the Alexey Ulyukayev 
case, even governmental ministers can become victims of such 
class confrontation. His case is illustrative: according to rumors, 
Alexey Ulyukayev’s arrest was the outcome of his conflict with 
Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft. Perhaps the Minister of Economic 
Development’s attempt to act within the bureaucratic system’s 
standards contravened the unwritten hierarchy and agreements, 
according to which Sechin had a blank cheque to violate common 
standards.
Apparently, the majority in society accept this class inequality 
and deliberate humiliation. An increasing number of citizens ready 
to protest could upset the society’s class structure. The figure of the 
president, who supposedly links the interests of “average citizens” 
and “the elite” is used to neutralize people’s frustration. In order 
to make it possible for him to unite society, the maximum possible 
number of sanctions for violating regulatory restrictions have been 
removed. The durability of Russian society depends on how long 
the nation has need of the president’s personality. The events of the 
past two years demonstrate that he was given a symbolic “mandate” 
not only to wage war in Ukraine and Syria, but also to violate the 
social standards which serve to strengthen the state. What was 
labelled a “hybrid war” or “doublethink” is one way of completely 
or partially concealing real information from society (both in Russia 
and abroad). The president is allowed to deceive us or them. It is, 
however, equally obvious that the disappearance of social threats 
could deprive the country’s leader of this special mandate. The 
number of respondents sympathizing with Putin reached its peak 
by the start of 2015, then began to return to normal levels as the 
conflict in Ukraine deescalated and people grew used to the Syrian 
issue. Of course, serious negative events would be required for 
attitudes towards Putin to change significantly, not just the scarcity 
of glorious victories. Nonetheless, the very trend for decreased 
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support for the authorities, combined with the lack of significant 
achievements, indicate a heavy burden of social problems which 
cannot be resolved via the current system of rules, and which 
are thus avoided not only by the authorities, but also by citizens 
themselves.
Table 1. Poll: “In which words would you describe your attitude to 
Vladimir Putin? (several answers are possible)”
Data from Levada Centre, % Mar.14 Mar.15 Mar.16 Jul.16
Admiration 6 10 8 8
Fondness 31 37 30 29
Nothing bad to say about him 29 30 30 31
Neutral, indifferent 15 10 15 17
Cautious, “wait-and-see” approach 6 5 8 4
Nothing good to say about him 7 3 4 6
Dislike 2 2 3 2
Disgust <1 1 1 1
Hard to say 4 2 3 1
Source: “Vladimir Putin vospriyatiye i doveriye,” Levada.ru, 8 August 2016, 
www.levada.ru/2016/08/08/vladimir-putin-vospriyatie-i-doverie.
OPINIONS ABOUT LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY
The collapse of the Soviet Union was not only the reason for 
a profound social trauma, but also signalled the beginning of the 
end for ideology-based politics. The crisis came at the moment 
when the collective consciousness had rejected both communism 
and liberalism. By 1991, the communist ideological system had 
been compromised, with only 30% of citizens believing in its naïve 
ideals. In 1992, 52% of Russians felt that the communist idea had 
exhausted itself, while 30% disagreed with that statement. It is 
noteworthy that this research was conducted after the liberalization 
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of prices, when Russians ran into the first consequences of the 
badly regulated market economy.
The swift demise of communism, however, did not imply that 
people would be quick to embrace ideas of liberalism. Liberalism 
soon become associated with social and political instability, and 
difficulties in adapting to the rapidly changing rules of the game. 
The main problem for the “democrats” was that liberalism had 
been built on top of the previous system of power relations. That 
was done in order to preserve the positions of some of the party 
nomenklatura, for fear that control over the country might be lost. 
At the same time, relations between state and society were never 
modified, and a paternalistic basis for dialog between civil society 
and the state remained in place. By the mid-1990s, it became clear 
that big businesses and idealistic liberals, affiliated to the state, were 
losing out to “patriotic” forces in terms of attractiveness and ability 
to fulfil the basic popular expectations. All this laid the foundations 
for modern society’s mistrust of liberal ideas and politicians. 
A relative majority of Russians (40%) admit to having no political 
views whatsoever and, among the remainder, only 6% consider 
themselves liberals. At the moment, many Russians feel that the 
democratic opposition is invariably weaker than the authorities, 
that it cannot propose a comprehensible, relevant political platform, 
and that it is out of touch with the people and has other interests.
– There was an opposition movement. There was 
Udaltsov. There was Navalny. There was Yavlinsky. 
These were the people who were dissatisfied with the 
elections. Well, that was a real mess, and the people 
went out onto the streets. An opposition bloc clearly did 
exist. Of course, the Americans “sniffed it out” and began 
playing them with money. And, of course, those people 
got spoilt right away.
– Here, for some reason… it is only really possible in Russia 
for the word “opposition” to be so strongly associated 
with concepts of Russophobia, hatred and disdain for the 
motherland. Nothing like this exists anywhere else. I even 
recall some American politician—I don’t remember who 
exactly—saying “I understand why the liberal opposition 
is so strongly disliked in Russia” after one of our opposition 
activists compared the victory of Lipnitskaya [author’s 
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note: a Russian figure skater] to the victory of some fascist 
sportswoman.8
Liberalism and democracy are often regarded as 
interconnected. It is important, however, to distinguish liberal 
and democratic ideals from attitudes towards certain components 
of these normative categories. According to Levada Centre data,9 
the majority of Russians (62%) believe that Russia does need 
democracy. Moreover, democracy is usually linked to “positive” 
definitions: freedom of expression (39%), the country’s economic 
prosperity (27%), order and stability (25%), the rule of law (22%), 
and direct elections (20%). Negative definitions—such as impunity 
(7%), “idle chatter” (6%) and anarchy (4%)—are used much less 
frequently.
At the same time, out of all the components of democratic 
rule, Russians highlight order and rule of law (36%) and the 
authorities’ attention to people’s needs (34%), but the authorities’ 
electability and accountability is mentioned less often (19% and 
18% respectively). It becomes clear that, to Russians, the content 
of democratic ideas themselves is being replaced by the ideals of 
a social state. Simultaneously, freedom and respect for individual 
rights (which are rather the foundations of liberalism than 
democracy) are mentioned most frequently, yet have the lowest 
substantive content. The West remains an example of a system 
that guarantees a decent standard of living. However, there is also 
a sense that some elements of this system, which allow Western 
countries to thrive, are “alien” to Russia. That is why almost half 
of Russians (46%) suppose that their country requires a “special” 
democratic model. The desire to disconnect from the rest of the 
world arises from a fear of losing in competition with other nations, 
fear of losing one’s identity if the high administrative authority is its 
cornerstone, and if other social institutions turn out to be (at best) 
mere appendages to the “strongman” of the state, while some are 
even branded “agents” influenced by some third party.
8 From focus-group respondents’ answers.
9 D. Volkov, S. Goncharov, Demokratiya v Rossii: ustanovki naseleniya, Moskva: 
Levada Centre, 2015, p. 43, www.levada.ru/old/sites/default/files/report_fin.pdf.
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The existing arrangement contains immense potential for 
monopolization of power. A third of Russians (35%) assert that the 
Russian people need a strong leader, while approximately a third 
(37%) feel that supreme power should be in the hands of just one 
person. Only one in five Russians (21%) are strictly against the 
monopolization of power. Yet, it is implied that the power should 
lie with the country’s president, not some abstract state. Over half of 
Russians (52%) consider that all the power should be in the hands 
of a leader, while only a third (34%) would prefer to see the power 
split between the president, parliament and judicial authorities, as 
envisaged by Western democratic traditions.
The authoritarian, anti-liberal traditions supported by the 
majority indicate a possible paradox of democracies. The policies 
of authoritarian governments which resort to populism are often 
more ostentatious (as can be confirmed from the Russian example). 
However, the effectiveness of such policies in economic terms 
might turn out to be less important than the authorities’ ability to 
convince the nation that they are capable of solving its problems. 
The symbolic importance of Crimea annexation was not simply 
territorial expansion, but the ability to turn the great social myth of 
a powerful state into reality.
PART OF A GLOBAL TREND
This text might have been interesting to just a narrow circle of experts 
on Russia, were it not for last year’s events, which convincingly 
proved the global nature of the anti-liberal tendencies described. It 
turns out that Russia was not lagging behind, but was in fact ahead 
of Western countries in certain respects. At the same time, it is 
equally evident that history is non-linear, and smooth transitions 
of societies from one socio-economic formation to another are 
fairly uncommon. Sporadic “setbacks” are inevitable and probably 
even healthy, provided that the system of social connections 
and self-organization which defines the political environment is 
independent from the state. In such an environment, it is essential 
for independent intellectuals to identify conflicts among social 
groups and define common tasks and goals.
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Searching for social dissonance (to use Jacques Rancière’s 
terminology10) and constantly overcoming internal confrontation 
are undoubtedly typical traits of the Western world. Current victories 
could signal that, some time ago, society chose an “easy” way to 
ignore the internal conflicts which hinder the implementation of 
universal values. Some citizens were forced out of the ideal model 
and, as recent events have revealed, such people are numerous. For 
Western researchers, a thorough study of Russian experience could 
be the key to understanding European and American processes. 
And it would be beneficial for Russians to realize that tectonic 
shifts can occur very quickly in the political landscape, given the 
appropriate social predispositions.
Translation: Alexandra Godina
Stepan Goncharov is a sociologist at the Moscow-based Levada Center, 
an independent, non-governmental polling and sociological research 
organization.
10 J. Rancière, “The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics,” Critical Mass, 2005, 
no. 2.
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WHO GETS TO SPEAK IN “POST-CRIMEAN” RUSSIA?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed in Russia that 
censorship had been thrown onto the scrapheap of history.1 Soviet 
information control, if anything, served as a warning to society, an 
abuse of human rights not to be repeated. This consensus lasted 
about a decade or so, but in the years after President Vladimir Putin 
took power, suppressions of free speech gradually returned. The 
result is that by 2017, Russia’s news media have largely lost their 
main communicative social function: that of informing the public 
and holding power to account through investigations, dialog and 
debate. Putin’s consolidated control has limited the scope for 
editorial independence; most media outlets have been reduced to 
the role of mouthpieces for the authorities. A few media outlets 
with an independent editorial policy still exist in Russia. But 
they are increasingly subjected to pressure. The activities of such 
organizations are curtailed by repressive laws that limit freedom 
of expression and prevent widespread coverage of information 
inconvenient to those in charge.
This chapter focuses on identifying and analyzing the nature 
of censorship in “post-Crimean” Russia, as well as the means of 
manipulation employed in order to divide Russian society and 
ensure its loyalty to the regime. 
1 A. Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: The Journey from Gorbachev’s Freedom 
to Putin’s War, London: Atlantic Books, 2015.
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THE LEGISLATIVE GROUNDS FOR FILTERING INFORMATION 
Encroachment on media freedom in Russia started within the first 
few months of Putin’s first presidential term. On 9 September 2000, 
Putin approved the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation (RF)2 which set out the fundamentals for the development 
of state policy for ensuring information security. It set the stage for 
the classification of media outlets as “good” or “bad.”3 Thus, “the 
information and propaganda activities of political forces, public 
associations, the media and individuals distorting the strategy and 
tactics in the foreign policy activity of the Russian Federation” was 
outlined as a separate item in a paragraph on the most dangerous 
internal threats to the information security of the RF in the field of 
foreign policy. “Deformation of the system of mass information 
owing to uncontrolled expansion of the foreign media sector in the 
national information space” is listed as one of the greatest dangers 
in the sphere of spiritual life. The former provision actually means 
that whenever the media or a public figure interprets the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy in any other way than the Kremlin does, it poses 
a threat to Russia’s national interests. In other words, the principle of 
the “Kremlin’s monopoly on the truth” was formulated back in 2000. 
The latter provision logically resulted in the restriction of the 
right of other states, international organizations, foreign companies, 
foreigners (and citizens of Russia with dual citizenship) to own 
Russian media outlets. In 2008, foreign ownership of various large 
media organizations was capped at 50%, a law which hit a number 
of Russia-wide TV channels, radio stations and newspapers.4 The 
restrictions were extended to encompass all media assets (including 
2 Doktrina informatsionnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 9 sentyabrya 
2000 g., N PR-1895, www.femida.info/14/19002.htm.
3 The Doctrine itself is not a law yet. It is a kind of a “declaration of intent,” 
the backbone of theoretical provisions which serve as the basis for subsequent 
adoption of legislative acts. The importance of such documents lies in the fact that 
they allow one to predict the subsequent vector of development of laws in a given 
field. 
4 Federal’nyy zakon ot 29 aprelya 2008 goda N 57-FZ g. Moskva “O poryadke 
osushchestveniya inostrannykh investitsiy v khozyaystrennyye obshchestva, 
imeyushchiye strategicheskoye znachenie dlya obespecheniya oborony strany 
i bezopasnosti gosudarstva,” https://rg.ru/2008/05/07/investicii-fz-dok.html.
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printed and online editions) holding a media license in 2014, a few 
months after the annexation of Crimea. The maximum allowed 
share of foreign shareholders in the equity of such companies was 
restricted to less than 20%, and foreigners and Russians with dual 
citizenship have been banned from founding media outlets5 since 
2014. It is noteworthy that Vadim Dengin, the first Deputy Chairman 
of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy, Information 
Technology and Communications, and one of the co-authors of 
the amendments to the Law on the Media (on restricting the share 
of foreign shareholders in Russian media outlets to a maximum of 
20%), openly announced that the amendments would help protect 
Russia’s information field from the influence of the West and “the 
fifth column” which is, in fact, tantamount to recognition of the 
authorities’ desire to isolate Russians from information other than 
that disseminated by pro-Kremlin media outlets. 
The Kremlin focused largely on homogenizing views 
presented in the traditional media until 2012, when it recognized 
the growing influence of internet news portals and social media. 
Demonstrations had taken place against elections fraud that year, 
which started in late 2011 and came to be known as the Snow 
Revolution. Independent television was subjected to purges, 
as would have been the case in previous years, but it also came 
alongside a major blow to Internet-based media outlets and 
a regulatory response to social media ownership structures. Russia’s 
authorities had noted how the Arab spring had unfolded, observing 
how social media had played an integral part in communication 
between protesters: how it had enabled real-time footage of 
demonstrations to be broadcast globally.6 The logic was that the 
same forms of communication—social media and niche online 
media outlets—had already begun to play an important role during 
the anti-government protests of 2011–2013. 
5 Federal’nyy zakon ot 14 oktyabrya 2014 g. N 305-FZ “O vnesenii 
izmeneniy v Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ‘O sredstvakh massovoy informatsii’,” 
https://rg.ru/2014/10/17/ino-smi-dok.html.
6 H. Braun, E. Guskin, A. Mitchell, The Role of Social Media in the Arab Uprisings, 
Pew Research Center, 28 November 2012, www.journalism.org/2012/11/28/role-
social-media-arab-uprisings.
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By the time the Kremlin turned towards greater control of 
the Russian internet, or Runet, as it is also known, the government 
was already in a commanding position with traditional TV outlets, 
though there was still some consolidation to go. The process—
began during the night of 13 April 2001, when the NTV channel 
was forcibly seized and later nationalized—was completed 
by 2015, when the Tomsk TV-2 channel was stripped of its 
broadcasting license.7 The punishment for TV-2 had been meted 
out following its coverage of a truthful and potentially damaging 
story about the deployment of Russian “volunteers” in the Donbas 
who were conscripted on a national scale. At one point, it seemed 
that it was possible to fully erase inconvenient facts from the 
consciousness of millions of people simply by eradicating them 
from TV coverage. However, judging by the results of surveys, 
TV’s popularity has waned while that of the Internet has soared 
over recent years.8 These factors have all played their part in 
determining the ways and means of the state’s encroachment on 
the freedom of online media. 
The turning point of the state’s shift from deterrence to an 
active offensive in this field was the adoption of the amendments to 
the Law “On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful 
to their Health and Development”9 which entered into force on 
1 November 2012. Based on this law, Roskomnadzor compiled 
a single register of sites “containing banned information” to be 
blocked. 
7 The Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information 
Technologies and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor) refused to renew 
a TV-2 radio broadcasting license in spring 2016 while referring to the fact that 
a TV-2 media outlet could not provide evidence of the lack of a second citizenship 
of one of the founders, as required by the provisions of the Law on the Media 
mentioned above according to which individuals with dual citizenship have no right 
to own more than 20% of the equity as founders of a media outlet. However, no law 
stipulates which documents would prove the absence of a second citizenship. The 
lawsuit between TV-2 and Roskomnadzor on this issue is still pending. 
8 Press-vypusk No 3098 “TV, Internet, gazety, radio: doveryay, no proveryay?,” 
VTSIOM, 4 May 2016, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115679.
9 Federal’nyy zakon ot 28 iyulya 2012 g. N 139-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy 
v Federal’nyy zakon ‘O zashchite detey ot informatsii, prichinyayushchey vred ikh 
zdorov’yu i razvitiyu’ i otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” 
https://rg.ru/2012/07/30/zakon-dok.html.
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The “Lugovoi Law”10 was added to the main law on “blacklisted 
sites” in February 2014. The “Lugovoi Law” provides the possibility 
of blocking access to the sites which disseminate calls for mass riots; 
as sites which publish “extremist” content would also be blocked 
without having to obtain a court order. Given the ambiguous 
wording of some Russian laws, virtually every statement can be 
classified as suitably extremist were it to contradict the Kremlin’s 
official stance. Effectively Roskomnadzor, Russia’s online regulator, 
secured a monopoly over censorship and is now empowered to 
block online sources merely upon the request of the prosecutor 
general or one of his deputies. Roskomnadzor used its power to 
deal out the full extent of this censorship as early as on 13 March 
2014, when the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian information campaign 
was in full swing; it restricted access to several online media 
outlets with independent editorial policies for political reasons—
all without a court order. These included, among others: Grani.ru, 
Kasparov.ru, and Ej.ru—the Yezhednevnyi zhurnal (Daily Journal) 
site of political commentaries. Alexey Navalny, an opposition 
leader, had his blogs specifically blocked on LiveJournal and the 
Echo of Moscow website.11 In addition to the blocking of sites 
for politicized reasons, the laws on “blacklists” are used to exert 
pressure on the editorial policy of independent media outlets. For 
example, the Lenta.ru news site received a warning for publishing 
an interview with the leader of the Ukrainian Right Sector party in 
March 2014. Consequently, the owner of the outlet demanded that 
editor-in-chief Galina Timchenko dismiss the journalist who wrote 
the interview which was not to Roskomnadzor’s taste. Timchenko 
refused to obey and was fired; the majority of staff resigned in 
solidarity with her. In February 2016, the Prosecutor General’s 
Office demanded that Otkrytaya Rossiya (Open Russia) remove 
content relating to actions planned to commemorate the death of 
Boris Nemtsov, another prominent opposition leader, who was shot 
on 27 February 2015, in Moscow a stone’s throw from the Kremlin. 
10 Federal’nyy zakon ot 28 dekabrya 2013 g. N 398-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy 
v Federal’nyy zakon ‘Ob informatsii, informatsionnykh tekhnologiyakh i o zash-
chite informatsii’,” https://rg.ru/2013/12/30/extrem-site-dok.html.
11 Echo of Moscow and LiveJournal met the requirement and limited access to 
Navalny’s blogs and were subsequently removed from the “blacklist.” 
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Were they to refuse to remove the material, openrussia.org would 
have been added to the blacklist.
According to the independent “Roskomsvoboda” organization, 
as of April 2017, there have been 2,243,022 domains blocked 
without sufficient grounds; the total number of domains listed 
in the register since the adoption of the Law on “blacklists” is 
4,378,528 (out of which 4,216,376 have been blocked indirectly and 
unlawfully because of sharing the same IP address). Bans on some 
of these outlets have since been lifted. The number had grown so 
large by a lack of accuracy: although less than 67 thousand Internet 
resources have been targeted directly, “neighboring sites” have also 
been inadvertently blocked due to technicalities; for instance, tens 
of thousands of sites sharing the same IP-address can be parked on 
the same server. At the same time, the number of Internet resources 
blocked based on the “Lugovoi’s Law”—i.e. without a trial and often 
for clearly politicized reasons—has been growing year upon year. 
Many blacklisted sites have attempted to get round blocks 
by creating so-called “mirror sites.” However, such sites are easily 
identifiable and are also ultimately blocked. Thus, the process of 
creating new mirror sites is potentially an endless and exhausting 
one, which can become both a financial and psychological headache 
for site owners. At the time of writing, the State Duma has already 
adopted amendments to the anti-piracy law at the first reading. 
According to the amendments, Roskomnadzor is authorized to 
block mirror sites of pirate sites. Currently, the amendment only 
relates to mirror sites of pirate sites; but the fact that a new term 
of a “derived Internet site” (i.e. a mirror site) was introduced into 
legislation suggests there is potential for expanding the practice 
of pre-trial blocking of mirror sites to encompass other sites, too. 
Especially since the procedure of pre-trial access restriction to such 
sites was defined—and the Kremlin has shown no shortage of an 
inclination to establish control over critical information. In addition, 
so-called “anonymizers” (i.e. anonymous proxies)—proxy servers 
used to circumvent blocks while hiding users’ real IP addresses—
have become the subject of a blanket block. 
In spring 2015, however, the international human rights 
organization Reporters without Borders (RSF) provided a clear 
example of a means of how the international community can help 
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independent media outlets bypass the editorial policy imposed by 
the Kremlin. The RSF provided access to the previously blocked 
Grani.ru site as part of their fight against political censorship. 
They posted mirror sites of Grani.ru and eight other blocked sites 
originating from other countries using the cloud services of major 
network operators. 
It meant that the Russian authorities—or any one of the 
countries which blocked access to one of the nine sites unblocked 
by RSF—tried to restrict access to these sites again, they would be 
forced to block thousands of sites belonging to other owners, as they 
would have to target the entire cloud service. At present, it seems 
that the authorities wish to avoid resorting to such drastic measures. 
HUSHING UP UKRAINE
Another significant part of the Kremlin’s information policy has been 
its attempts to stifle and distort truthful information about events in 
Ukraine. For instance, attempts to restrict information on Russian 
combatants who lost their lives in Ukraine. In May 2015, Putin 
extended the list of types of information deemed to be secrets of 
the state to include data on Russian military losses suffered during 
wartime. The extension included any losses incurred during special 
operations in peacetime. Six months earlier, Pskov Deputy Lev 
Schlosberg published an article about the funeral of paratroopers 
killed in unknown circumstances.12 Articles about the military 
combatants in the Donbas also appeared in Novayagazeta.ru and 
a number of other media outlets with an independent editorial 
policy. As of May 2015, authors of such publications can be 
charged with disclosing state secrets—punishable by up to seven 
years’ imprisonment. 
In this way, independent media outlets are effectively now 
forbidden to publish interviews or other items concerning Russian 
servicemen deployed in Ukraine or Syria. Another political 
12 L. Schlosberg, “Myortvyye i zhyvyye. Rossiyskoe gosudarstvo pytayetsa skryt’, 
chto ono posylayet svoikh synovey na voynu, kak oni pogibayut i gde pokhorony,” 
Guberniya, 25 August 2014,  http://gubernia.pskovregion.org/number_705/01.php.
Olga Irisova210
intervention designed to distort the truth about Russia’s policy 
towards Ukraine was the introduction of Article 280.1 on “Public 
calls for action aimed at the violation of the territorial integrity 
of the Russian Federation” into the Criminal Code in May 2014. 
According to this article, individuals who undermine Russia’s right 
to Crimea, by airing their views via the mass media or online, may 
be imprisoned for up to five years. Words such as “occupied” 
or “Ukrainian” are being erased from the Russian media space 
in reference to Crimea. Online discussions about the status 
of Crimea have been restricted as a result: as many as 15 cases 
concerning Article 280.1 were pending by 2016 and the majority 
(8) unsurprisingly concerned Crimea. 
According to another law adopted after the annexation 
of Crimea, any member of the online community with a daily 
audience of over 3 thousand who posts or re-posts materials 
of someone deemed to be extremist or separatist can be jailed. 
According to this law, popularly known as the “Law on Bloggers,” 
influential online personalities now virtually classified as media 
outlets and subjected to all the applicable restrictions that come 
with having to register with Roskomnadzor. The details of as many 
as 640 bloggers13 were entered into the register within a year of 
the law’s enactment. Popular publicly accessible pages of social 
media outlets such as VKontakte, MDK, and Lentach—via which 
materials criticizing authorities are published frequently—are 
also targeted. The administrators of the public page Lentach have 
announced that they have been included in the register against 
their will. Precise data on the minimum number of daily visitors 
allowed before compulsory registration applies have not been 
voluntarily presented by Roskomnadzor. Popular global social 
media sites—such as Twitter or Facebook—defend their users’ 
rights by refusing to provide Roskomnadzor with information 
about the number of visitors some of their pages attract, and have 
also refused to relocate their servers to Russia as demanded by 
the RF. Twitter is reported to be reviewing its policy and most 
likely will transfer Russian users’ data to local servers in Russia by 
13 “Chislo zaregistrovannykh Roskomnadzorom blogerov prevysilo 600 
chelovek,” Lenta.ru, 3 August 2015, https://lenta.ru/news/2015/08/03/rknbloggers.
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mid-2018.14 Incidentally, LinkedIn was blocked on the territory of 
Russia in fall 2016 by Russian authorities for refusing to comply 
with similar demands about server relocation. 
For the time being, popular opposition bloggers like Navalny 
have avoided having to register their Twitter accounts as mass 
media sources. However, according to the law, not only bloggers 
but also platform owners are held responsible for disseminated 
content which violates RF legislation. It means that, hypothetically, 
should Twitter fail to satisfy a Roskomnadzor request to remove 
content deemed unlawful under RF legislation, it may be blocked 
on Russian territory.
THE SILENCE OF AGGREGATORS
News aggregators have also, in fact, been equated to media outlets 
when it comes to liability of content. A “Law on news aggregators”15 
as of 1 January 2017, aggregators with a daily audience of more 
than 1 million unique visitors are obliged to verify the reliability of 
published information—save for reports by media outlets officially 
registered with Roskomnadzor. The Yandex.Novosti portal, which 
is popular in Russia, as well as SMI2 and Novosti Mail.Ru, have 
already been registered as news aggregators governed by this law. 
It is, of course, impossible to fully automate the process 
of checking the “reliability” of information and its compliance 
with the laws of the RF; and it is just as futile to manually audit 
thousands of publications links which are published daily by 
aggregators. So Yandex, for example, has decided not to link to 
news articles published on sites not registered with Roskomnadzor 
on its main page. Many media outlets with Kremlin-independent 
agendas are not registered in this way, and are therefore deprived 
14 See “Twitter Reportedly Caves to Russian Censors, Will Possibly Move Data 
to Russian Servers,” The Moscow Times, 19 April 2017, https://themoscowtimes.
com/news/twitter-plans-to-transfer-personal-data-of-russian-users-to-russia-
by-2018-57759.
15 Federal’nyy zakon ot 23 iyulya 2016 g. N 208-FZ O vnesenii izmeneniy 
v Fe deral’nyy zakon ‘Ob informatsii, informatsionnykh tekhnologiyakh 
i o zash chite informatsii’ i Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob administrativnykh 
pravonarusheniyakh,” https://rg.ru/2016/06/28/zashita-dok.html.
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of substantial traffic by not being listed on aggregators like Yandex. 
This applies to both Russian and foreign media: for example, the 
Russian-language BBC website—and ensures a near-monopoly of 
pro-Kremlin content on the RuNet, at least on a scale wide enough 
to be impactful. The SMI2 resource, registered as an aggregator, will 
not be able to disseminate publications from independent media 
outlets not registered with Roskomnadzor either. Its cooperation 
with a “patriotic” media holding created by the St Petersburg “troll 
factory,”16 which litters the media space with ideologically-tainted 
publications, has also been revealed. 
Nearly half a year has passed since this news aggregator 
restriction came into force. And there is every reason to speak of 
a homogenized agenda when it comes to Russia’s main aggregators. 
Articles about the anti-corruption rallies which took place on 
March 26 in more than eighty towns across Russia, which attracted 
more protestors than any other rally of the last five years—and was 
the most numerous in terms of the number of detainees in general—
did not appear among the top five news stories on Yandex’s main 
page at the time. The aggregator had, of course, stopped processing 
information disseminated by independent media outlets which 
were not registered with Roskomnadzor, and which were actively 
reporting the demonstrations and arrests across the country. This is 
how the Kremlin managed to conceal information about the rallies 
not only from TV viewers, but also from Internet users who are 
accustomed to avoiding certain news sources and who read articles 
from a selection of top news stories compiled by aggregators.
However, the Kremlin apparently does not intend to stop 
there. The number of users of instant messengers has been growing 
rapidly over recent years. In particular, the encrypted messenger 
app Telegram has introduced channels—including the increasingly 
popular anonymous political channels—which have emerged as 
a key source of news untainted by Kremlin censorship, especially 
for young people. This soon came to the attention of the Kremlin. 
It would be hard to ignore any such trend, especially in the leadup 
to Russia’s 2018 presidential election. Back in January 2017, a few 
16 A. Zakharov, P. Rusyayeva,” Rossledovanie RBK: kak iz ’fabriki trolley’ vyrosla 
’fabrika media‘,” April 2017, RBK, www.rbc.ru/magazine/2017/04/58d106b09a7
94710fa8934ac.
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weeks after the RF introduced its aggregator law, German Klimenko, 
who advises Putin on his internet policy, spoke of needing to 
equate Telegram channels to mass media outlets. Klimenko 
frankly admitted that “Telegram channels multiplied in response to 
regulation of social media.”17 That is, he actually confirmed that the 
authorities were conducting a witch hunt against newly emerging 
bolt holes of critical information. 
So the authorities, having limited the capabilities of traditional 
media, then online media, have then attempted to control social media 
and news aggregators; now that users have switched to messengers in 
search of uncensored content, they have decided to regulate them, too. 
The Russian Media-Communication Union and Roskomnadzor have 
already developed amendments to the Laws “On Information” and 
“On Communication” as well as the Code of Administrative Offenses 
aimed at tightening up the regulation of messengers. The amendments 
will be adopted sooner or later. It is only a matter of time. The bill will 
require messenger services to register with Roskomnadzor and will 
introduce the same liability for disseminating information in violation 
of legislation of the Russian Federation: the same rules which apply to 
mass media, bloggers and aggregators. 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of repressive initiatives 
which have been introduced since the annexation of Crimea with 
the aim of restricting the dissemination of information. Even so, 
it is an insight into the Kremlin’s effectiveness when it comes to 
limiting the dissemination of information that does not sit well with 
its interests, the news that does not echo the “reality” as portrayed 
by media outlets under control of the Kremlin’s inner circle. Over 
the last three years, online censorship has meant that Russian 
cyberspace is on its way to resembling the ideal proclaimed by 
Klimenko: the great firewall of China.18 
Understandably, this situation is reflected in the country’s 
international press freedom ratings. For example, the World Press 
17 “Sovetnik Putina dopustil priznanie Telegram-kanalov sredstrami massovoy 
infoprmatsii,” GovoritMoskva, 31 January 2017, https://govoritmoskva.ru/news/ 
108189.
18 “German Klimenko predozhil ogranichit’ v Rossii internet,” Vedomosti, 
26 January 2017, www.vedomosti.ru/technology/news/2017/01/ 26/675045- 
klimenko-internet.
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Freedom Index19 by Reporters without Borders—an international, 
non-governmental organization—assesses the freedom of media by 
applying criteria such as pluralism, media independence, legislative 
framework and safety of journalists in a given country. Russia’s 
media freedom demonstrated steady deterioration between 2014–
2016. With a score of 100 points meaning zero media freedom, 
Russia’s rating went up from 42.78 points in 2014, to 44.97 in 
2015, and to 49.03 in 2016. This trend looks set to continue.
DIVIDE ET IMPERA: CREATING AND USING IMAGES  
OF THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL “OTHER” IN RUSSIA
Having seriously limited the ability of Russian citizens to obtain 
independent information, the Kremlin’s strategists have managed 
to unify the “picture of the world” received by the overwhelming 
majority through the media. Reinforcing this view are the so-called 
“trolls”—internet users who are paid to echo the same messages 
as the pro-Kremlin media do, but through using other, less formal 
platforms. This is mostly via social media, messengers, fora, 
commentaries to articles, etc. The aim is to create the appearance 
of a false grassroots consensus and to undermine the credibility of 
any opposing voices, or to bully them into silence and submission. 
The number of political talk shows broadcast by major TV 
channels has significantly increased over recent years. Many of 
them are now scheduled during prime time, though the format 
typically occupied night time slots in the past. Pro-government TV 
channels are now peddling propaganda of “proper” political and 
ideological views in one form or another night and day—keeping 
pace with the 24 news cycle. Russians greatly appreciate the most 
vitriolic and controversial political talk shows: “Vesti nedeli” (News 
of the Week) hosted by Dmitry Kiselyov and “Voskresnyi vecher” 
(Sunday Evening) hosted by Vladimir Solovyov top the list. 
However, propaganda cannot be effective if there are no 
corresponding ideas and stereotypes entrenched in a given society. 
It is also ineffective if its messages do not correspond to the 
19 2016 World Press Freedom Index, https://rsf.org/en/ranking.
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objective reality which can easily be verified. Hence, when the 
stagnation of the Russian economy began—it was first of all caused 
by structural problems and high dependence on oil prices—the 
manipulation of consciousness through a positive message was not 
in demand and would not have been plausible. Few attempts were 
made to paint the economy and well-being as improving. After all, 
people who identify a negative economic trend when it comes to 
their own pocket refuse to believe information to the contrary. So 
public opinion was shifted by the creation of an external enemy on 
which to place the blame. In this regard, appeals to more abstract 
constructs such as spirituality and patriotism became important.
For an external enemy, it was easy to point the finger at “the 
West.” Mistrust of the West runs deep; anti-Western scare stories 
were a staple of Soviet propaganda. These suspicions have stayed 
because no large-scale, post-Soviet attempt has been made at 
correcting these sorts of anti-Western myths. 
The thesis on the particular effectiveness of the external 
component of propaganda is also confirmed by the results of 
sociological surveys. Thus, according to a public opinion poll 
conducted by the Levada Center, 58% of respondents believe that 
television provides the most objective information on issues related 
to foreign policy whereas the proportion of those who consider 
information regarding domestic policy, society and the economy 
to be objective is much lower: roughly a quarter. At the same time, 
33% of respondents agreed that the least objective information, 
concerning both the economy and life of the society, appeared on 
TV (while as little as 13% of respondents confirmed that foreign 
policy was covered in a biased way).20 
The observed waning trust of the Russians in traditional media 
(47% of Russians often experience the feeling that television, radio 
and newspapers “talk around corners”) results in some sociologists 
and political scientists announcing that “an erosion of the faith of 
Russians in state-run media” has taken place. However, it would 
be more accurate to say that many Russians are disappointed with 
the coverage of domestic events—Russians have always typically 
been more critical of coverage concerning domestic policy. On the 
20 “Doverie SMI i gotovnost’ vykazyvat’ svoye mnenie,” Levada.ru, 12 August 
2016, www.levada.ru/2016/08/12/14111.
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other hand, so far, views on the developments outside the country 
presented on TV sit well with their own, deep-seated beliefs—and 
international news stories are more prevalent than Russian news 
stories on Russian TV. Thus, public attention is purposefully diverted 
from more pressing domestic issues towards safer, external issues. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the effectiveness of 
propaganda can be judged by how much resentment it can rouse 
towards the collective West, and deflect from domestic issues. 
World history is full of such similarly minded formulations of 
“Us” and “Them.”21 The use of a collective image of the West 
as the “external other” to temporarily mobilize public support in 
Russia is not a new strategy for the Kremlin in the post-Soviet era, 
either. Over the course of the 17 years of Putin’s reign, Russians 
have rallied around the regime precisely against the backdrop of 
active anti-Western information campaigns22—when confrontation 
with the West as the significant other was presented as a way of 
preserving a special Russian myth. 
The Kremlin is now wholly dependent on this image of the 
West as the external “other,” and it is precisely this image that serves 
as the basis for the mobilization of support. Mobilization is built, 
but identity cannot be consolidated, since it is extremely difficult to 
create a Russian identity which is converse to Western identity since 
the West or Europe, to be more precise, is not an antithesis, but rather 
somewhat of an ideal for Russians. The impossibility of attaining this 
ideal breeds ressentiment. Besides, in previous years, all attempts 
to create an identity based on opposition to the West followed the 
formula of “we as the object,” whereas stable identities are built in 
accordance with the opposite principle “we as the subject.”
The Kremlin has come to grasp this problem: on the one hand, 
full polarization to the West is impossible while, on the other, the 
objectification of Russian society as a victim of Western forces is not 
entirely effective. Messages are usually conveyed in an attempt to 
strike this balance: for instance, “Russia has its own path,” or “Russia 
21 Th.H. Eriksen, “We and Us: Two Modes of Group Identification,” Journal of 
Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995), pp. 427–436.
22 O. Irisova, “The West through the eyes of Russians. The anti-Western rhetoric of 
Russian propaganda as a tool for preserving the regime and eroding the European 
identity of Russians,” Intersection, 6 November 2015, http://intersectionproject.
eu/article/society/west-through-eyes-russians.
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is exceptional” or “Russia is a Eurasian rather than a European 
civilization” dominated discourse in the aftermath of the annexation 
of Crimea; a new narrative, however, is coming to the fore—a form 
of “Russia is a true European Christian civilization” in confrontation 
with the West “which has turned away from true Europeanness.”23 
Given such interpretations, the West as the other is divided 
into two categories: the “close other” that allegedly pursues the same 
goals as the tentative “us” (primarily countries where “traditionalists” 
and political forces representing conservative values are in power 
belong to the category of “close other”) and the “oppressive other” 
which is an opponent (mainly liberal democracies) allowing the 
creation of an image of a besieged fortress—an effective means by 
which to mobilize support. 
At the same time, we can see that the image of the external 
other has become more opaque in recent years. This dichotomy is 
no longer built based on geographical or institutional principles—
the geographically defined West or the West united by institutions. 
Abstract values whose interpretation strongly depends on the 
Kremlin’s goals are at the core of this image. Thus, the Kremlin 
now occupies a broad field of maneuver and is free to alter the 
characteristics of the alien “other” on an ad hoc basis. However, 
the attribution of internal problems to the external other remains 
a constant feature. 
The Kremlin, it should be noted, also creates an image of 
the alien internal other precisely due to their alleged affinity to 
the external other. Therefore, critics of the Kremlin are defined 
not as internal dissenters by pro-government media outlets, but 
as individuals who possess the identity of the other. Suggestive 
examples include lists of “national traitors” and the “fifth column” 
allegedly representing the interests of the external other disseminated 
by the pro-government “patriotic” niche media, or official lists of 
NGOs with a telling label of “foreign agents.” 
These examples also include attempts to undermine the 
“Russianness” of opponents. The most telling examples are 
occasional attempts to equate Jews to liberal dissenters dissatisfied 
23 M. Engström, “The New Russian Renaissance. Why the Kremlin is fascinated 
by classical antiquity,” Intersection, 4 April 2017, http://intersectionproject.eu/
article/russia-europe/new-russian-renaissance. 
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with the regime, which accuse them of being potential destabilizers 
of the status quo.24 The result is an appearance that only an external 
other would have an interest in challenging Putin.
This strategy of linking the image of the internal other with 
the external other—the enemy—has turned out to be extremely 
effective; many of those who are currently dissatisfied with the 
developments in the country prefer not to be associated with any of 
the opposition forces and retreat into so-called “internal emigration” 
so as to avoid being associated with the opposing (according to 
propaganda) side of this dichotomy. At the same time, another 
significant proportion of Russians employs a method of social 
adaptation known as “mimicry of the majority.” The authorities 
frequently stress that they have the support of the overwhelming 
majority, however flawed that view might be in reality.25 Both 
internal migrants and majority-mimicking individuals reproduce 
an illusion that Russians approve of the country’s developments. 
At the same time, Kremlin-controlled information platforms tune 
out protest moods. For example, none of the national channels has 
covered trucker protests that have swept across Russia, and do their 
utmost to preserve an illusion of total support. 
Effective censorship and active use of the image of the 
external and internal other are primarily aimed at preserving the 
regime; these effective techniques prevent society at large from 
realizing that there are many more dissenters in the country than it 
would seem.
Translation: Natalia Mamul
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24 O. Irisova, “Manageable anti-Semitism: The Kremlin is keeping anti-Semitism 
“under control,” Intersection, 19 May 2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/politics/
manageable-anti-semitism.
25 Eadem, “Where did the Russian ‘democrats’ disappear to?,” Intersection, 
19 August 2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/where-did-russian-
democrats-disappear.
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DENIS VOLKOV
HOW RUSSIANS VIEW THE WEST
The overwhelming majority of the Russian population almost 
entirely base their opinions about Western states on what they see 
on TV. As of March 2016, less than 1% of Russians had visited 
the U.S. in the last five years and less than 10%1 had visited any 
EU country. The same percentage of people have friends and 
acquaintances in the West. In total, no more than 15% of the 
population actively follow developments outside of Russia. The 
majority of Russian citizens have only a vague idea of what is going 
on abroad and about the modern world in general; it is usually 
difficult to hold group discussions on these issues. Stereotypical 
and hackneyed beliefs dominate public opinion in this respect. 
In the eyes of most Russians, the West is not exactly 
tantamount to the U.S. but is politically and economically controlled 
by America. It is widely believed that it is precisely the U.S. which 
defines not only NATO’s, but also the EU’s policy. In March 2016, 
67% of the population shared this view regarding NATO and 37% 
(relative majority)—regarding the EU. The leading role of Germany 
in the EU (the second most dominant country in this regard) was 
mentioned by 24% of respondents. 85% of Russians also thought 
1 Here and below, the data of regular nationwide opinion polls conducted by 
the Levada Center (VCIOM until 2003) are cited unless otherwise specified. On 
the dynamic series on the attitudes towards the U.S. and EU see www.levada.ru/
indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam. A selection of nationwide polls on the Russians’ 
attitudes to the U.S. see www.levada.ru/tag/ssha/?category_name=press. 
A selection of polls before 2015 on Russians’ perception of the relations between 
Russia and the Western countries see Russian Public Opinion—2013–2015, 
Moskva: Levada-Center, 2016, pp. 286–309, www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/2013-2015-Eng.pdf. 
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that European states imposed sanctions against Russia under 
pressure from the U.S. and as few as 6% of respondents believed 
that the EU acted independently on this issue. Besides, looking at 
opinion polls on the generalized positive or negative attitude to the 
U.S. and EU, one can conclude that these sentiments change in 
parallel although negative feelings towards Europe are a little less 
pronounced than those towards the U.S. (see fig. 1 and 2). 
Figure 1. General attitude to the U.S. 
Figure 2. General attitude to the EU
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Thus, today’s conflict between Russia and the West 
is primarily perceived as a Russian-American confrontation. 
Moreover, NATO and militarism are seen as central constituent 
parts of the image of the West in general and the U.S. in particular. 
Attitudes towards America and Europe have undergone significant 
change over the last quarter of a century according to sociological 
studies, while NATO’s image in the eyes of Russians has always 
been rather negative and has been associated with a military threat 
to Russia. Western countries are seen through the prism of the 
conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine nowadays. 
A historical journey will help us better understand today’s anti-
Western sentiments. 
SENTIMENTS IN THE 1990s AND 2000s
Strange as it may seem, in the early 1990s, the majority of the 
Russian population perceived the West and the U.S. in the first place 
as an indisputable role model and the main benchmark in foreign 
policy. According to 1990–1991 poll results, 39% of respondents 
were curious about the U.S., which attracted most attention among 
all countries in the world (27% of respondents showed interest in 
Japan and 17%—in Germany). When respondents were asked to 
choose a Western country with which Russia should cooperate 
first and foremost, the absolute majority (74%) cited America. 
The second most popular prospective partner—Germany—was 
mentioned barely over half as much. The U.S. was perceived as the 
richest and most well-developed country in the West. 
Not only was America perceived as a benchmark by Russians 
during this brief period, but it was also considered its most reliable 
partner which could always be counted on; the U.S. was believed 
to provide help in the first place if assistance was needed (37%). To 
compare, as few as 9% expected Germany to offer a hand in times 
of trouble. Moreover, the majority (44%) were convinced that the 
United States of America would definitely help if necessary (as few 
as 18% did not believe it, the remaining respondents were unsure 
or believed that no help would be needed). The U.S. was perceived 
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as a friendly country (51%) or an ally (16%). Between 1–2% of 
respondents believed that the U.S. was hostile towards Russia. 
The image of the U.S. in Russian public opinion had gradually 
changed by the mid-1990s. The role of this country on the global 
arena was assessed more negatively and certain American steps in 
foreign policy were met with disapproval; discontent was brewing. 
Russians’ positive attitude towards the U.S. was first challenged 
following the U.S. bombing of Iraq in 1993. Russian public opinion 
was divided: one third of the population supported U.S. actions 
whereas half of the population expressed disapproval (moreover, 
26% of respondents “absolutely condemned” the bombing). Still, 
in 1995–1996, the majority of respondents still believed that U.S. 
actions towards Russia were friendly on the whole. The U.S. was 
not perceived as an opponent or enemy at the time. As few as 7% 
perceived the U.S. as an enemy (in comparison, approximately 
60% of respondents do today). 
A clear increase in the proportion of negative attitudes 
towards the West has been observed since the mid-1990s. As 
few as 6% of respondents were inclined to cite the U.S. as one 
of many enemies in 1996 whereas since 1999, the country has 
ranked third in terms of Russian enemies after only “international 
terrorists” and “the Chechens.” In 2008, the U.S. was Russia’s main 
enemy in the eyes of 35% of respondents. In 2014, at the peak of 
anti-Americanism, a record 65% of the population saw the U.S. as 
Russia’s main enemy. This figure fell to 46% in spring 2016 and 
the U.S. is now listed as Russia’s main enemy on a par with ISIS, 
banned in Russia. Back in May 1998, nearly 75% of respondents 
believed that America wanted to weaken Russia and turn it into 
its “commodity appendage.” Approximately 80% of respondents 
shared this view in 2016. 
The 1998–1999 events became a watershed in terms of 
Russia’s attitude towards the U.S. Apart from the intervention of 
NATO forces in the Balkans, this period saw the onset of the Second 
Chechen War, harshly criticized by the West, the announcement 
of the intention of the U.S. to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and 
first NATO eastward expansion since the collapse of the USSR. This 
constituted a serious blow to Russians’ perception of the United 
States of America. 
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According to the polls, in 1999, 55% of Russians believed 
that the American stance as regards missile defense “was contrary to 
the interests of Russia.” A similar proportion (50%) of respondents 
maintained that Russia should augment defense and security in 
response to NATO enlargement (another 23% insisted on the 
development of cooperation while 13% believed no reaction was 
necessary). It was then that the U.S. came to top of the list of countries 
which “posed a threat to Russia’s security” (23% of respondents 
expressed this view in 1998 compared to 35% in 1999). 75% of 
Russians stated that they agreed with the statement that “the U.S. 
takes advantage of the hardships in Russia in order to turn it into 
an insignificant country.” Similar opinions were expressed by 
a slightly higher percentage of Russians in March 2016—in the days 
of open confrontation with the Western countries—when 85% of 
respondents agreed with the statement that “the West has always 
sought to weaken and humiliate Russia.” 
It is noteworthy that the image of the U.S. as the global 
hegemon was prevalent among Russians by the early 2000s. 
A universal formula for the interpretation of all international 
conflicts involving the U.S. emerged: half (or more) of Russians 
saw American policy as being motivated solely by an intention to 
establish control over a given territory and not to ensure fulfillment 
of international norms and to avenge foes. A comparable number 
of respondents explained the causes of the Kosovo, Iraqi and 
subsequent conflicts by interests of the U.S. itself. This pattern can 
be observed in the way Russians perceived interventions of the 
allies in Afghanistan and Iraq, responses to the developments in 
Libya and Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine.  
The next watershed period following the 1998–1999 events 
was perhaps the period of 2003–2004 when the U.S. Army 
invaded Iraq. This period also saw a series of “color revolutions” 
supported by the West and perceived by the Russian elite as 
a conspiracy against Russia (interestingly, only one-fifth of the 
Russian population shared this view back then compared to the 
main explanatory approach to the developments in Kyiv as an “anti-
Russian conspiracy” which dominated in 2014), and a second 
wave of NATO eastward expansion. The Russian establishment 
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finally understood the futility of talks on Russia entering the Euro-
Atlantic security structures back then. 
As a result, Russian foreign policy was gradually becoming 
hostile towards the West and the U.S. In parallel, Russian public 
opinion was steadily drifting away from cooperation and towards 
isolation and confrontation. In 2002, half of the population 
supported cooperation with the military bloc and one-quarter of 
respondents were against it, whereas the situation reversed over 
the next decade. The current conflict between Russia and the West 
has cemented this opinion: the number of respondents against 
rapprochement with NATO had reached a record 55% by spring 
2016; the number of Russians who welcomed such rapprochement 
had fallen to 18%. Besides, the U.S. and NATO occupied the 
leading positions among “Russia’s enemies” by the mid-2000s.
Another event which triggered a new wave of anti-Western 
sentiment in Russia was the Russo-Georgian War; polls recorded 
more negative attitudes towards the Western states (the first peak 
of anti-NATO sentiments was recorded back then). Russians 
believed in the desire “of the United States of America to extend 
its influence so as to encircle Russia’s neighboring states” and half 
of the population believed that to be the main cause which led to 
the war. 32% held Georgia responsible and just 5% believed that 
Russia was at fault. In August 2008, the general attitude, not only 
to the U.S. but also the European Union, (and Ukraine) changed 
from “positive” to “definitely negative” in several days against the 
backdrop of a mass Russian propaganda campaign. 
The Russo-Georgian conflict also reveals a commonly-held 
attitude towards re-living the collapse of the USSR; former Soviet 
republics are denied much recognition as independent actors, 
and the Russian population is loath to accept that the Western 
path of development might be more attractive to these states than 
the Russian one. The same pattern can be observed both with 
respect to Georgia and Ukraine. In the eyes of Russians, Georgia 
became the main “enemy” and “the most unfriendly country” 
(approximately 60% of respondents expressed this opinion in 
2008–2009) as a result of the Russo-Georgian War, while the U.S. 
ranked second (45% of respondents). From 2014–2016, America 
was enemy number one, while Ukraine was not even perceived 
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as an unfriendly country. At the same time, the attitude towards 
Germany deteriorated drastically (Germany was perceived as one 
of the most friendly countries towards Russia for a long time) as well 
as that towards the UK. Russians’ attitude towards Poland became 
even more hostile, too. 
A significant proportion of the population (usually 40–50%) 
is highly susceptible to official rhetoric concerning foreign policy 
and they correctly identify the “enemy” even in the absence of an 
open military conflict between Russia and the said state. In the mid-
2000s, the Baltic States competed for the role of the main enemy 
and were succeeded by Georgia in the late 2000s. The U.S. had 
become Russia’s main enemy by 2013. Interestingly, the hostile 
attitude to America increased noticeably two or three years before 
the conflict (see Table 1), just as it did in the case of Georgia in the 
second half of the 2000s. 
Table 1. The dynamics of the changes in perception of the countries 
most unfriendly towards Russia*
 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
U.S. 37 35 45 26 33 35 38 69 73 72
Ukraine 27 23 41 13 20 15 11 30 37 48
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 29
Poland 7 20 10 14 20 8 8 12 22 24
Latvia 46 36 35 36 35 26 21 23 25 23
Lithuania 42 32 35 35 34 25 17 24 25 23
Germany 2 2 3 1 4 3 3 18 19 19
UK 5 3 8 6 8 7 9 18 21 18
Estonia 28 60 30 28 30 23 16 21 19 16
Georgia 44 46 62 57 50 41 33 19 11 10
* The following wording was used: “Name five countries which are the most 
unfriendly and hostile towards Russia.” This relates to a Russian nationwide 
sample conducted among the adult population of the country. The ten most 
frequently mentioned countries are listed here. The results are listed according to 
the last ranking.
Therefore, one should distinguish two different levels of 
Russians’ attitude to the Western countries: the most generalized 
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attitude and basic perception of the international image of a given 
country including its attitude towards Russia. For example, 
a generally positive or generally negative attitude towards America 
and the European Union is the indicator most liable to fluctuations. 
At the moment of open conflicts between Russia and Western 
countries like for example the one in the Balkans in 1999, over 
Iraq in 2003 or over Georgia in 2008, the Russian public opinion 
instantaneously shifted from a positive attitude to a negative one, 
and quickly returned to positive perception in the aftermath of the 
conflict. We can say that public sentiments fluctuated alongside 
the changing rhetorical stance of television programs. Perceptions 
of Western countries quickly deteriorated in 2014. However, in 
this case, the “normalization” of public attitudes toward Western 
countries is slow. It is unlikely to become highly positive until 
sanctions are lifted and the Russian establishment decides the 
conflict has been settled. 
However, a closer look at the history of how the image of 
the U.S. is formed in the eyes of public opinion (this not so much 
data on other Western countries) reveals that a consistent prejudice 
against America was gradually being formed—even during the 
periods marked by the most positive general attitude. As far back as 
the late 1990s, the theme of America as the puppeteer who pulls the 
strings of the regimes in Russia’s neighboring countries, and a threat 
to Russia itself, was constantly recurring. Caution towards the U.S. 
(and other Western countries to a lesser extent) had developed even 
before Vladimir Putin came to power and consolidated control 
over the major state-owned media outlets. Strangely enough, the 
2014 events, which prompted record high negative attitudes to 
the U.S. and EU (the results of the surveys can also be projected 
on attitudes to other Western countries), only slightly affected the 
basic ideas about the Western states (about their place in the world, 
motives behind their policy towards Russia etc.). 
THE PERIOD OF OPEN CONFRONTATION (2014–2016)
The current conflict with the U.S. and other Western countries is 
different in that this time, we are dealing with an open confrontation 
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(the countries have introduced reciprocal sanctions) which is now 
in its third year. The attitude towards the U.S. and the European 
Union worsened significantly immediately after the onset of the 
Ukrainian conflict. Negative feelings towards America saw a rise 
from 44% in January 2014 to 71% in May 2014 and had reached 
their maximum level by the early 2015 (81% in the poll in January). 
The corresponding figures were 34%, 60% and 71% with respect 
to the EU, respectively. Unlike in the case of previous conflicts, 
public opinion resembled doom and gloom when it came to the 
relations between Russia and the U.S.; the understanding that 
relations between the states were “chilly” was gradually becoming 
widespread throughout the 2000s. However, a majority assessed 
these relations as “tense” and even “hostile” in 2014 for the first 
time. The tension has eased a little since around the first half of 
2015. However, we have not seen a reversion “to the norm” which 
is a generally positive attitude to the West, as happened in the 
aftermath of previous conflicts. 
The observed record high in terms of anti-American and 
anti-Western sentiments can partially be explained by the fact that 
Russian society was subjected to relentless television propaganda 
in the case of this conflict. Having analyzed 2013/2014 television 
broadcasts, TV critic Arina Borodina wrote in June 2014 that “every 
Russian TV channel broadcasting news without exception … 
fulfilled the ideological imperative of the Russian authorities entirely. 
It was an unprecedented ideological avalanche incomparable 
to any political campaign: neither President Putin’s election nor 
congresses of United Russia nor even the war against Georgia in 
2008 were accompanied by such a campaign.”2 
To begin with, Euromaidan had to be discredited in the eyes of 
Russian TV viewers since polls conducted by Ukrainian sociologists 
indicated3 that the sentiments and motives harbored by protesters in 
2 A. Borodina, “Televizor Olimpiady i Ukrainy,” Forbes.ru, 3 July 2014, 
www.forbes.ru/mneniya-opinion/konkurentsiya/261539-televizor-olimpiady-i-
ukrainy-rekordy-propagandy. 
3 On sentiments of Euromaidan protesters see: V. Paniotto, “Evromaidan—Do 
i posle Maidana,” Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniya, 2014, nos 1–2 (117), 
pp. 135–140, www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/vom_1-2_2014.pdf. On sentiments 
of protesters at the Bolotnaya Square in Moscow see: D. Volkov, “Protestnyye 
mitingi v Rossii kontsa 2011—nachala 2012 gg.: zapros na demokratizatsiyu 
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Kyiv at the outset strongly resembled those shared by the Russians 
who took to the streets at the Bolotnaya Square in 2011–2012. 
The example of public disobedience in the neighboring state was 
unacceptable for the Russian authorities. Russian television resorted 
to tried and tested rhetoric by accusing the West of inciting protests 
in Ukraine (scandals involving American officials at the Maidan4 
covered by the Russian media legitimized this version). Hence, from 
the point of view of half of the Russian population, the main factor 
which brought protesters to the streets of Kyiv was “the influence of 
the West seeking to draw Ukraine into the orbit of its own political 
interests.” This belief was becoming even more popular with time 
(an increase from 41% in December 2013 to 54% in December 
2014). In April 2015, the majority (56%) explained the ongoing 
conflict in eastern Ukraine by the fact that it was “beneficial to the 
leadership of the U.S. and Western countries” and not at all by 
Russia’s actions (only as few as 6% thought so). Thus, from the very 
start, the events in Ukraine—prior to the annexation of Crimea and 
imposition of Western sanctions against Russia—were perceived by 
Russian society as the results of interventions by Western states 
aimed at damaging Russia. 
However, it would be erroneous to assume that anti-Western 
sentiment (and, in general, the “official” version of the conflict 
promoted by Russian television channels) is characteristic only of 
those who watch Russian television. Even the majority of those 
who regularly access independent media as a source of information 
denied the presence of the Russian troops on the territory of the 
Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic, and 
were happy about Crimea “joining” Russia. They also expressed 
negative feelings about the West (although the figures in this 
group were slightly below the proportion of the population on 
average).5 They should know better and hence, we cannot attribute 
their views to ignorance or blind faith in official propaganda, or 
politicheskikh institutov,” Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniya, 2012, no. 2 (112), 
pp. 73–86, www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/vom2_2.pdf.
4 A telephone conversation between Victoria Nuland and the U.S. Ambassador 
to Ukraine, Ekho Moskvy, 7 February 2014, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/ 
1253668-echo.
5 For more detail see: D. Volkov, “Rodina vne kritiki,” Vedomosti, 17 March 
2016, www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/03/18/634111-rodina-kritiki.
How Russians View the West 229
uncritical acceptance of the developments. Based on the results 
of qualitative research conducted by the Levada Center in 
 2014 – 2016, we can assume that an important role in the 
population’s approval (among population as a whole and among 
the majority of the audience of the independent media) of the 
policy of the Russian authorities regarding Ukraine and Syria, 
as well as confrontation with the West, is played by the idea of 
the resurgent grandeur of Russia. As described by participants of 
focus-group interviews, the country “bares its teeth,” “makes others 
reckon with it,” “makes others respect it,” talks “on equal terms” 
with the leading global superpowers and does not yield to their 
pressure. It brings satisfaction and a sense of self-importance. It 
turns out that the feeling of belonging to a great superpower is 
almost as important to the enlightened Russian public as it is to 
an ordinary person. The idea of restoration of the status of a great 
superpower which it itself lost in the post-Soviet era (according to 
popular belief) has legitimized Russia’s involvement in conflicts in 
Ukraine and Syria in the eyes of the Russian population. It has also 
become one of the foundations for a new form of legitimacy for the 
Russian authorities.6 
Focus-group participants were saying enthusiastically: “It took 
only two days—and Crimea is ours!,” “Earlier, Putin only spoke of 
the greatness of the country whereas now, he has proven it with 
his deeds.” According to public opinion polls, it was precisely the 
annexation of Crimea which evidenced Russia’s resurgence to the 
status of great superpower for 80% of the population. The objections 
of the U.S. and Europe have served to stoke Russian national pride: 
“we did it to spite everyone.” And although joy stemming from 
Crimea “joining” Russia had subsided by late 2014 (although 80% 
still believe it was the right step which is beneficial for the country), 
the ongoing confrontation with the West, reciprocal sanctions and 
mutual accusations are now perceived as proof of the country’s 
importance in the international arena. “They do not like us, they 
are afraid of us, they are trying to weaken us, and hence, they take 
us seriously.”
6 For more details about the dynamics of approval ratings and their dependence 
on the perception of the greatness of the country see idem, “86 protsentov Putina: 
verit’ ili net,” Vedomosti, no. 3977, 9 December 2015.
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The need for self-importance (in the eyes of others and, 
consequently, in one’s own eyes) which underlies today’s 
negative attitude of the majority of the Russian population to the 
U.S. and West explains the paradoxical, simultaneous presence 
of the contrasting desire to cooperate with the West in the mass 
consciousness. For example, nearly 70% of Russians were in favor 
of “developing economic, political and cultural ties with Western 
countries” in November 2016. This figure never fell below 50% 
even during the period of hostile confrontation with the U.S. in 
2014–2015 and reached 76% in “peaceful times.” And this is not 
surprising since the current conflict has not changed Russians’ 
perception of the Western countries as advanced, economically 
developed states where citizens enjoy a high standard of living. 
However, the majority is convinced that it is the West which 
is not inclined to conduct a dialog. This aspect of relations with the 
Western countries can be characterized using the formula which 
shifts the entire responsibility for the continuation of confrontation 
onto a rival: “we want to cooperate with them; it is they who do 
not want to cooperate with us.” In early 2017, the majority of 
Russians were still preparing themselves for a protracted (non-
violent) confrontation with the West rather than insisting on seeking 
a compromise. Reconciliation and a dialog can be accepted, 
according to Russian public opinion, only if the West recognizes 
Russia as an equal partner, lifts sanctions and makes concessions 
(at least the Russian authorities and Russian television should have 
grounds to present it in such a way). If this happens, the legitimacy 
of the Russian regime could be built on cooperation with the West 
instead of confrontation. 
All in all, a shift in public opinion towards cooperation 
with the West seems possible today. The peak of anti-American 
and anti-Western sentiments was reached in early 2015 and less 
hostile attitudes have been observed over the last two years. 
The victory of Donald Trump (presented by the Russian media 
in a positive light, at least until recently) consolidated this trend, 
although no radical changes have been observed since he took 
office. According to a survey conducted in January 2017, as few 
as 7% of Russians associate “significant improvements” in relations 
between the two countries with Trump. Approximately 40% speak 
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of “minor improvements.”7 However, these expectations are very 
close to those recorded following 2009 polls pertaining to Barack 
Obama. No euphoria or elevated hopes for serious improvement 
of relations are observable. Sentiments can be encapsulated in 
a single phrase uttered by a respondents participating in a focus-
group interview in January 2017: “Barack Obama also promised 
mountains and marvels in the beginning.” In other words, Russians 
do not believe in the possibility of radical improvements in Russo-
Western relations. Even in the case of normalization of diplomatic 
relations, the majority of the population will still harbor a deep-
seated distrust in Western policy towards Russia. 
Denis Volkov is a sociologist at Levada Center and holds an MA in 
political science from Moscow Higher School of Social and Economic 
Sciences and the University of Manchester. He is a frequent contributor 
at Vedomosti, RBC and Carnegie.ru.
7 “Izbranniye Trampa,” Levada.ru, 26 January 2017, www.levada.ru/2017/01/26/
izbranie-trampa.
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CRIMEA IN CONCLUSION: A SUCCESSFUL FAILURE
Three years have passed since Russian troops, operating without 
military insignia, seized control over the Crimean peninsula 
and held a referendum at gunpoint. The result: an annexation of 
Ukrainian territory roughly the size of Belgium with a population 
a little larger than Latvia’s. 
The majority of Western experts today believe this annexation 
has caused Russia a lot of trouble,1 but Russian officials claim their 
policies have been a success.2 Who is right? Holders of both views 
tend to agree on its historical significance at least—both for the post- 
-Soviet space and for the Western world, which makes the question 
of success or failure a relevant one. But also a tricky one to address: 
declaring the Crimean annexation a success or failure for Russia 
requires looking far beyond the Black Sea. That is why this chapter 
makes an assessment by measuring the wider impact of Crimea on 
Russia’s relations with the West, its pivot to the East, its regional 
integration projects, and its economic health. 
1 K. Bennett, “Is Putin’s Russia Headed for a Systemic Collapse?,” The American 
Interest, 26 August 2016, www.the-american-interest.com/2016/08/23/is-putins-
russia-headed-for-a-systemic-collapse.
2 S. Karaganov, “Russian Foreign Policy Finding New Bearings,” Russia in 
Global Affairs, 7 June 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Russian-Foreign-
Policy-Finding-New-Bearings-18203.
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RUSSIA-WEST: BROKEN RULES. SHATTERED TRUST
Throughout President Vladimir Putin’s rule, he has regularly 
spoken of his desire for Russia to be on an equal footing with the 
West. Time and again, he has sought to be recognized as a leader 
of an important power, a leader that his counterparts in the West 
consult before making strategic decisions. The majority of Russia’s 
ruling elite echo this wish. Intelligence and military figures publicly 
and frequently complain about issues like NATO expansion and 
democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space; they believe any 
Western push for either requires a Russian kickback. Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and its military actions in Eastern Ukraine 
that followed was portrayed as a kickback in this spirit. But instead 
of raising Russia to the level of equal partner, it brought the West 
closer together and further from Russia, strengthening NATO and 
shattering efforts, built up over the twenty years before, to build 
a relationship of trust and mutual respect.
When, in 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, the 
Western reaction was slow; only after the escalations in the east of 
Ukraine did sanctions come thick and fast. Ukraine is not a NATO 
member, but Russia’s violation of international law and ongoing 
activities on the territory of Ukraine have stimulated the NATO 
members of nearby countries in Central and Eastern Europe to call 
for greater reassurance and deployments in the region. One could 
argue that because Russia has attacked Ukraine, NATO was given 
a “second life.” A revival of its initial Cold War purpose elaborated 
by its first Secretary General, Lord Ismay: “keep the Russians out.”3 
Already today the NATO is reassuring its Eastern Flank with four 
brigades rotating between Poland and the Baltic States. Moreover, 
Russia has jolted NATO’s military top brass into mulling over various 
war scenarios that involve Russia, as well as returning to much 
a tighter scrutiny of Russian military capabilities4 that was displayed 
in Crimea, the east of Ukraine and in Syria. No matter what actual 
military threat Russia poses to the Baltics and Poland, Russia’s actions 
3 S. Blank, “The Years of Living Dangerously,” Intersection, 28 April 2016, 
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/years-living-dangerously.
4 J. Cohen, “Do not underestimate the Russian military,” Intersection, 8 January 
2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/do-not-underestimate-russian-military.
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in Ukraine rejuvenated NATO; giving it a new reason to demand 
for each member state to meet its 2% of GDP minimum spend 
commitments as well as rekindling a general feeling of unity. 
Russia’s relations with Western nations’ governments and its 
people have worsened even more noticeably. Traditional partners 
like Germany and France have given up on Putin; the 2003 Moscow-
-Berlin-Paris solidarity against the Iraq’s invasion seems a long time 
ago now. The new Franco-German attitude is characterized best by 
the words of Chancellor Angela Merkel, who, after talking to Putin 
in 2014, has concluded that he “lives in another world.” 
Aside from the United States under President Donald 
Trump, or isolated leaders such as the Czech leader Miloš Zeman, 
Hungary’s Viktor Orban, or to a lesser extent Alexis Tsipras of 
Greece, Western leaders have been standing firm in their support 
for Ukraine, and frequently condemn Russian aggression. While 
talk of sanctions being dropped is often mooted in countries like 
Italy, the EU keeps prolonging its sanctions against Russia, despite 
lobby group efforts to promote the idea of sanctions relief as an 
incentive to get Russia back into a spirit of cooperation.
Taking the cue from their leaders, public opinion in Western 
nations is becoming increasingly Russophobic. According to the 
Pew Research Center,5 26% hold a positive view of Russia on 
average across the EU; in Poland it is just 15%, while the Italians 
are the most predisposed at 34%. In the United States, just 22%. 
The world median viewing Russia positively is now only 30%, 
which means Russia has actually helped the U.S.: for the first time 
since the invasion of Iraq, Russia has taken the mantle of “world’s 
least favorite” big nation from the U.S.
Global public attitudes towards Vladimir Putin himself as the 
leader who “would do the right thing in the world affairs” is even 
lower, ranging from 6% in Spain to 24% in Germany with a EU 
medium of 15% (21% in the USA). 
By 2016–2017, any ties to Russia, whether past or present, 
whether business partnerships, political affiliation, or just a personal 
acquaintance with a Russian state official is turning into nothing 
5 Russian image in the world, Pew Research Center, 5 August 2015, 
www.pewglobal.org/2015/08/05/russia-putin-held-in-low-regard-around-the-
world.
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anyone would want to boast about. To the public in Europe and 
Americans, these sorts of links could cost a moderate politician 
their reputation or even their career. Except for mostly far-right and 
far-left politicians, ties to Russia are proving to be a considerable 
downer for public approval, especially with the ongoing FBI and 
CIA investigations into links between the Russian government and 
Trump’s presidential campaign team.
Figure 1. Favorable views of Russia and U.S. in all parts of the world
Source: Pew Research Center Spring 2015 Global Attitude Survey, 23 June 2015, 
questions 12 a, d. 
Russia is guaranteed to maintain a low trust profile for the 
West for at least as long as Putin is in power, made worse the longer 
the Ukraine conflict remains unresolved, and if further reports of 
human rights abuses in Crimea (and across Russia, particularly 
Chechnya) continue to circulate. This is a far cry from the equal 
footing with the West that Putin and his entourage have been 
calling for over the last seventeen years. 
This “cold peace” with the West is pushing Russia under 
Putin to seek alternatives in Eurasia and East Asia.
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ILLUSIONS OF EURASIANISM 
In 2010, Russia was eager to promote a Russia-led integration 
project that mirrored the European Union. The idea was to create 
an alternative to European integration for the post-Soviet space. 
The EU’s Eastern Partnership had been launched a year before, and 
a number of ex-Soviet states were gravitating towards it, especially 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The Kremlin felt threatened by the 
Eastern Partnership, which excluded Russia and could potentially 
be seen as a step towards eventual EU and NATO membership for 
these countries in what Russia knows as its “near abroad.” 
By launching the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan (since 2015 the Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan), the Kremlin was 
hoping to prove that it was able to offer its own development path 
for these countries. After all, most in Moscow concluded, Russia had 
an advantageous position over the EU in this regard: its economic 
ties were far deeper in these countries.
Any Eurasian integration project, however, only made sense 
if Ukraine was involved. Without Ukraine, it would become purely 
a “Russia+Club” where Russia makes up 80% of the Eurasian 
Union’s population, 84% of its territory and 84.3% of its GDP. 
By comparison, Germany—the largest economy of the European 
Union (EU)—makes up only 16.3% of the EU’s population, 8.1% 
of its territory and 18.1% of its GDP.6 If Ukraine would have joined 
the Eurasian integration project, it would have been the second 
largest, raising its overall population from 183.7 million to 229.2, 
much closer to a critical mass for a viable trade zone in the same 
league as the EU.
When Russia annexed Crimea, though, it not only closed the 
question of whether Ukraine will ever join the Russia’s integration 
projects, it has effectively killed off any hopes that the Eurasian 
integration might ever work. Politically, Russia made irrelevant 
the hopes of its Eurasian Union allies, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
6 A. Barbashin, “To save the ‘Eurasian Dream’,” Intersection, 3 August 2016, 
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/save-eurasian-dream.
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to get integrated faster into the global economy. The attraction of 
Eurasianism for these two countries had been the hope of gaining 
better terms in trade deals with the rest of the world when done 
in tandem with Russia; but Russia’s trade isolation and economic 
ill-health after the Crimean annexation dashed these hopes. Both 
Minsk and Astana had to distance themselves from Moscow to 
some extent, mixing support for Russia and condemnation of 
the annexation of Crimea, depending on the audience they were 
addressing. Generally speaking, it made it much harder for Russia’s 
partners to remain Russia’s allies while continuing to pursue their 
relations with the West. To some extent, both Minsk and Astana 
have every right to be afraid of possible Russian meddling in their 
domestic affairs. Neither can count on any Western country making 
much effort to come to their defense. Both nations have authoritarian 
leaders that have ruled for over two decades; a political transition 
once their rule comes to an end might be a tricky process, especially 
given that Kazakhstan has 24% of ethnic Russians, mostly living 
in its northern part close to the Russian border, and Belarusian 
sovereignty is questioned by Russia even more than the sovereignty 
of Ukraine. 
Russia’s sanction “war” has de facto crippled the customs 
union within the Eurasian Union. When Russia introduced rounds 
of counter-sanctions or simply an embargo on several European 
goods, other members of the Union have not followed Russia. This 
has led to a number of high profile banned products showing up 
in Russia, after coming in via Belarus or Kazakhstan. Moreover 
when Belarus has introduced a 5 day visa-free regime (though with 
many limitatons) for 80 nations, including the entire EU, it led to 
Russia bringing back border checks on its Belarusian border that 
effectively termined proclaimed freedom of movement within the 
Eurasian Economic Union. 
Despite seven years of integration, Eurasian Union states 
share in Russia’s trade has only increased by 0.5% from 2010 to 
2016. The only aspect of integration that could be even remotely 
considered successful is customs regulation between countries, but 
this is the opposite of a desired outcome.
By annexing part of Ukraine, Putin has irreversibly taken 
away any meaningful opportunity to unite the post-Soviet space 
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within any form of Moscow-led integration project. The Eurasian 
Economic Union, like the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
might very well stay a feature of official rhetoric and protocol. 
In practice its bearing on regional politics looks set to diminish, 
bowing to more lucrative paths to development increasingly offered 
by China’s New Silk Road and the EU.
A PIVOT TO ASIA-PACIFIC THAT DID NOT HAPPEN
Since 2012, Russia has been attempting a “Pivot” to the Asia-Pacific 
region—a shift in foreign policy that should have balanced Russian 
trade and foreign relations, pulling them away from a perceived 
over-dependence on Europe. Russia was hoping not only to increase 
its presence on the Asian markets, especially when it comes to 
energy supplies, but to attract investments to the Far East and by 
“using our country’s transit potential to create new, shorter, more 
profitable routes that will link the Asia-Pacific and Europe.”7 The 
annexation of Crimea and consequent crisis in the relations with 
the West has only increased the incentives to push this eastward 
turn; data suggests, though, that its success has been marginal. 
Russia’s promise, however, to guarantee the transit between 
Europe and Asia-Pacific is a pure fiction: the Northern Sea Route 
that in 2012 was promised to deliver 64 million tons of cargo by 
2020 in 2015 accounted for only 39,000 tons of transported cargo, 
down from 274,000 in 2014, and 1.18 million in 2013. Russian 
Railways, which in 2015 proudly announced a 7-fold increase of 
Trans-Siberian cargo transit to 131,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent 
unit of cargo capacity) from 2009 to 2014, is dwarfed by only one 
Chinese sea port. The port of Shanghai exceeds the capacity of the 
biggest Russian transporter by almost 300 times, with an annual 
transport of 36.54 million tons of cargo.8 
7 Putin’s reply to a journalist after the APEC Leader’s Week, 9 September 2012, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16432.
8 A. Barbashin, “To save the ‘Eurasian Dream’,” Intersection, 3 August 2016, 
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-world/save-eurasian-dream.
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Russia’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, instead of addressing 
half the global economy, is only addressing China with Russia’s 
trade with China growing from 10.5% in 2013 to 14.1% in 2016, 
while trade with two other key trade partners in the region was far 
less impressive. Trade with South Korea increased by 0.2% over the 
same period, while trade with Japan actually decreased by 0.5%.
China does not guarantee even a fragment of investments that 
were pouring in from Europe into Russia. In 2012 China has invested 
in Russia $450 million, $597 million in 2013, then $1,27 billion in 
2014 and back down to $645 in 2015 and roughly $500 million in 
2016.9 Hardly is it comparable to pre-Crimean amounts of investment 
coming from the EU which in 2013 amounted to $38 billion. What is 
more curious is that in 2016 Chinese outgoing investment amounted 
to $170 billion, so only 0,3% were directed at Russia. Russia, to 
China, is still a peripheral interest for its economy.
Instead of substituting Europe with China, Russia increases 
its political commitment to Beijing, and Crimea has left it in 
a weaker bargaining position at the table. By focusing on China, it 
compromises its relations with other regional partners, especially 
Vietnam10 without getting any evident gains from what you could 
call a “China First” approach. The hope that China, during debates 
throughout 2014–2015 in Russia, would be a backstop for the 
Russian economy, have so far turned out to be woefully misplaced.
COUNTING IN DOMESTIC COSTS
Russia in 2017 is much worse off economically than it was in 
2014 before the annexation of Crimea. Russia’s GDP dropped from 
$2,232 trillion in 2013 to $1,331 trillion in 2016, GDP growth 
rate that in 2011 stood at 4.2% has gone down to 0.7% in 2014 to 
-3.7% in 2015 and is slightly above 0% now.11 The Reserve Fund 
9 Figures according to Central Bank of Russia, www.cbr.ru/statistics/?PrtId=svs.
10 M. Kaczmarski, “Russia in East Asia: Ambitions Fall Short of Reality,” 
Intersection, 16 April 2017, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-east-asia-
ambitions-fall-short-reality.
11 According to World Bank data: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=RU.
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that stood at $87 billion right before the annexation have been 
almost depleted and are leveling around $16 billion today12 and 
expected to be fully exhausted before the end of 2017. 
The economy is not collapsing. But it has been stagnating. 
Industrial production and manufacturing has been flat for the last 
three years. Retail—one of the main catalysts of Russia’s economy 
through much of Putin’s era has been subsequently weak for the 
last two years and today stands at just 75% of 2014 volumes.13 
Russia’s trade has suffered even more starkly. The overall volume 
of trade has halved from $844.2 billion in 2013 to $467.8 billion in 
2016.14 Still, we need to clarify that the ongoing economic stagnation 
is not all due to the sanctions and anti-sanctions that followed 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in the east of 
Ukraine. Russia’s economy has been slowing down since 2011 and 
the 2015 dip would have happened even without the introduced 
sanctions. Moreover the key component of this decline was the oil 
prices that have dropped from the average of around $110 per barrel 
of Brent in 2011–2014 to around $50 in 2017 with a low point of 
around $32–$35. This decline in oil prices has also caused the two-
fold devaluation of Russian national currency in late 2014. It is worth 
noting that such a high dependence on oil prices—the fundamental 
problem that Putin has been constantly promising to resolve, is as 
urging today as it was 5, 10 or 15 years ago, if not more. 
Despite a seemingly doomed state affairs in the Russian 
economy, as it was seen by various analyses in 2014–2015,15 the 
Kremlin maintains that all troubles are temporary and thus does 
not change its political course. Putin’s conviction that the economy 
does in fact endure is based on a few key figures. Russia’s foreign-
exchange reserves in March of 2017 remain at a comfortable 
12 According to Ministry of Finance of the RF, http://minfin.ru/ru/perfomance/
reservefund/statistics/volume.
13 According to data by the Rosstat: www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2017/info/oper-
02-2017.pdf.
14 According to data by the Russian Federal Customs Agency: www.customs.ru/
index.php?optioncom_newsfts&view=category&id=125&Itemid.
15 For example, P.R. Gregory, “A Russian Crisis with No End in Sight, Thanks 
to Low Oil Prices and Sanctions,” Forbes, 14 May 2015, www.forbes.com/sites/
paulroderickgregory/2015/05/14/a-russian-crisis-with-no-end-in-sight-thanks-to-
low-oil-prices-and-sanctions/#4797ccd211a5.
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$397 billion, which are of course down from $493 billion three years 
ago, but still hold a relatively safe volume. The foreign debt is down 
by $40 billion over the last three years from over $550 billion to little 
$510 billion (with state debt being very small—only $11 billion). 
According to official data inflation in 2016 stands at 5.3% down 
from 13% in 2015—though there are considerable concerns that 
there is a lot of manipulation with official data, especially when it 
comes to inflation. Even so, these are the numbers that Putin sees 
when he has economic reports sent to him by his assistants. 
This macroeconomic stability of stagnation—given an 
assumption oil prices will not collapse again to 2014 lows—
guarantees that if properly adjusted through budget cuts, sliding 
tax raises and basically squeezing of small and medium size 
business that Russian economy would not repeat the vertical drops 
similar to crises of 1998 or even 2008. What is perceived by most 
Western analysts like a depressive downwards outlook for Russia’s 
economy is perceived by the Kremlin as an inevitable price to pay 
for its status as great power that Russians have to accept and work 
through. (When asked in late 2014 about economic hardship by 
a journalist, Putin replied: “This is actually the price we have to 
pay for our natural aspiration to preserve ourselves as a nation, as 
a civilization, as a state.”16) Clearly today’s Russian leadership lacks 
the same economic rationale that has been the basis of Western 
political thinking over the last decades. Nevertheless, the numbers 
in this case are hard to argue against a clear failure in this regard.  
NO BACK PEDAL
Considering the rather depressing state of affairs in and around 
Russia, one might ask why Putin is not changing his policy 
orientation in order to revamp the economy and rebuild its 
relations with the West. The problem here is that despite the 
rational assessment that Crimea was a major policy mistake is self-
evident, for Putin it constitutes an already fundamental pillar of 
16 Annual Press conference of Vladimir Putin, 18 December 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47250.
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his legitimacy. Crimea has secured a long-standing high approval 
rating for Putin. Just as with previously in his career, every conflict 
with the West led to a rise of his popularity and a general trust 
in the government.17 Besides providing for overwhelming support 
and readiness to neglect certain social limitations, the effect of 
sanctions and economic stagnation by the population, it cemented 
its irreversibility. In the poll conducted by Levada Center and 
published in March 2017, the “return of Crimea” ended up being 
the second most important event in Russia’s history that Russians 
were proud of.18 In a sense, this newfound feeling of being a great 
power that compensates for a lack of economic success, or civic 
freedoms and a sense of future prospective, is both the problem 
and the solution for Putin. It helped him build the consensus 
that still stands after three years since annexation and will most 
likely guarantee his victory in the 2018 presidential elections. But 
it carries all the side effects mentioned in the previous chapters, 
clearly creating a number of concerns for the years to come. 
Putin has chosen to maintain power instead of addressing 
in a true manner any of the outstanding concerns: whether that is 
a faltering economy in need of diversification, or a costly foreign 
policy of war and isolation. Under existing political circumstances 
with Putin as a formal or informal leader, it would be practically 
impossible to reverse or even alter the status of Crimea in the 
Russian Federation. Thus, what could and should be considered 
a failure for Russia ends up being trumpeted (perhaps rightly, in 
a way) a relative personal success for Putin.
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17 O. Irisova, “The West through the eyes of Russians,” Intersection, 6 November 
2015, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/west-through-eyes-russians.
18 See Levada Center poll “Pride and Shame,” 1 March 2017, www.levada.ru/ 
2017/03/01/gordost-i-styd.
